Chapter 49

Investment Banking
Compliance

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Traditionally, insider trading and protection of confidential information has been the largest and most important compliance issue for persons involved in investment banking. Insider trading is the trading of a company’s securities by persons in possession of nonpublic information about that company. Insider trading can take place legally, such as when corporate insiders buy and sell securities in their own companies in compliance with the regulations governing such trading and their own internal company guidelines, and illegally, such as when corporate insiders with material nonpublic information use that information to make profits or avoid losses.¹

“Material information” has been defined by the U.S. Supreme Court as information where: (i) there is a “substantial likelihood” that a “reasonable investor” would consider the information important in making an investment decision; (ii) the disclosure of the

information would be “viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available”; or (iii) the disclosure of the information is “reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the market price of the security.”

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has described “nonpublic information” as information that has not been disseminated or made available to investors generally.

Sources of inside information include corporate officers or employees, corporate clients, corporate borrowers, non-corporate entities, such as government agencies, principal investments, corporate insiders, institutional investors, and research.

[B] Legal Framework

[B][1] Securities Exchange Act § 10(b)

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder prohibit the misuse of material nonpublic information in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Courts have interpreted section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to prohibit the purchase or sale of securities on the basis of material nonpublic information where there has been a breach of a duty to disclose such information or abstain from trading.

6. In addition to the classic case of insider trading, where a corporate insider trades in securities on the basis of material nonpublic information, liability under Rule 10b-5 can arise when information has been misappropriated. Misappropriation occurs when an outsider trades in violation of a duty of confidentiality and loyalty owed to someone else. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Rule 10b5-2 “provides a non-exclusive definition of circumstances in which a person has a duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the ‘misappropriation’ theory of insider trading.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2000). In United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), the Second Circuit declined to accept the theory that a defendant who receives

(Broker-Dealer Reg., Rel. #14, 9/18) 49–7
Rule 10b5-1, promulgated in 2000, provides affirmative defenses to violations of Rule 10b-5, including a provision that a broker-dealer or other entity may “demonstrate that a purchase or sale of securities is not ‘on the basis of’ material nonpublic information” if the person making the investment decision was not aware of the information, and the broker-dealer or other entity had implemented reasonable policies and procedures to ensure that investment decisions would not be based on such information. In the release accompanying the rule, the SEC noted that a broker-dealer could reduce the risk of trading desk awareness of material nonpublic information by “segregating its personnel and otherwise using information barriers so that the trader for the firm’s proprietary account is not made aware of the material nonpublic information.”

[B][2] Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act

In the 1984 Insider Trading Sanctions Act (ITSA), Congress gave the SEC more power to combat insider trading. In 1988, amid several insider trading scandals, Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA). Congress intended the act to “augment enforcement of the securities laws, particularly in the area of insider trading, through a variety of measures designed to provide greater deterrence, detection and punishment of violations . . . .”

information indirectly—a so-called “remote tippee”—need not know that the insider had disclosed material non-public information in exchange for a personal benefit (while the government petitioned for certiorari with respect to certain aspects of this decision, it did not do so on the question of whether a remote tippee has to know about the benefit conferred on the insider; the Supreme Court rejected the petition in any event). Because industry participants frequently receive information indirectly, the Newman decision has caused some institutions to consider whether their policies should define insider trading more narrowly such that trading is prohibited only when the recipient of information knows that it was disclosed in breach of duty and in exchange for a benefit. In fact, however, the Newman decision’s application in the context of investment banking compliance has thus far been limited, because investment banking compliance has traditionally ignored the question of whether the insider received a benefit.

7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(2) (2000).
ITSFEA created section 15(f) of the Exchange Act, renumbered as section 15(g) by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), which, for the first time, created an affirmative duty for broker-dealers to “establish, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed . . . to prevent the misuse . . . of material nonpublic information.”

Section 15(g) requires broker-dealers not only to implement information barriers to prevent the misuse of material nonpublic information, but also to regularly review and to vigorously enforce the barriers. ITSFEA expanded the enforcement power of the SEC by allowing it to seek sanctions against firms that fail to have adequate policies and procedures in place, even if no actual trading violations occur.

ITSFEA does not expressly outline the types of procedures necessary to avoid liability; however, the ITSFEA House Report cited some examples, including:

- restraining access to files likely to contain material nonpublic information;
- providing continuing education programs concerning insider trading regulations;
- restricting or monitoring trading in securities about which firm employees possess material nonpublic information; and
- diligently monitoring trading for firm or individual accounts.

Following the passage of ITSFEA, the SEC Division of Market Regulation (the “Division” [now the Division of Trading and Markets]) published a report in March 1990 of its review and analysis of broker-dealers’ information barrier policies and procedures. Although ITSFEA explicitly granted the SEC broad powers to mandate specific policies to be adopted by broker-dealers, the SEC provided some general observations regarding the elements of an adequate information barrier and concluded that the self-regulatory organizations

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14. For an example of a case in which the SEC brought charges under section 15(g) without identifying trading violations, see Litigation Release No. 20,551 [May 1, 2008] [announcing the filing and settlement of a civil complaint against Chanin Capital LLC for failure to establish, maintain, and enforce adequate procedures under section 15(g)].
were best equipped to test the adequacy of current broker-dealer policies and procedures and to formulate any required improvements or modifications. Throughout its report, the Division emphasized the need to tailor a firm’s policies and procedures to the nature of its businesses and the importance of a firm’s compliance department to the proper functioning of the firm’s information barriers. In June 1991, the NASD and the NYSE issued a Joint Memo on Chinese Wall Policies and Procedures, discussing the minimum elements necessary to create and maintain an adequate information barrier.

§ 49:1.2 Information Barriers

[A] Generally

Multi-service firms establish information barriers to restrict the flow of material nonpublic information between employees who regularly acquire or develop that type of information, such as investment bankers, and employees who buy, sell, or recommend the securities to which the information relates. Information barrier policies and procedures initially adopted by firms generally focused primarily on the control of material nonpublic information obtained by investment bankers in connection with corporate transaction and advisory assignments. However, there are other potential sources of material nonpublic information that require careful handling.

17. FINRA was formed in 2007 upon the merger of the NASD and certain divisions of the NYSE. The FINRA rulebook currently consists of both NASD rules and certain NYSE rules that FINRA has incorporated. For purposes of this outline, these rules will be referred to as NASD and NYSE rules, respectively, or where applicable FINRA rules. FINRA also has incorporated the interpretive guidance issued by the NASD and the NYSE related to NASD rules and the incorporated NYSE rules.


20. The legislative history of ITSA reveals strong support for the idea that effective information barriers can provide a defense to alleged insider trading violations. The then-Chairman of the SEC stated in a letter to Congress that “[i]t is . . . important to recognize that, under both existing law and the bill, a multiservice firm with an effective Chinese wall [or information barrier] would not be liable for trades effected on one side of the wall, notwithstanding inside information possessed by firm employees on the other side.” Letter from John S. R. Shad to Rep. Timothy E. Wirth (June 29, 1983), reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 98-355, at 28 n.52 [1983], reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2301 n.52.

21. For example, research departments’ knowledge of to-be-published research reports can constitute material nonpublic information.
Firms have flexibility to tailor information barriers, but the SEC and SROs have set certain minimum elements of an effective information barrier program.

**[B][1] Written Policies and Procedures**

Information barrier policies and procedures must be incorporated in a firm’s procedure and policy manuals and must restrict material nonpublic information to employees who have a “need to know” such information. These procedures include: policy statements, restrictions on access to records and support systems for sensitive departments, and supervision of all interdepartmental communications (“wall-crossing”) involving material nonpublic information. There is leeway to compartmentalize organizations within the firm (such as between the investment banking business and the sales/trading/research businesses), but it is still important to incorporate a “need to know” policy within organizations. Information can be subject to non-disclosure requirements even if it is confidential, but not material. As a result, some firms have imposed the “need to know” policy more broadly to apply to all types of confidential information.

**[B][2] Wall-Crossing Procedures**

Firms must have “wall-crossing” procedures designed to facilitate situations that require an employee to cross an information barrier. Wall-crossings must be controlled and monitored, preferably by the compliance departments, and must be specifically documented in writing and records must be retained.

**[B][3] Restricted List and Watch List**

The restricted list is a list of issuers whose securities or other financial instruments are subject to restrictions on sales, trading, or research activity. An issuer or security may be placed on the restricted list in order to reinforce a firm’s information barrier, to comply with trading practices and other rules, to avoid the potential appearance of impropriety, or to meet other compliance or regulatory objectives. When an issuer appears on the restricted list, certain sales, trading and research activities involving that issuer’s securities or other financial instruments may be restricted. Restricted activities may include: proprietary trading, including market-making; solicitation of client orders; the recommendation of the issuer’s securities; and transactions for any employee, associated person, or related account with respect to the related securities or financial instruments. The
restricted list is usually maintained by a firm’s compliance department, or by an institutional control room.

The watch list (sometimes called the “grey list”) is a confidential list of issuers or securities about which a firm may have received or may expect to receive material nonpublic information, or about which the firm expects a reason to monitor activities. The placement of an issuer or security on the watch list generally will not affect sales and trading activities, except by personnel who have access to material nonpublic information that may be the reason for the addition to the watch list. Trading in and research regarding watch-list securities or issuers are subject to surveillance by the firm’s compliance department. The contents of the watch list and any related restrictions that may be imposed by the legal or compliance department are extremely confidential, and access to the watch list is very limited.

Firms that conduct both investment banking and research or arbitrage activities must maintain some combination of restricted and watch lists, and should conduct regular reviews of trading in securities appearing on the lists. The SROs set forth specific minimum documentation standards concerning such lists, including records of the firm’s methods for conducting reviews of employee and proprietary trading, the firm’s procedures for determining whether trading restrictions will be implemented and the firm’s explanations of why, when, and how a security is placed on or deleted from a restricted or watch list. Further, the firm must adequately document how it monitors employee trading outside the firm of securities on the restricted or watch lists.

[B][4] Surveillance of Trading Activity

Firms must take reasonable steps to investigate any possible misuse of material nonpublic information, including any transactions in restricted or watch-list securities. Each investigation initiated must be documented, and should include the name of the security, the date the investigation began, an identification of the accounts involved, and a summary of the disposition of the investigation.

22. Even firms that do not conduct investment banking, research, or arbitrage activities must have documented procedures to review employee and proprietary trading for misuse of material nonpublic information. See 1990 SEC Market Reg. Report, supra note 16, at pt. III.

23. The NASD/NYSE Joint Memo further mandates documentation for the use of restricted lists and watch lists. First, the firm must develop reasonable written standards or criteria for placing a security on and deleting a security from such lists. Second, documentation must include the date and, for restricted lists, the time the security was added to or deleted from the list.
Information barriers must include arrangements for reasonable physical separation of public-side businesses (for example, sales and trading) from private-side businesses (for example, investment banking) that regularly receive confidential information. Information barriers must also consider secure separation of databases and systems used by private-side businesses.

Firms must establish and maintain reasonable training and education programs to ensure sufficient employee understanding of federal and state securities laws, SRO requirements, and the firm’s policies and procedures to prevent the misuse of material nonpublic information.

Firms must require each employee to sign an attestation, to be maintained in the firm’s files, of his or her knowledge of insider trading rules and regulations at least once during the course of employment. The SROs encourage firms to require employees in sensitive departments, such as investment banking, to sign an attestation on an annual basis.24

The SEC imposes restrictions on the ability of securities offering participants to communicate publicly about a securities offering when such an offering is contemplated or occurring. The restrictions generally apply to all forms of communications, including press releases, interviews, and social media. Violations, or “gun-jumping,” can result in offering delays, fines, or sanctions by the SEC. The SEC’s authority to restrict communications in this manner derives from section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”).25 The statute divides the offering period into three: the pre-filing period, the waiting period, and the post-effective period. Different types of communications are allowed during each period.

The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the “JOBS Act”) significantly eased the restrictions on offering communications by permitting


emerging growth companies (EGCs) to make “testing-the-waters” oral and written communications with potential investors that are qualified institutional buyers (QIBs), as defined in Rule 144A under the Securities Act, and other institutional accredited investors as defined in Rule 501 of the Securities Act. EGCs may test the waters before or after the filing of the registration statement, and may continue to test the waters during the waiting period. The JOBS Act also provides that the publication or distribution of research about an EGC that proposes to register an equity offering under the Securities Act or has a pending registration statement does not constitute an “offer” under the Securities Act.

While market sounding activities for non-EGC’s continue to be undertaken with great care (in the United States, only after a registration statement is on file) to avoid section 5 “gun-jumping” issues, the SEC has alleviated some of the previous concerns about whether market-sounding activity might run afoul of Rule 15c2-8(e) under the Exchange Act, which requires a broker-dealer to make available a preliminary prospectus (containing a price range) to each associated person that is expected to solicit customer orders prior to the effective date. In a JOBS Act FAQ, the SEC staff confirmed that market-sounding activities consisting of seeking non-binding indications of interest, including number of shares at various price ranges, should not, in the absence of other factors, violate Rule 15c2-8(e).26

§ 49:1.4 2012 OCIE Report on the Use of Material Nonpublic Information by Broker-Dealers

In September 2012, the SEC issued the OCIE MNPI Report on information barriers, based on observations by staff of the SEC, FINRA, and the NYSE Division of Market Regulation of broker-dealer programs to protect against misuse of material nonpublic information (MNPI).27 Examiners from the SEC examined six of the largest broker-dealers, and examiners from the NYSE and FINRA examined an additional thirteen broker-dealers. The Report does not restate the conclusions of the 1990 SEC Market Reg. Report, which it confirms remain generally appropriate. Instead, it summarizes findings on sources of MNPI, Control Structures and Controls at the firms examined and makes observations about potential areas of concern and possible avenues of improvement.

27. See OCIE MNPI Report, supra note 5.
[A] Sources of MNPI

The OCIE MNPI Report describes in detail the following sources of MNPI that were observed in the examinations:

- **Corporate Clients.** Broker-dealers obtain MNPI from traditional corporate clients through advisory work on M&A transactions, participating in capital markets transactions, in derivative sales functions as an adjunct to M&A and capital markets transactions, and in the credit function, in the process of reviewing and approving extensions of credit.

- **Corporate Borrowers.** Broker-dealers obtain MNPI from corporate borrowers in a number of ways, including acting as administrative agent, syndicate member, holder of loan interests, manager of a loan site, loan trading, and acting as a member of a bankruptcy committee.

- **Non-Corporates.** The Report suggests broker-dealers consider the extent to which nonpublic information obtained from government agencies may be MNPI. 28

- **Principal Investments.** Broker-dealers may obtain MNPI from companies in which they hold a significant principal investment.

- **Corporate Insiders.** Groups within a broker-dealer may obtain MNPI through contact with corporate insiders. The Report also mentions situations in which an employee of the broker-dealer serves as board member of another company.

- **Institutional Investors.** The Report suggests that information about trades or trading strategies of institutional customers may constitute MNPI.

- **Research.** The Report suggests that nonpublic information about views, including price targets, of research analysts associated with the broker-dealer may constitute MNPI.

28. See In the Matter of Marwood Grp. Research, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 76,512 [Nov. 24, 2015] (finding that Marwood failed to maintain procedures reasonably designed to prevent misuse of MNPI information obtained confidentially from the government and subsequently used in research reports and was considered to have a substantial risk of containing MNPI).
[B] Control Structure

[B][1] Issues Identified

The Report refers to a number of control structure issues that could raise concerns about inappropriate sharing of MNPI, including proximity of public and private-side trading groups, exceptions for special situations (for example, public-side desk “goes private” with respect to a specific security), and access without clearance (for example, “above the wall” classification for senior management).

[B][2] Control Room

The Report identifies control room practices that raised concerns, including, for example, reliance on the control room or bankers to determine when and whether to place matters on the watch list; absence of written guidance on when matters should go on the watch list; and absence of testing. The Report suggests there is a trend to more automated solutions that are integrated with new-matter intake systems.

[B][3] “Above the Wall” Designations

The Report notes that “above the wall” designations for certain persons and groups, such as senior managers, the research department, and syndicate group personnel, can create circumstances where select personnel have access to MNPI without the observance of rigid or comprehensive procedures. The Report recommends consideration of appropriate controls and surveillance for such persons.

[B][4] Materiality Determinations

The Report notes that matters are sometimes not put on the watch list due to a determination that the matter is not material. Concerns were raised about the failure to memorialize transactions deemed immaterial; failure to document the materiality assessment; and absence of mechanisms to reevaluate such a determination based on changed circumstances.

[B][5] Oversight of Non-Transactional Sources of MNPI

The Report stresses the need to consider the potential for receipt and misuse of MNPI outside the transactional context. It raises questions about whether such information should be forwarded to the control room, and suggests there is risk associated with relying on the self-reporting of public-side employees who received MNPI.
[B][6] Compliance with Oral Confidentiality Agreements

The Report notes with concern that deals governed by oral confidentiality agreements confirmed through emails, such as overnight deals, can lack MNPI protections, because in such cases the control group’s ability to conduct appropriate monitoring is diminished.

[B][7] Personal Trading Problems

The Report notes that some broker-dealers generally exempt employees’ managed accounts from the pre-clearance process. The Report expresses concern about firms’ that permit employees to use any external manager and do not conduct any scrutiny as to the ability of the employee to influence trading in the account. The Report also criticizes firms for their weak responses to employees’ repeated failures to obtain pre-clearance prior to personal trading.

[C] Access Controls

[C][1] Limiting Authorized Access

The Report stresses the need for controls around information sharing and wall-crossing. It expresses concern about undocumented informal discussions between private and public-side personnel. It also raises issues about controlling access to computerized document management systems and databases, even those that are limited to private-side employees (need-to-know basis).

[C][2] Preventing Unauthorized Access

The Report raises concerns regarding the absence of walls and/or restrictions of access to private-side support areas like information technology and operations.

[C][3] Other Control Issues

The Report discusses the need for controls over third-party sources of MNPI, like loan sites and virtual data rooms. It raises concerns about information received based on oral or informal confidentiality undertakings, and reliance on written policies and self-reporting in such situations. It also raises concerns about the quality of processes, documentation, and monitoring of access to MNPI by third parties (wall-crossings, market color, virtual data rooms, and loan sites set up for syndications).

[C][4] Surveillance

The Report suggests that broker-dealers should be enhancing the scope of surveillance to broaden traditional notions of where MNPI
might be misused. It suggests that surveillance programs should be expanded to detect patterns of behavior rather than just “point-in-time” violations, and identifies the need to properly document the resolution of surveillance matters.

[D] Controls Perceived to Be Effective

[D][1] Control Room Monitoring

The Report commends the use of independent checks, such as automatic (and automated) surveillance by and notices from conflicts systems, to ensure prompt notification of the potential of employees possessing MNPI.

[D][2] Information Barriers

The SEC staff also applauds the use of formal, documented processes for taking public-side employees over information barrier walls. In addition, the Report commends the use of controls around conversations between investment bankers and institutional investors, such as prequalification of the investor; advance submission of questions subject to discussion; mandatory participation by senior bankers; and the establishment of physical and technological barriers between departments that routinely have access to MNPI (for example, investment banking, credit and private equity, research covering corporate issuers, conflicts and control room, and printing and production).

[D][3] Surveillance

The Report commends the tailored and proportionate expansion of surveillance by broker-dealers with reference to the range of transactions and instruments being reviewed (for example, credit default swaps, total return swaps, warrants, and bond options).

[E] Conclusion

The Report emphasizes that broker-dealers should continually reassess both potential sources and uses of MNPI, and whether reasonable controls are in place. “Practices that are sufficient for a broker-dealer at one time may not adequately comply with its legal obligations at other times. Importantly, written and implemented controls that are deemed reasonable may likely vary among broker-dealers depending on factors such as size and business model.”

29. See OCIE MNPI Report, supra note 5.
§ 49:1.5 Selective Disclosure by Issuers: Regulation FD

Regulation FD requires all U.S. reporting companies to make a public announcement or filing with the SEC of any material nonpublic information they disclose on a non-confidential basis to certain persons outside the company, including securities market professionals and large money managers, as well as investors, where it is reasonably foreseeable that the investor would trade on the basis of the information.\(^{30}\)

Non-U.S. companies are exempted, but expected to conduct themselves in accordance with the basic principles underlying Regulation FD. The SEC has stated that it may extend the same or similar obligations to those issuers in the future. Non-U.S. companies should be aware that their disclosures remain subject to anti-fraud provisions, including insider trading prohibitions. Non-U.S. companies should also be aware of their obligation under NYSE or NASDAQ listing standards to make timely reports of material information.\(^{31}\) Selective disclosure may also implicate other regulatory regimes applicable to non-U.S. companies, such as the EU Market Abuse Regulations.

Investment banks need to be sensitive to a client’s obligation not to make selective disclosures and avoid situations that could lead to potential violations. Where violations occur, as with FCPA violations or certain other laws and regulations that are the subject of enforcement actions, cooperation with the SEC or the Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) will often be looked upon favorably by the enforcement agency and could prevent enforcement action.\(^ {32}\) Companies aware of violations should consider carefully the potential advantages of self-reporting violations [where that is not already mandated by applicable law] and discuss their options with outside counsel as appropriate.

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32. In 2013, the SEC chose to forgo prosecution of First Solar, Inc., a company that was involved in the Regulation FD violation because of its extraordinary cooperation with the investigation. First Solar had already cultivated an environment of compliance through the use of a disclosure committee that focused on compliance with Regulation FD. As a result, it immediately discovered the selective disclosure and promptly issued a press release the next morning before the market opened. The company also quickly self-reported the misconduct to the SEC and, concurrently with the SEC’s investigation, undertook remedial measures such as additional Regulation FD training for employees responsible for public disclosure. See SEC Press Release 2013-174, SEC Charges Former Vice President of Investor Relations with Violating Fair Disclosure Rules [Sept. 6, 2013], https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539799034.
§ 49:1.6 Practical Issues in Managing Confidential Information

Information barrier policies and procedures initially adopted by firms in response to section 15(g) focused primarily on the control of material nonpublic information obtained by investment bankers in connection with corporate transactions and advisory assignments. However, there are other potential sources of material nonpublic information that require careful handling, as discussed below.

[A] Expert Networks

Market participants sometimes access “expert network” firms to help market professionals and research analysts to better understand complex developments in specialized industry areas by giving them access to expert consultants. These interactions involve risks if the consultants have or have recently had access to material nonpublic information. Market participants should evaluate their policies and procedures in this area and evaluate situations in which expert consultants are used.

The SEC has brought a number of insider trading cases involving expert networks, charging employees of expert network firms, expert consultants and hedge fund portfolio managers and analysts.

Even with the appropriate assurances, use of experts who are employed by public companies (or private companies that service or supply them) may be problematic. It is important to consider that even where the expert is not employed by a public company, trouble can arise from using expert consultants who purport to have specific financial figures or other data from undisclosed sources. In addition, even where the ultimate source of the information provided by experts is unknown, receipt of and trading on that information may be scrutinized. It is frequently difficult to determine whether the information obtained from experts will be considered to have been provided in breach of a duty.

Another category of experts that has more recently been the focus of authorities is so-called “political intelligence” consultants. These are individuals or firms that purport to have insights into political processes, whether based on interactions with legislators, their staff, or executive agencies. In 2012, Congress passed the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act (the “STOCK Act”), designed to address insider trading by prohibiting the use of nonpublic information for private gain by members of Congress and other government employees. The STOCK Act, for the first time, formally made clear that members of the government were not to use their inside knowledge for personal gain. To date, the only investigation of a potential STOCK Act violation made public was in 2013 and involved a former staff
director for the House Ways and Means Committee who allegedly had leaked information about Medicare reimbursement rates to Height Securities, a political intelligence firm, which then divulged it to several Wall Street firms. While the SEC and the House reached an undisclosed settlement in the case, the investigation highlighted the SEC’s willingness to look at government officials in insider trading cases.

Beyond the STOCK Act, enforcement authorities have taken steps to curb insider trading in this area in recent years. In 2011, the SEC charged an FDA chemist with illegally trading in advance of at least twenty-seven public announcements about FDA drug approval decisions involving nineteen publicly traded companies. The defendant was also charged in parallel criminal proceedings; he pleaded guilty to one count of securities fraud and one count of making false statements, and was eventually sentenced to five years in prison.

More recently, in 2017, the SEC and DOJ, in parallel actions, charged two hedge fund analysts with trading on material nonpublic information related to rulemaking decisions of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The analysts were alleged to have received this information from a political intelligence consultant, who had in turn received it from a CMS employee. While CMS, like many government agencies, often made efforts to engage with the public and industry interest groups, the SEC and DOJ took the position that much of the information related to those rules was nevertheless both material and nonpublic. At trial in the criminal action, the government introduced evidence concerning the vetting process of the political intelligence consultant’s firm, highlighting, among other things, the failure of the hedge fund to follow its own due diligence processes and the consulting firm’s inexperienced compliance officer. The government also focused on the structure of the consultant’s compensation, which was tied to the success of the investments tied to his information. The hedge fund analysts were convicted of various charges, including securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud.

Given the government’s focus in this area, significant caution is required around obtaining and using government information, even with respect to issues as to which the government has an obligation to be open and transparent with the public. When using a political

34. United States v. Cheng Yi Liang, No. 11 Cr. 530 (DKC) [D. Md. 2011].
35. SEC v. Blaszczak et al., No. 17 Civ. 3919 (AJN) [S.D.N.Y. 2017]; United States v. David Blaszczak, No. 17 Cr. 357 (LAK) [S.D.N.Y. 2017].
intelligence consultant, firms should perform appropriate due diligence on the consultant, the consultant’s sources, and the consultant’s own compliance policies, procedures, and resources. Finally, fee or bonus structures that tie a consultant’s compensation to the performance of trades based on the consultant’s information may be viewed as creating inappropriate incentives to obtain unique information.

[B] Hedge Fund Interaction—Market-Sounding

As with any discussions with public-side persons, investment bankers need to be vigilant when interacting with hedge funds that trade public securities. The various ways in which investment bankers may interact with hedge funds include: (i) “testing the waters” with respect to a possible issuance of securities,\(^\text{36}\) (ii) investment in private equity and private placements of securities, and (iii) communications with hedge funds seeking a better understanding of the current state and future direction of an industry or market.

Ordinarily, trading clients talk to public-side traders to get a sense of the market. However, on occasion, a hedge fund may reach out to investment bankers in order to gain a better understanding of the current state and future direction of an industry or market.

[C] Hedge Fund Access to Corporate Executives

Increasing attention has been called to the potentially market-moving nature of information shared in meetings and calls between hedge funds and corporate executives.\(^\text{37}\) In many cases, such meetings have been facilitated by investment bankers whose firms have trading relationships with hedge funds as well as have extensive client relationships with public companies. Because these meetings have the potential of violating Regulation FD or applicable insider trading laws, investment banks should evaluate their policies and procedures relating to facilitating these meetings and for banker participation.

\(^{36}\) Securities Act § 5(d), adopted in the JOBS Act, provides that an emerging growth company, as defined in the act, or any person authorized to act on its behalf may engage in oral or written communications with potential investors that are qualified institutional buyers (as defined in Rule 144A under the Securities Act) or institutional accredited investors (as defined in Rule 501 under the Securities Act), for the purpose of determining interest in the offering, either prior to or following the date of filing of a registration statement. In the past, these “market-sounding” activities were undertaken with great care (in the United States only after a registration statement was on file), to avoid running afoul of section 5 “gun-jumping” issues. The JOBS Act has removed the section 5 concerns for testing the waters activities that comply with the foregoing requirements. This is used in IPOs; follow-on offers would require Regulation FD compliance.

In January 2012, the U.K. Financial Services Authority (FSA) imposed a financial penalty of £3,638,000 on the president of a hedge fund, for engaging in market abuse in breach of insider information laws. The fine related to trading of shares and contracts for difference in Punch Taverns plc in June 2009. The fund was invited to be a wall-crossed participant in an equity offering contemplated by a public company. Subsequently, a corporate broker arranged a meeting between the company and the hedge fund president on a non-wall-crossed basis. Immediately after the call, hedge fund traders reduced the firm’s position in the company’s shares pursuant to the president’s instructions. When the company announced its transaction, its shares fell by 29.9%, and the hedge fund avoided a loss of approximately £5.8 million. The FSA alleged that during the call, which was expressly set up on a non-wall-crossed basis, the president received inside information that the company was at an advanced stage of the process toward the issuance of a significant amount of new equity in order to repay a convertible bond and create headroom under financial covenants. According to the FSA, it should have been apparent that the information was confidential and price-sensitive, and gave rise to legal and regulatory risk. The FSA concluded that the hedge fund president committed an error in judgment in deciding to sell shares without first seeking compliance or legal advice.

The FSA brought a separate action against a trader at the hedge fund’s UK entity who also served as money-laundering and compliance officer. The FSA found that the trader failed to question and make reasonable inquiries prior to effecting the sale of the company’s shares, even though he was told that the decision to sell was made after a meeting with company’s management and that negative information would have been received if the hedge fund had been wall-crossed. The FSA also faulted him for not following up after the announcement, which they said should have alerted him to the risk of market abuse. The trader was fined £130,000 and banned from performing anti-money-laundering and compliance functions.

The FSA also brought a separate action against a trading desk director at an investment bank, who was instructed to execute sales on behalf of the hedge fund. He was fined £68,000 for failing to recognize and alert the compliance department that there were reasonable

grounds, following the announcement of the transaction, to suspect that the sales constituted insider trading or market abuse.  

[D] Research Content As MNPI

In 2012, the SEC brought charges against a broker-dealer under section 15(b) of the Exchange Act out of concern that its weekly “huddles” of traders created a risk of sharing material nonpublic information in violation of section 15(g).  

"Huddles" were a practice in which the broker-dealer’s equity research analysts met to provide their best trading ideas to firm traders and a select group of top clients. Analysts’ contributions to huddles and calls with top clients were discussed in performance reviews and in connection with analyst evaluations. The SEC charged that the broker-dealer did not establish, maintain, and enforce adequate policies and procedures to prevent any misuse of material nonpublic information concerning its published research. The broker-dealer agreed to settle the charges and pay a $22 million penalty. It also agreed to be censured, to be subject to a cease-and-desist order, and to review and revise its written policies and procedures to correct the deficiencies identified by the SEC. The broker-dealer also entered into a settlement with FINRA for supervisory and other failures related to the huddles.

In 2013, the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts entered a consent order against a broker-dealer for the provision by a research analyst of confidential nonpublic information to hedge fund and institutional clients prior to publication in a research report. The broker-dealer subsequently entered into a settlement with the Massachusetts Securities Division. Without admitting or denying liability, the broker-dealer agreed to (1) pay a civil penalty of $30 million; (2) conduct a review of, and revise as necessary, policies and procedures applicable to the research department; (3) establish a mandatory training program for research analysts; and (4) make annual certifications regarding compliance with the consent order for a period of three years.

[E] Use of Confidentiality Agreements

While confidentiality agreements can provide a secure method by which investment bankers can disclose material nonpublic information, these agreements must be carefully constructed and contain explicit language concerning duties and expectations.

40. Id.
SEC v. Cuban, an insider trading case from 2009, specifically addressed the provisions of a confidentiality agreement and whether it explicitly or implicitly imposed a duty not to disclose material nonpublic information, and a duty not to trade on or otherwise use this information. The SEC alleged that the actions of Mark Cuban constituted insider trading after he sold shares of the company in which he owned a minority stake upon learning of a planned stock offering from the CEO. Cuban’s quick trade saved him more than $750,000 in losses. The district court granted Cuban’s motion to dismiss, finding that while the SEC alleged that Cuban had entered into an agreement not to disclose the information, it did not allege that he had expressly or implicitly agreed not to use the information. However, the district court’s decision to dismiss has since been vacated on appeal. The Fifth Circuit noted that it was plausible that each of the parties understood, if only implicitly, that Cuban was being provided the terms and conditions of the offering solely for the purposes of evaluating whether he would participate in the offering, and that Cuban could not use the information for his own personal benefit. The matter was tried in the district court in 2013, and a federal jury found Cuban not guilty.

The SEC staff’s position on trading while in possession of this kind of information has not changed as a result of the case.

§ 49:1.7  Personal Trading Procedures

A critical issue facing investment banking compliance is the protection of material nonpublic information—particularly with respect to forthcoming transactions—that is in the possession of the investment bank. All investment banks are expected to maintain policies and procedures reasonably designed to protect the firm’s MNPI. Insider trading procedures should encompass the following measures:

- *Education.* The training of both banking and compliance personnel is an integral part of any program seeking to ensure the protection of MNPI. Training should include an explanation of what constitutes nonpublic information, the determinants of materiality, and the “disclosure or staleness” standards for the resumption of trading. Training will also generally sensitize personnel to the operation of the specific firm’s “watch” and/or “restricted” lists.

44. SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).
• **Control of information.** Procedures should specify (a) the names in which the receipt of MNPI is identified (or controlled) and brought to the attention of senior banking and/or compliance personnel; (b) how MNPI is recorded; and (c) how “watch” and “restricted” procedures operate to establish appropriate walls, and/or prohibitions on trading or other activity due to the possession of the MNPI.

• **Pre-Clearance of Trading and Trade Monitoring.** The requirement of all personnel to pre-clear personal trading on a trade-by-trade basis, or the exceptions from such a requirement, should be addressed. Policies should address initial and annual certification of personal holdings, accounts, and compliance, and reporting of all personal trades inside or outside of the firm.

• **Conflict Mitigation and Fraud Detection Procedures.** Procedures that are reasonably designed to mitigate possible conflicts or the appearance of conflicts with client transactions, manipulation, fraud, insider trading, or other violations of the federal securities laws, and the review of trading inside and outside the firm by covered personnel to detect the same.

• **Recordkeeping.** Records that are sufficient to permit the firm to test, audit, and demonstrate compliance with applicable law and regulation.

• **Protection of Electronic Systems and Records.** Cybersecurity has become a core aspect of investment banks’ protection of MNPI. Cybersecurity is reviewed below at section 49:12.

§ 49:2 Conflicts and Related Disclosures

§ 49:2.1 Dealing with M&A Transaction Conflicts

[A] Generally

In M&A transactions, investment bankers are likely to face a variety of potential conflicts in which their interests diverge from those of their clients. For example, an investment banker hired to explore strategic alternatives might have worked with potential bidders on prior matters or might have personal ties with those companies’ employees; the banker or his or her firm might be invested in certain bidders or value those companies as lucrative clients; and, perhaps even often, a banker will view one strategy as requiring significantly more of his or her services than would another.

Courts are acutely aware of these conflicts and have in recent years dealt with them severely. These legal developments create a high
degree of litigation risk over even conflicts that unsuspecting industry participants might consider minor.

The approaches that multi-service investment banks use to avoid and mitigate their conflicts include:

(i) conflict identification;
(ii) engagement letters;
(iii) disclosure and consent;
(iv) engaging co-advisors and co-financers; and
(v) developing standards for frequent areas of conflict.

[A][1] Conflict Identification

Firms have become increasingly focused on identifying sources of potential conflict. In a widely circulated report, Goldman Sachs noted that conflicts may arise from representing clients in particular roles, from representing other clients, and from the firm’s own proprietary interests.

[A][2] Engagement Letters

Investment banks often use engagement letters to mitigate their conflicts. These documents are provided to clients upon the start of each new project and they outline the scope of the services to be rendered; importantly, they can also be used to specifically address the firm’s potential conflicts and the firm’s related ability to take on additional roles in the transaction.

[A][3] Disclosure and Consent

Fairness opinions must include disclosures of all material relationships. Securities offerings or proxy solicitations should also contain robust conflicts disclosures.

[A][4] Co-Advisors and Co-Financers

A company may retain an independent co-advisor early in the M&A transaction to cure otherwise litigable advisor conflicts. Retaining a co-advisor may allow directors to rely on the company’s conflicted primary advisor’s M&A services without appearing to violate their duty of care.

[A][5] Standards for Frequent Areas of Conflict

Firms often develop standard policies and procedures for dealing with the types of conflicts that they most frequently encounter. These standards help firms decide if existing conflicts prevent them from rendering services such as fairness opinions.

[B] Stapled Financing

In a sell-side process, the seller sometimes offers an acquisition financing package to all potential buyers competing in the auction process ("stapled financing"). The financing is usually arranged by the same investment bank that is serving as the seller’s financial advisor. The investment bank participating in this arrangement therefore earns fees from both sides of the transaction—M&A advisory fees from the seller, and fees for commitment letters, bridge loans, and underwriting services from the buyer. Fees for financing often significantly exceed total fees of the investment bank for the M&A assignment. Consequently, there is a potential conflict of interest for the investment bank that acts on both sides of the transaction: it is in the investment bank’s financial interest to recommend a buyer that has committed itself to the stapled financing package, even if there are higher bids.

[C] Delaware Chancery Court Cases

Beginning in 2005, the Delaware Chancery Court has addressed issues relating to the conflicts of interest associated with stapled financing.

In the 2005 Toys "R" Us stapled financing case, In re Toys "R" Us, Inc., S’holder Litig., Consol. No. 1212-N [Del. Ch. June 24, 2005], the Delaware Chancery Court recognized that stapled financing may be consistent with the best interests of the target company (that is, the sell-side) by inducing more bidders to take the risk of an acquisition. Nevertheless, the court’s opinion advised "investment banks representing sellers not [to] create the appearance that they desire buy side work, especially when it might be that they are more likely to be selected by some buyers for that lucrative role than by others." In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holder Litig., Consol. No. 6027-VCL [Del. Ch. June 27, 2011]. See also In re El Paso S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432 [Del. Ch. 2012].
private equity–led sponsor group. The injunction was based on the directors’ breach of their fiduciary duties, which in the court’s view was caused by tainted financial advice based on the advisor’s conflict of interest related to its financing of the buy side. The advisor’s conflict was further exacerbated by its various other acts and omissions.

In the Rural/Metro case, the Delaware Chancery Court found the financial advisor liable for aiding and abetting the board of director’s fiduciary breach in connection with the company’s sale to a private equity firm. The adviser was held liable even though the board members were not, as a result of statutory exculpation. The court found that despite the involvement of a co-advisory firm and the execution of an engagement letter, the financial advisor was motivated by a substantial and undisclosed conflict of interest arising out of a desire to provide buy-side financing. The court also held that a general acknowledgment in the engagement letter regarding the extension of acquisition financing by the financial advisor did not insulate it from liability.

In the Zale case, however, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of an aiding and abetting claim against a financial advisor, finding that the advisor’s conflict had been cured by the informed votes of the board of directors and the disinterested shareholders. Dismissing the claim against the advisor meant that the transaction was fully covered by the business judgment rule. The court noted that its finding would be different in the presence of bad faith or disloyalty.

**[D] Best Practices in Dealing with M&A Transaction Conflicts**

Actual or potential conflicts should, in appropriate situations, be disclosed to shareholders because such conflicts will be material to the shareholders’ decision about whether to approve the transaction. A great level of detail may need to be included regarding such conflicts. Conflicts are also linked to fairness opinions, because investors cannot have any confidence in a fairness opinion unless conflicts or perverse incentives that may affect the investment bank or other financial institutions are properly and fully disclosed.

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49. \*In re Rural/Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., Consol. No. 6350-VCL (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 2014)\*

§ 49:2.2 Fairness Opinions

FINRA Rule 5150 requires FINRA members who issue fairness opinions that are included in a proxy statement to disclose in the opinion any material relationships with the companies involved in the transaction (for example, offering stapled financing).

FINRA Rule 5150 also requires disclosure of the following:

- whether the advisor is being compensated with success fees;
- whether a “material relationship” has existed between the investment bank and any of the parties to the transaction within the previous two years or whether the investment bank anticipates developing such a “material relationship”;  
- whether the company supplied the investment bank with information constituting a “substantial basis” for the fairness opinion and whether the bank independently verified the accuracy of such information; and
- whether the investment bank’s fairness committee approved of or issued the fairness opinion.

FINRA Rule 5150 also requires certain procedures be implemented:

- the investment bank must develop and adhere to procedures for choosing members of its fairness committee;
- these procedures must be reviewed from time to time, and the bank must periodically review its selection of members for the committee;
- the committee must have oversight into the methodology and analysis used in determining the fairness of each particular transaction about which the bank opines; and
- the committee must assess the possibility that compensation to the company’s officers and directors, relative to shareholder rewards, influenced the bank’s fairness opinion.

Delaware law also imposes an obligation for directors to provide shareholders with a “fair summary” of the analysis underlying fairness opinions. 51 Increasingly, appropriate disclosure of conflicts has been highlighted as a key element of disclosure relating to fairness opinions,

including disclosure related to fees, buy-side relationships and contacts, and even potential buy-side business. In the Atheros case,\(^\text{52}\) the Delaware Chancery Court granted a preliminary injunction preventing the target’s board of directors from proceeding with a vote to approve a sale of the company to a strategic partner. The injunction was based on the inadequate disclosure by the board of the financial advisor’s fee, which was largely contingent on closing of the contemplated transaction.

\section*{§ 49:2.3 FINRA Guidelines on Conflicts in Product Development and Distribution}

FINRA has issued guidelines relating to conflicts in the product development and distribution process.\(^\text{53}\) These do not constitute comprehensive guidance, and are instead designed to focus on three particular areas: (i) enterprise-level frameworks to identify and manage conflicts of interest; (ii) approaches to handling conflicts of interest in manufacturing and distributing new financial products; and (iii) approaches to compensating their associated persons, particularly those acting as brokers for private clients.\(^\text{54}\)

[A] Enterprise-Level Frameworks to Identify and Manage Conflicts of Interest

The guidelines emphasize that a satisfactory conflicts management framework requires firm oversight from top leadership. In the FINRA Conflicts Report, FINRA describes an expectation that senior leadership will define how particular conflicts can arise in the context of their particular business, and instruct and train employees on their roles and responsibilities in identifying and managing conflicts. Senior leadership must also establish an effective code of conduct.

The FINRA Conflicts Report suggests that severe conflicts should be avoided, and significant conflict issues should be reported, if and as applicable, to the firm’s clients, to the CEO, and to the board under appropriate circumstances. As a best practice, a firm’s conflicts should also be inventoried on a periodic basis.

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54. \textit{Id.} at 1.
[B] Conflicts of Interest in the Manufacture and Distribution of New Financial Products

Firms should establish a review process for new products that is designed to identify conflicts, and then take steps to disclose those conflicts in plain English so that customers—particularly retail customers—can understand them.

The FINRA Conflicts Report notes that “know your distributor” policies and procedures can reduce incentives to utilize distribution channels which may be associated with conflicts. In particular, FINRA notes concerns regarding the preference of proprietary products in the retail setting; in addition to conflicts that arise with respect to suitability, efforts to integrate distributors into the sales process can raise them to the level of “co-manufacturer” which could lead to additional conflicts.55 Firms should consider declining to offer new products where associated conflicts are too significant to be effectively managed.

[C] Compensation of Associated Persons

The FINRA Conflicts Report points out that compensation can be a source of conflicts. Use of “product agnostic” compensation grids can reduce incentives that could lead to conflicts. Other approaches to reducing conflicts in respect of compensation can include (i) linking surveillance of registered representatives’ recommendations to thresholds in a firm’s compensation structure, and (ii) setting a cap on the credit a registered representative may receive for a comparable product across providers.56

[D] Conclusion

The FINRA guidelines suggest best practices, and emphasize that there is no one-size-fits-all approach. Firms must tailor their conflicts management framework to their particular circumstances.

§ 49:3 Offering Issues

§ 49:3.1 Rule 506(c)

Under the Securities Act, offers to sell securities must either be registered under the Securities Act or meet an exemption from registration.57 One exemption from registration is the safe harbor found at Rule 506 of Regulation D, which exempts an offering, provided that the offering meets certain conditions. Regulation D was amended in 2013

55. Id. at 25.
56. Id. at 4.
with the addition of Rule 506(c), pursuant to the JOBS Act, to allow general solicitation of investors under certain circumstances.

Under Rule 506(c) of Regulation D, an offering that is made only to accredited investors and that is otherwise qualified under Regulation D may make use of general solicitation and advertising, so long as the issuer takes “reasonable steps” to verify that all purchases of securities are made by accredited investors or by purchasers reasonably believed by the issuer to be accredited investors at the time of the sale. Rule 506(c) took effect on September 23, 2013.

To rely on the exemption provided by Rule 506(c), issuers are required to take reasonable steps to verify that all purchases of securities are made by accredited investors or by purchasers reasonably believed by the issuer to be accredited investors at the time of the sale. While these reasonable steps were not specified in the rule, the SEC adopting release\(^{58}\) suggests some factors that should be carefully considered, including the nature of the purchaser, information about the purchaser, publicly available information in regulatory filings, third-party information that is reasonably reliable, verification of investor status, the nature of the offering, and the terms of the offering. The SEC also clarified that what is “reasonable” is an objective assessment depends on the particular facts and circumstances.\(^ {59}\)

Offerings conducted under Rule 506(c) are not considered to be public offerings, so hedge funds, private equity funds, and other similar private funds may use general solicitation in connection with the offering and remain within exemptions from registration under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Investment Company Act”) that generally bar public offerings of securities by such funds.

\section*{§ 49:3.2 Rule 506(d)}

The JOBS Act amendments to Regulation D also included the addition of new Rule 506(d). The purpose of Rule 506(d) is to disqualify securities offerings involving felons and other “bad actors” from reliance on the safe harbor exemption from registration provided by Regulation D.\(^ {60}\) The rule applies to offerings under Rule 506(b) and (c) and delineates “covered” persons. If any of these covered persons

\begin{footnotes}
59. \textit{Id}.
\end{footnotes}
commit designated “disqualifying events” (as defined below), then Rule 506(d) operates to remove the offering from the safe harbor. Some of the disqualifying events have five-year lookbacks, and the criminal conviction lookback is ten years.

Covered persons include:

- issuer or affiliates that issue securities in the same offering,
- directors of the issuer,
- executive officers of the issuer,
- general partners and managing members of the issuer,
- any beneficial owner of 20% or more of the issuer’s outstanding voting equity,
- promoters connected with the issuer at time of sale (as defined in Rule 405),
- any person being paid, directly or indirectly, for soliciting purchasers in the offering; and
- investment managers of issuers that are pooled investment funds.

Disqualifying events include: 61

- criminal convictions in connection with securities/SEC regulations or requirements;
- court injunctions or restraining orders preventing or restraining covered persons from engaging in securities trading or conduct;
- final orders of regulators in the context of securities trading or practice;
- SEC disciplinary orders under specified provisions of the securities laws;
- SEC cease-and-desist orders;
- SEC stop orders; and
- U.S. Postal Service False Representation Orders.

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61. Disqualification under Rule 506(d) is not triggered by actions taken in jurisdictions other than the United States, nor is it triggered by cease-and-desist orders for violations of “non-scienter”-based provisions of the federal securities laws. See Compliance as Disclosure Interpretations 260.20 and 260.21 (Dec. 4, 2013).
§ 49:3.3 Regulation M

Regulation M, promulgated under the Exchange Act, consists of six rules, described below, that prevent persons with a financial interest in a securities offering from taking certain actions that could manipulate the market for the securities being offered. The regulation applies to activities by issuers, selling security holders, underwriters, and other distribution participants and affiliated purchasers. Definitions applicable to the regulation are set forth in Rule 100.

Rules 101 and 102 make it unlawful for distribution participants and issuers, or their affiliated purchasers, to directly or indirectly bid for, purchase, or attempt to induce any person to bid for or purchase, a covered security during the applicable restricted periods. Thus, the basic prohibition under Regulation M: a transaction participant cannot be distributing an offering, while buying at the same time.

There are many exceptions to this general rule for both securities and activities, but it is important to note that the scope of the exception is different under each rule. For example, Rule 101, applicable to underwriters, has an exception for actively traded securities, but the corresponding exception in Rule 102 only covers actively traded “reference securities.” Under both rules, some types of debt securities are exempt. Rule 102 has fewer activities exceptions than Rule 101. Some of these exceptions include research, unsolicited transactions, and redemptions by commodity pools or limited partnerships.

Rule 103 governs passive market making activities for NASDAQ listed securities. Rule 103 sets forth explicit criteria that must be followed, including pricing limitations, purchasing capacity, limitations on the size of bid that the broker-dealer is allowed to display, designation of bids, regulatory notification, and prospectus disclosure.

Rule 104 relates to stabilization activities. Rule 104 generally makes it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to stabilize, to effect any syndicate covering transaction, or to impose a penalty bid, in connection with an offering of any security, except in accordance with the rule. The rule applies to all offerings, not just to “distributions” (that is, the rule applies even to offerings smaller than a “distribution”). It is designed to generally prevent stabilizing activities except for those done in order to try to prevent or mitigate a decline in market price of a security. The rule also imposes disclosure and recordkeeping requirements in connection with Rule 104 activities. There are some exceptions to Rule 104, including but not limited to:

- Rule 144A/Regulation S transactions;
- distributions of exempted securities as defined in section 3(a)(12) of the Exchange Act; and
- stabilization activities occurring outside the United States.
Rule 105, which is an anti-manipulation rule that is qualitatively different from other provisions of Regulation M, includes short sale restrictions that generally prohibit any person who sells short a security that is the subject of a registered offering from purchasing the offered securities from an underwriter or broker or dealer participating in the offering if the short sale was effected during a restricted time frame prior to the pricing of the security, as described by Rule 105. The Rule does not apply to offerings of nonconvertible debt securities, offerings that are not registered under the Securities Act, and best efforts offerings. In addition, there are some exceptions, including for purchases by investment companies.

§ 49:3.4 Section 10b-5 Due Diligence Defense

[A] Background

Section 11(a) of the Securities Act provides that parties involved in a registered public offering, including issuers and underwriters, may be held liable if the registration statement contains “an untrue statement of material fact” or omits “to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.” Section 11(b) provides a defense, known as the “due diligence” defense, for underwriters and other persons (other than the issuer) who conduct a “reasonable investigation.”

[B] When a “Reasonable Investigation” Is Required

Under section 11(b)(3)(A), for portions of a registration statement provided on the authority of an “expert,” a reasonable ground for belief need not be based on a reasonable investigation. Instead, a non-expert defendant must only show that it had no reasonable ground to believe, and must not have believed, that the expertized statements were untrue or that there were any omissions. Courts have established that it is insufficient for underwriters to blindly rely on the opinions of experts. Although the Securities Act does not require an “investigation” for expertized portions of the registration statements, underwriters remain under a duty to inquire whenever they discover “red flags” in expertized statements.62

For all other portions of the registration statement, non-expert defendants must have had, after reasonable investigation, a reasonable ground to believe and a belief in fact that the statements made in the registration statement at the time it became effective were true and that there were no material omissions of facts required to make the statements made in the registration statement not misleading. Courts

have held that the receipt of a “comfort letter” from the company’s independent public accountants does not in and of itself constitute a reasonable investigation of unaudited financial statements.63

[C] The Legal Standard for “Reasonable Investigation”

When a reasonable investigation is required, the defendants must have made a “reasonable attempt” to independently verify the information provided to them by the company and in the offering documents. The extent of such verification is “a matter of judgment in each case.”64 Courts have held that a reasonable investigation is required to assert a due diligence defense, even if it is found that the fraud would not have been discovered with reasonable investigation.65

Section 11(c) defines the standard of reasonableness underlying the requirements for a reasonable investigation and a reasonable belief as that required of “a prudent man in the management of his own property.” Specifically, Rule 176 under the Securities Act sets forth relevant circumstances in considering whether or not the standard of reasonableness has been met. These include:

- the type of issuer;
- the type of security;
- the type of person;
- the office held when the person is an officer;
- the presence or absence of another relationship to the issuer when the person is a director or proposed director;
- reasonable reliance on officers, employees, and others whose duties should have given them knowledge of the particular facts;
- when the person is an underwriter, the type of underwriting arrangement, the role of the particular person as an underwriter and the availability of information with respect to the registrant; and
- whether, with respect to a fact or document incorporated by reference, the particular person had any responsibility for the fact or document at the time of the filing from which it was incorporated."

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63. See id.
§ 49:4 Volcker Rule

The Volcker Rule was enacted in 2010 as part of the Dodd-Frank Act. It is set forth as section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. Six federal regulatory agencies are responsible for administering the Volcker Rule, and these agencies issued regulations (the “VR Regulation”) in December 2013 to implement the Volcker Rule.

In general, the Volcker Rule broadly prohibits banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading and from making investments in, and having certain other relationships with, certain private investment funds, in each case subject to various exemptions, exceptions, conditions, and requirements.

Under the VR Regulation, “banking entities” are broadly defined to include (1) any insured depository institution; (2) any company that controls an insured depository institution; (3) any bank headquartered outside the United States that is treated as a bank holding company under the International Banking Act of 1978 (that is, because it operates a branch or agency office in the United States); and (4) any subsidiary or affiliate of any of these entities. However, under the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act enacted on May 24, 2018, insured depository institutions and companies that control them that have less than $10 billion in consolidated assets are no longer considered banking entities.

§ 49:4.1 Prohibition on Proprietary Trading

The Volcker Rule prohibits banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading, which is generally defined as purchasing, selling or otherwise acquiring, or disposing of financial instruments as principal for the banking entity’s trading account for the purpose of short-term gain. “Financial instruments” generally include securities, derivatives, and futures contracts and options on the same, and generally do not include loans (other than loans that are securities or derivatives), physical commodities, and spot foreign exchange.

68. The federal regulatory agencies responsible for implementing the Volcker Rule published proposed changes seeking public comment in June 2018. Consistent with prior rulemaking regarding the Volcker Rule, this proposal is lengthy, running to 373 pages, with 342 specific questions posed for comment. The feedback received in response to these questions has the potential to make any revisions to the final rule more far-reaching than the specific changes in the Proposed Rule.
A transaction is “for the trading account” of a banking entity if one of several tests is met. In general, the VR Regulation includes a rebuttable presumption that a purchase or sale of a financial instrument is “for the trading account” of a banking entity if the banking entity holds the instrument for fewer than sixty days [although holding a financial instrument for longer than sixty days does not mean that an activity is not proprietary trading]. In addition, any purchase or sale by a U.S. securities dealer constitutes proprietary trading to the extent the financial instrument is purchased or sold in connection with activities that require the dealer to be licensed as such. A non-U.S. dealer is presumed to be engaged in proprietary trading (regardless of the holding period) “to the extent that the instrument is purchased or sold in connection with the activities of” the entity’s dealer business.  

§ 49:4.2 Underwriting Exemption Permitting Principal Trading

There are multiple exemptions to the Volcker Rule’s prohibition on proprietary trading, including exemptions for underwriting, market-making, certain hedging activities, and, for foreign banking entities, activities conducted solely outside the United States. Each exemption is subject to numerous limitations and conditions.

The underwriting exemption permits the purchase and sale of securities, so long as (i) the banking entity is acting as an underwriter for a distribution of securities and the relevant trading desk’s underwriting position is related to such distribution; (ii) the amount of securities in the underwriter’s position does not exceed the reasonably expected near-term demands of clients; (iii) the underwriting positions are disposed of within a reasonable time; and (iv) the banking entity establishes various controls, including appropriate trading desk limits and compensation arrangements that are designed not to reward or incentivize prohibited proprietary trading. Examples of activities that may be permissible under the underwriting exemption include:

- stabilization activities;
- establishment of syndicate short positions and aftermarket short covering;

70. The June 2018 proposed changes include replacing the sixty-day “trading account” presumption with a limited rebuttable presumption of compliance for trading desks, subject only to the accounting prong that falls within a $25 million profit and loss threshold.

71. See 17 C.F.R. § 255.4[a].
• holding an unsold allotment when market conditions may make it impracticable to sell the entire allotment at a reasonable price at the time of the distribution (and selling such position when it is reasonable to do so); and

• helping the issuer mitigate its risk exposure arising from the distribution of its securities (for example, entering into a call-spread option with an issuer as part of a convertible debt offering to mitigate dilution to existing shareholders).72

Certain activities not permitted under the underwriting exemption may nevertheless be permissible under other exemptions, such as the market-making exemption, depending on the particular facts and circumstances involved.

§ 49:4.3 Prohibition on Sponsoring and Investing in Private Funds

The other hallmark provision of the Volcker Rule prohibits a banking entity from acquiring or retaining an ownership interest in, or having certain other relationships or conducting transactions with, certain private funds, referred to as covered funds. Covered funds are generally issuers that would be considered an investment company under the Investment Company Act but for the exemptions under section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of such act, as well as certain similar foreign private funds and commodity pools. The VR Regulation, however, generally permits a banking entity to engage in underwriting and market-making involving ownership interests in covered funds so long as the activity is conducted in compliance with the applicable proprietary trading restrictions on those activities discussed above. In addition, the Volcker Rule Regulation imposes per fund limits and aggregate quantitative ownership limits on a banking entity’s permitted ownership interests in covered funds that the banking entity organizes and offers or engages in underwriting or market-making involving ownership interests thereof, including a 3% limit on the number and amount of ownership interests in any one covered fund organized and offered by a banking entity.

§ 49:4.4 Compliance

The Volcker Rule Regulation generally requires that banking entities establish a compliance program designed to ensure compliance with the Volcker Rule. Banking entities with significant trading assets

and liabilities also must comply with detailed reporting and record-keeping requirements in connection with the restrictions on proprietary trading.\footnote{Of the many changes in the June 2018 proposal, perhaps the most important is the division of banking entities into three tiers of total trading assets and liabilities for compliance purposes. The most stringent requirements of the Volcker Rule will apply only to banking organizations with over $10 billion in trading assets and liabilities, while those with trading assets and liabilities under $1 billion would be presumed to be in compliance with the Volcker Rule and exempt from establishing a compliance program unless directed. Those banks with between $1 billion and $10 billion in total trading assets and liabilities would be subject to a tailored, simplified compliance program.}{73}

Banking entities that do not establish adequate Volcker Rule compliance programs are subject to formal regulatory enforcement actions.\footnote{See Federal Reserve Order, dated April 20, 2017, imposing a fine of $19.7 million against a global bank for failure to maintain an adequate compliance program. The failures identified by the Federal Reserve included weakness in the methodologies the bank used for demonstrating reasonably expected near-term demands of clients, customer, or counterparties, as required for permitted market-making activities, as well as weaknesses in the bank’s metrics reporting and monitoring process.}{74}

The Volcker Rule generally does not treat covered funds as banking entities. Instead, a banking entity’s relationship with a covered fund is governed by the Volcker Rule’s various limitations and prohibitions, but a covered fund associated with a banking entity may, for example, engage in proprietary trading. One of the apparent unintended consequences of the Volcker Rule Regulations is that a foreign private fund that is not offered to residents of the United States, and therefore does not rely on exemptions under section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act, is not itself a covered fund. However, if the foreign banking entity that sponsors such a fund controls the fund through governance arrangements or otherwise, the fund itself will be treated as a banking entity that is subject to the Volcker Rule. The relevant agencies provided no-action relief for this issue in July 2017 for one year, which they would extend for one year until July 21, 2019, under the June 2018 proposed rule.

\section{§ 49:5 Relationship of Investment Banking to Research}

\subsection*{§ 49:5.1 Legal Framework}

The rules and regulations governing research production and distribution were adopted in part to increase public confidence in the integrity of securities research by improving objectivity and transparency, and ensuring the provision of reliable and useful information to investors. The rules and regulations were enacted beginning in the

(Broker-Dealer Reg., Rel. #14, 9/18) 49–41
early 2000s following public scrutiny questioning the objectivity of securities research published prior to the bursting of the “dot-com bubble” and the collapse of several large public companies. The rules regulate: research analyst conduct; research analyst compensation; research disclosures; research analyst personal trading; and relationships between research analysts and subject companies, investment banking, sales and trading, and principal trading.

The SRO rules governing research production and distribution have seen significant changes in recent years. In late 2015, as part of the FINRA rulebook consolidation process, the existing NASD and NYSE equity research rules were consolidated into FINRA Rule 2241 (the “Equity Research Rule”). The new rule preserved the vast majority of the substance of the predecessor rules, but also amended them in important ways.

In 2016, FINRA’s regulation of research production and distribution was expanded to include fixed-income research for the first time, through FINRA Rule 2242 (the “Fixed-Income Research Rule,” and, together with the Equity Research Rule, the “FINRA Research Rules”). The Fixed-Income Research Rule applies many of the concepts of the Equity Research Rule to fixed-income research, but there are significant differences between the rules. The chief difference may be that the Fixed-Income Research Rule provides significant exemption from policy-and-procedure and disclosure requirements for firms distributing research to institutional investors only, whereas the Equity Research Rule’s obligations apply across-the-board.

75. The multiple roles of broker-dealers came under particular regulatory and public scrutiny in the early 2000s following the bursting of the dot-com bubble and the collapse of large, public reporting companies such as Enron and Worldcom. The research departments of various investment banks issued favorable research reports on these and other companies, influenced, it was claimed, by the investment banking department’s interest in participating in transactions for the same companies. Various U.S. regulatory bodies and the New York State Attorney General brought actions against ten large broker-dealers alleging in part conflicts of interest around research production. The equity research rules of the NASD and NYSE (now consolidated as FINRA Rule 2241) became effective in 2002, SEC Regulation AC became effective in 2003, the Global Settlement was entered into in 2003, and the Fixed-Income Research Rule became effective in 2016.

76. FINRA Rule 2241 incorporated much of the substance of NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472, but restructured some of the existing obligations and added an overarching requirement that firms maintain and enforce policies and procedures that effectively manage conflicts of interest related to research production and distribution. Some of the changes were designed to level the playing field between firms subject to the Global Settlement (discussed below) and those that were not. Other noteworthy changes include changes to the research blackout periods established by the rule.
The following sections discuss (i) equity and fixed-income research regulations adopted by FINRA, (ii) the Global Settlement, and (iii) SEC Regulation AC.  

### § 49:5.2 FINRA Regulation of Research Reports

The Equity Research Rule governs equity research services provided by member firms of FINRA. FINRA’s stated objective with respect to the Equity Research Rule is to improve objectivity and independence in research through the following measures:

- restrictions on the relationship between research analysts and investment banking personnel and on communications with companies that are the subject of research;  
- restrictions on compensation of research analysts and on personal trading by research analysts;  
- prohibitions on promises of favorable research, on retaliation against research analysts for unfavorable research, and on research analyst participation in pitches for investment banking business; and  
- imposition of quiet periods on the issuance of research reports and public appearances by research analysts.

Firms that do not produce their own research but merely distribute research reports produced by other firms are subject to a more limited set of policy-and-procedure and disclosure obligations.

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77. Section 15(g) of the Exchange Act is also relevant to research. Section 15(g) requires registered broker-dealers to establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent misuse of material nonpublic information by broker-dealers or persons associated with them.

78. FINRA Rule 2241[b][2]. See also FINRA Rule 5280[b] (requiring member firms to establish, maintain, and enforce policies and procedures reasonably designed to restrict the information flow between research analysts and trading department personnel).

79. FINRA Rule 2241[b][1][C].

80. FINRA Rule 2241[b][2][E] and [F].

81. FINRA Rule 2241[b][2][J].

82. FINRA Rule 2241[b][2][K].

83. FINRA Rule 2241[b][2][H].

84. FINRA Rule 2241[b][2][L].

85. FINRA Rule 2241[b][2][I].

86. FINRA Rule 2241[h]. Firms distributing equity research reports produced by affiliates must ensure that a more limited set of disclosures are included in the research report [FINRA Rule 2241[h][4]], and must establish procedures to ensure that the third-party research report contains no
The Equity Research Rule also requires the disclosure of conflicts of interest and other information to assist investors in making investment decisions. Member firms must establish written procedures reasonably designed to ensure such firms are in compliance with the FINRA Research Rules.

In 2012, the Equity Research Rule was amended to conform to the requirements of the JOBS Act. The amendments permit research analysts to attend meetings with investment banking personnel for IPOs of EGCs. The amendments also permit publication of research and public appearances during certain quiet periods for IPOs and secondary offerings of EGCs.

The Equity Research Rule also includes certain exemptions from policy-and-procedure requirements for firms with limited investment banking activity.

§ 49:5.3 Fixed-Income Research Rule

The Fixed-Income Research Rule (FINRA Rule 2242) brought into effect FINRA’s long-stated ambition to establish a fixed-income research rule. The Fixed-Income Research Rule is modeled on the Equity Research Rule, but with some structural changes and other modifications. The most significant difference is that the Fixed-Income Research Rule provides an exemption from many of the policy-and-procedure and all of the particularized disclosure requirements for firms that distribute fixed-income research to institutional investors.

Firms distributing equity research reports produced by non-affiliated firms may qualify for a full exemption from the rule’s requirements if its distribution complies with FINRA Rule 2241(b)(6).

87. FINRA Rule 2241(c)(4).
88. FINRA Rule 2241(c)(2).
89. FINRA Rule 2241(b)(1).
90. See FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-49 (Nov. 2012).
91. FINRA Rule 2241 SM .01(b). While research analysts are permitted to attend such meetings, they may not engage in otherwise prohibited conduct, including efforts to solicit investment banking business. Id.
92. FINRA Rule 2241(b)(2)(I).
93. See NASD FINRA Rule 2711(c); NYSE Rule 472(g)(12241(i).

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investors only, provided that the investors consent to the receipt of such research as required by the rule.95

For firms distributing fixed-income research to non-institutional investors, the obligations of the Fixed-Income Research Rule look a lot like the obligations imposed by the Equity Research Rule, with some modifications. These obligations include:

• restrictions on the relationship between research analysts and investment banking, principal trading, and sales and trading personnel,96 and on communications with companies that are the subject of research,97

• restrictions on compensation of research analysts98 and on personal trading by research analysts;99

• prohibitions on promises of favorable research,100 on retaliation against research analysts for unfavorable research,101 and on participation in pitches for investment banking business.102

Some chief differences between the Equity Research Rule and Fixed-Income Research Rule include that:

• The Fixed-Income Research Rule does not impose any licensing requirements on fixed-income research analysts. Equity research analysts and their supervisors must pass research-specific FINRA licensing examinations.103

• The Fixed-Income Research Rule does not impose quiet periods following the member’s participation in the underwriting syndicate of an offering by a subject company.104

• The Fixed-Income Research Rule requires the establishment of policies and procedures regarding relationships between

95. As further described below, the exemptions cover most of the provisions regarding supervision, coverage determinations, budget and compensation determinations, and all of the particularized disclosure requirements.

96. FINRA Rule 2241(b)(2). See also FINRA Rule 5280(b) (requiring member firms to establish, maintain, and enforce policies and procedures reasonably designed to restrict the information flow between research analysts and trading department personnel).

97. FINRA Rule 2241(b)(1)(C).

98. FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(E) and (F).


100. FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(K).

101. FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(I).

102. FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(L).

103. NASD Rule 1050.

104. For the Equity Research Rule’s quiet periods, see FINRA Rule 2241(b)(2)(I).
research and investment banking and subject companies, but also with the member’s sales and trading and principal trading personnel.\(^{105}\)

- The Fixed-Income Research Rule imposes prohibitions on specific types of communications between trading desk personnel and fixed-income research analysts.\(^{106}\)

The Fixed-Income Research Rule also includes certain exemptions from policy-and-procedure requirements for firms with limited investment banking activity and limited principal trading activity.\(^{107}\)

Please see section 49:5.8 below for a chart describing the differences between the Equity Research Rule and Fixed-Income Research Rule.

### § 49:5.4 Fixed-Income Research Rule for Firms Distributing Fixed-Income Research Only to Institutional Investors

FINRA member firms that distribute fixed-income research provided only to certain eligible institutional investors that provide the consent\(^{108}\) required by the Fixed-Income Research Rule are exempted from certain disclosure and policy-and-procedure requirements of the Fixed-Income Research Rule. Many firms have structured their fixed-income research production to rely on this institutional exemption.

With respect to the consent requirement, for research distribution to investors that qualify as a QIB under Securities Act Rule 144A,\(^{109}\) firms may rely on a negative consent process.\(^{110}\) For investors that do not qualify as a QIB but do qualify as an institutional account under

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105. FINRA Rule 2241(b)(1); FINRA Rule 2242(b)(1), (b)(2)(D).
106. FINRA Rule 2242 SM .03.
107. FINRA Rule 2242(h), (i).
108. Supplementary Material .13 provides that institutional fixed-income research may be distributed to certain specified persons for informational purposes unrelated to investing in fixed-income securities, even without affirmative consent or qualifying under the negative consent provisions described below. These persons are regulators, academics, issuers, and media.
109. Any entity that in the aggregate owns and invests on a discretionary basis at least $100 million in securities of unaffiliated issuers qualifies as a Qualified Institutional Buyer. For further discussion, see infra section 49:10.2.
110. FINRA Rule 2242(j)(1)(A). The requirements of the negative consent process are that: [1] the FINRA member firm must have a reasonable basis to believe that the QIB is capable of evaluating investment risks independently, both in general and with regard to particular transactions and investment strategies involving fixed-income securities; and [2] the QIB must have has affirmatively indicated that it is exercising independent
the definition of FINRA Rule 4512(c) (a $50-million-asset standard),
firms must obtain the affirmative consent of the investor to receipt of
research that is not subject to all of the independence and disclosure
standards applicable to debt research reports prepared for non-institu-
tional investors.\textsuperscript{111}

While the Fixed-Income Research Rule does not require institu-
tional fixed-income research to carry the specific disclosures applicable
to retail fixed-income research, it does require that such research carry
general disclosures (widely referred to as a “health warning”) promi-
nently on the first page that:

\begin{itemize}
  \item the fixed-income research report is intended only for institu-
tional investors and does not carry all of the independence and
disclosure standards of retail debt research reports;
  \item if applicable, that the views in the report may differ from the
views offered in retail debt research reports; and,
  \item if applicable, that the report may not be independent of the
firm’s proprietary interests, and that the firm trades the secu-
rities covered in the report for its own account and on a
discretionary basis on behalf of certain customers, and such
trading interests may be contrary to the recommendation in the
report.\textsuperscript{112}
\end{itemize}

Firms distributing only institutional fixed-income research are also
exempt from many of the policy-and-procedure requirements of the
rule, as indicated below in Chart 49-1.\textsuperscript{113}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{111} FINRA Rule 2242(j)(1)(B).}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{112} See proposed FINRA Rule 2242(j)(3). With respect to the disclosure
requirement, if applicable, that the views in the institutional debt research
report may differ from views in retail debt research, FINRA notes institu-
tional debt research is not subject to Supplementary Material .06, which
otherwise requires a member to inform its customers of the existence of a
different research product offered to other customers that may reach
different conclusions or recommendations that could impact the price of
the debt security.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{113} The chart assumes that the firm does not qualify for the Fixed-Income
Research Rule’s exemptions for firms with limited investment banking or
principal trading activity.}
# Chart 49-1

## Firms Distributing Only Institutional Fixed-Income Research Exemptions from FINRA Rule 2242

**Policy-and-Procedure Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Provision (References are to FINRA Rule 2242)</th>
<th>Applicable to Firms Distributing Retail Research?</th>
<th>Applicable to Firms Distributing Only Institutional Research?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General procedures to manage conflicts: Establish, maintain and enforce policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and effectively manage conflicts of interest related to fixed-income research. FINRA Rule 2242(b)(1)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of reports by investment banking personnel: Prohibit prepublication review, clearance, or approval of fixed-income research reports by investment banking personnel. FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(A)(i)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of reports by principal trading/sales &amp; trading personnel: Prohibit prepublication review, clearance, or approval of fixed-income research reports by principal trading personnel and sales and trading personnel. FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(A)(ii), (iii)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Provision (References are to FINRA Rule 2242)</td>
<td>Applicable to Firms Distributing Retail Research?</td>
<td>Applicable to Firms Distributing Only Institutional Research?</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Review of reports by those not directly responsible: Restrict or prohibit prepublication review, clearance or approval of fixed-income research reports by persons not directly responsible for the content of such reports, other than legal and compliance personnel. Subject to exceptions for factual review noted in SM .05. FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(B)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrict input into coverage decisions: Restrict or limit input by investment banking department, sales and trading and principal trading personnel into fixed-income research coverage decisions to ensure that research management independently makes all final decisions regarding the research coverage plan. FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(C)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervision/compensation evaluation of analysts: Limit supervision and compensatory evaluation of fixed-income research analyst to persons not engaged in (a) investment banking services transactions and (b) principal or sales and trading activities. FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(D)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Provision (References are to FINRA Rule 2242)</td>
<td>Applicable to Firms Distributing Retail Research?</td>
<td>Applicable to Firms Distributing Only Institutional Research?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed-income budget determinations: Limit determination of fixed-income research department budget to senior management, excluding senior management engaged in investment banking or principal trading activities, and without regard to specific revenues or results derived from investment banking. FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(E)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis of analyst compensation: Prohibit compensation of fixed-income research analysts based on specific investment banking services or specific trading transactions or contribution to a firm’s investment banking services or principal trading activities. FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(F)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee review of analyst compensation: Require that the compensation of a fixed-income research analyst primarily responsible for the substance of a research report be reviewed by a committee reporting to the board of directors, without any representation from investment banking personnel or persons engaged in principal trading activities. Additional affirmative obligations apply as cited in this section. FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(G)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Provision (References are to FINRA Rule 2242)</td>
<td>Applicable to Firms Distributing Retail Research?</td>
<td>Applicable to Firms Distributing Only Institutional Research?</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Policies to insulate analysts from pressure, review, or oversight of certain personnel: Establish information barriers or other institutional safeguards to ensure that fixed-income research analysts are insulated from review, pressure, or oversight from persons involved in investment banking, principal trading, sales and trading, and others who might be biased in their judgment and supervision. FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(H)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, with respect to insulation from pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibit retaliation: Prohibit retaliation against fixed-income analysts by any employee as the result of an unfavorable research. FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(I)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyst trading: Restrict or limit fixed-income research analyst account trading in securities, any derivatives of such securities, and any fund whose performance is materially dependent upon the performance of securities covered by the fixed-income research analyst. FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(J)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promises of favorable research: Prohibit explicit or implicit promises of favorable fixed-income research, a particular fixed-income research rating or recommendation, or specific fixed-income research content as inducement for the receipt of business or compensation. FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(K)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectivity of analysts, including prohibition on participating in investment banking pitches and solicitations: Restrict or limit activities by fixed-income research analysts that can reasonably be expected to compromise their objectivity, including prohibiting:</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) participation in pitches and other solicitations of investment banking services transactions; and</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(ii) participation in road shows and other marketing on behalf of an issuer related to an investment banking services transaction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(L)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibit investment banking direction regarding marketing and communications: Prohibit investment banking department personnel from directly or indirectly:</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) directing a fixed-income research analyst to engage in sales or marketing efforts related to an investment banking services transaction; and</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Provision (References are to FINRA Rule 2242)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(ii) directing a fixed-income research analyst to engage in any communication with a current or prospective customer about an investment banking services transaction.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(M)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review by subject company: Prohibit prepublication review of fixed-income research reports by a subject company (except for fact-checking). FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(N)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitch materials: Prohibition on including in pitch materials any information about fixed-income research capacity that suggests that the firm might provide favorable fixed-income research coverage. This prohibits including analyst ranking. (SM .01)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on analyst communications with customers: Prohibition on analyst communication with current or prospective customer in the presence of investment banking personnel or company management. (SM .02(a))</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Provision (References are to FINRA Rule 2242)</td>
<td>Applicable to Firms Distributing Retail Research?</td>
<td>Applicable to Firms Distributing Only Institutional Research?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Barriers between analysts and trading desk personnel: Requirement for procedures to prohibit (a)(1) principal trading or sales and trading personnel from influencing analysts view to benefit trading position of firm or customers, and (a)(2) analysts identifying or recommending specific transactions to desk personnel inconsistent with published report, or disclosing timing of, or material conclusions in, a pending report. The provision also permits enumerated types of communications. (SM .03)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective Dissemination. Prohibition on differentiating a fixed-income research product based on the timing of receipt; nor may a firm label a fixed-income research product with substantially the same content as a different fixed-income research product as a means to allow certain customers to trade in advance of other customers. In addition, a firm that provides different fixed-income research products and services for different customers must provide disclosure. (SM .06)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Due Diligence: Prohibited in the presence of investment banking personnel prior to the awarding of a mandate. (SM .09)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
§ 49:5.5 Global Research Analyst Settlement

In October 2003, the SEC, the New York Attorney General, and other regulators settled various enforcement actions against a group of major financial institutions (the “Global Settlement”) relating to their practices regarding research analysts, research reports, and investment banking personnel. The Global Settlement was most recently amended in March 2010.

The Global Settlement seeks to achieve the separation of research and investment banking functions. In particular, the Global Settlement places restrictions on the ability of investment banking personnel to influence the budget and expenses available to research departments, interact with research personnel, and influence research coverage decisions. The Global Settlement also requires the provision of independent research from at least three providers. Finally, the Global Settlement requires the settling firms to make disclosures regarding conflicts of interest and the availability of third-party research reports.

The Global Settlement is of narrower applicability than the FINRA Research Rules because:

- The Global Settlement is only applicable to the firms that were parties to the settlement agreement.
- The definition of “research report” in the Global Settlement applies to reports that are furnished to investors in the United States.
- The Global Settlement’s restrictions and requirements on the separation of research and investment banking apply only for research reports relating to a U.S. company or a non-U.S. company for which a U.S. market is the principal equity trading market.

§ 49:5.6 Regulation AC

The SEC’s Regulation Analyst Certification (“Regulation AC”) requires brokers, dealers, and certain persons associated with a broker

114. See Global Settlement, add. A, sec. I.
or dealer that distribute research reports to include certifications by the
research analyst that the views contained in the report accurately
reflect the analyst’s personal views, and disclose whether or not the
analyst received compensation or other payments in connection with
the analyst’s specific recommendations or views.\footnote{122}

Regulation AC also requires broker-dealers to make and keep
records related to public appearances by research analysts.\footnote{123} These
records must include statements by the research analyst attesting that
the views expressed by the analyst accurately reflected his or her
personal views, and that no part of the analyst’s compensation was
related to any specific recommendations or views.\footnote{124}

Regulation AC applies to both equity and fixed-income research.\footnote{125}

SEC Regulation AC enforcement has included an enforcement
action against a firm whose analyst signed the Regulation AC certifi-
cation that the report accurately reflected his personal views, while
expressing to the firm’s sales-and-trading staff that he wanted to
downgrade the subject company, but did not in order to maintain
his relationship with company management. The analyst also in-
structed certain customers to sell the security notwithstanding the
published buy rating.\footnote{126}

\section*{§ 49:5.7 \quad Toys “R” Us Enforcement Actions Regarding
Rule 2711}

In December 2014, FINRA announced that it had taken enforce-
ment action against ten firms and imposed total fines of over $40
million relating to the interactions of the firms’ research analysts with
investment banking personnel and a prospective issuer, Toys “R” Us
(TRU), in respect of TRU’s potential IPO, alleging violations of NASD
Rule 2711’s prohibitions on analyst participation in efforts to solicit
investment banking business and firm promises of favorable research
(the “TRU enforcement actions”).\footnote{127} In May 2015, FINRA published

\footnote{122. \textit{See} 17 C.F.R. § 242.501[a].}
\footnote{123. 17 C.F.R. § 242.502[b].}
\footnote{124. \textit{Id.}}
\footnote{125. 17 C.F.R. § 242.500 \{2012\}. The definitions of “research report” and
“public appearance” do not refer to either equity or fixed-income research.}
No. 79,083 \{Oct. 2016\}.}
\footnote{127. Press Release, FINRA, FINRA Fines 10 Firms a Total of $43.5 Million for
Allowing Equity Research Analysts to Solicit Investment Banking Business
and for Offering Favorable Research Coverage in Connection with Toys “R”
Us IPO \{Dec. 11, 2014\}, http://www.finra.org/newsroom/2014/finra-fines-
10-firms-total-435-million.}
Research Rules Frequently Asked Questions (the “Research FAQs”), which provides more generalized guidance on FINRA’s views on some of the issues raised by the TRU enforcement actions.\(^{128}\)

Although the facts of each of the TRU enforcement actions varied, FINRA seemed to focus on two aspects of the TRU IPO process in particular: (1) the appearance of analysts at a meeting with the issuer at which the issuer solicited the analysts’ views on the company, after a TRU sponsor informed the banks that it would consider the firm’s analyst’s views in determining whether the firm would receive an underwriting role in the IPO (although some firms’ analysts did not discuss specific comparables or TRU valuation metrics based on their compliance and legal team’s direction), and (2) the completion by the banking teams of a valuation template, when the TRU sponsor had stated that, if selected, the firm, including the analyst, would be expected to stand behind the valuation provided in the template. The TRU enforcement actions accordingly raised questions regarding required policies and procedures with respect to analyst-issuer communications and regarding the completion of valuation templates by banking teams.

The Research FAQs articulate three stages of the IPO process, with a sliding scale of attendant risks for analyst/issuer communications: (1) a pre-IPO period; (2) a solicitation period; and (3) a post-mandate period. FINRA considers the solicitation period to begin when the issuer makes known that it intends to proceed with an IPO and to end when there is a bona fide awarding of an underwriting mandate to a particular bank. In the solicitation period, FINRA views research analyst communications with the issuer as carrying significantly elevated risk, although FINRA expressly states that not all analyst-issuer communications during the solicitation period are violative of the research rules and specifically references “bona fide” due diligence and vetting communications. However, the Research FAQs provide that “[i]n general, FINRA believes that positive statements to an issuer by a research analyst during a solicitation period carry a high risk of constituting an impermissible promise of favorable research,” and that in circumstances where an issuer overtly or tacitly expresses that the selection of underwriters will be based in whole or in part on the views of a research analyst (including valuation), FINRA believes any subsequent sharing of those views by the member or the research analyst during the solicitation process would carry unmanageable risk.

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128. For the FAQs, see FINRA, Research Rules Frequently Asked Questions [FAQ], http://www.finra.org/industry/faq-research-rules-frequently-asked-questions-faq [last visited July 6, 2015].

(Broker-Dealer Reg., Rel. #14, 9/18) 49–57
Communications during the pre-IPO and post-mandate periods, as well as communications for follow-on offerings, would carry less risk in FINRA’s view, but, again, the Research FAQs expressly decline to create any periods during which analyst-issuer communications are absolutely prohibited or permitted, instead noting that context and content are highly important in the analysis.\textsuperscript{129}

The Research FAQs also provide guidance on the communications between investment banking personnel and research analysts in a vetting context, noting that investment bankers may consult with research analysts regarding analyst views regarding valuation, but banks may not expressly state or let a tacit understanding exist that the bankers’ views regarding valuation are aligned with those of the analyst.\textsuperscript{130} If an issuer creates an improper expectation that a firm’s valuation will reflect a research analyst’s view or analyst alignment with the investment bankers’ view, a firm that wishes to continue to compete for a role in the offering must repudiate the overture and explain that any valuation provided represents the bankers’ views only and that the firm cannot make any representations about the views of the research analyst.

\textbf{§ 49:5.8 Disclosure Requirements}

The FINRA Research Rules require member firms to disclose \(\text{i}\) conflicts of interest, and \(\text{ii}\) information to assist investors in making investment decisions.

The following chart describes and compares the disclosures required under the Equity Research Rule and Fixed-Income Research Rule. As noted in each row in the chart, firms relying on the Fixed-Income Research Rule’s institutional research exemption do not need to provide any particularized disclosures, and only need provide the standard “health warning” set out in the rule.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Comparison of Required Disclosures} & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{49 Equity Research Rule and Fixed-Income Research Rule} & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Id.} FAQs 1–3.

\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Id.} FAQ 4.
**Chart 49-2**

**Equity Research Rule and Fixed-Income Research Rule**

**Comparison of Required Disclosures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Disclosure</th>
<th>Required by Equity Research Rule?</th>
<th>Required by Fixed-Income Research Rule?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analyst</td>
<td>If the research analyst or a member of the research analyst’s household has a financial interest in the securities of the subject company and the nature of the financial interest.</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2241(c)(4)(A)).</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2242(c)(4)(A)). Not required for firms distributing only institutional fixed-income research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership of subject company securities</td>
<td>If the member or its affiliates beneficially own 1% or more of any class of common equity securities of the subject company.</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2241(c)(4)(F)).</td>
<td>No, but there is obligation to disclose material conflicts of interest per FINRA Rule 2242(c)(4)(H), and to disclose if the firm trades as principal in the fixed-income securities that are the subject of the report or related derivatives. (FINRA Rule 2242(c)(4)(F)). Not required for firms distributing only institutional fixed-income research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Disclosure</td>
<td>Required by Equity Research Rule?</td>
<td>Required by Fixed-Income Research Rule?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Any material conflict of interest</strong></td>
<td>If any material conflict of interest of the research analyst or member that the research analyst or an associated person of the member with the ability to influence the content of a research report knows or has reason to know at the time of the publication or distribution of a research report.</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2241(c)(4)(I)).</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2242(c)(4)(H)). Not required for firms distributing only institutional fixed-income research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research analyst compensation based on certain firm revenues</strong></td>
<td>If the research analyst has received compensation based upon (among other factors) the member’s investment banking revenues.</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2241(c)(4)(B)).</td>
<td>Yes and also requires disclosure of analyst compensation based on principal trading or sales and trading (FINRA Rule 2242(c)(4)(B)). Not required for firms distributing only institutional fixed-income research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Disclosure</td>
<td>Required by Equity Research Rule?</td>
<td>Required by Fixed-Income Research Rule?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment banking compensation</td>
<td>If firm or affiliate: a. managed or co-managed a public offering of securities for the subject company in the past twelve months; b. received compensation for investment banking services from the subject company in the past twelve months; or c. expects to receive or intends to seek compensation for investment banking services from the subject company in the next three months.</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2241(c)(4)(C)).</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2242(c)(4)(C)). Not required for firms distributing only institutional fixed-income research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Disclosure</td>
<td>Required by Equity Research Rule?</td>
<td>Required by Fixed-Income Research Rule?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-investment banking compensation of firm, client of firm, affiliate</td>
<td>If, as of the end of the month immediately preceding the date of publication or distribution of a research report (or the end of the second most recent month if the publication or distribution date is less than thirty calendar days after the end of the most recent month), the member or its affiliates have received from the subject company any compensation for products or services other than investment banking services in the previous twelve months. If the subject company is, or over the twelve-month period preceding the date of publication or distribution of the research report has been, a client of the member, and if so, the types of services provided.</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2241(c)(4)(D), (E)).</td>
<td>Same as FINRA Rule 2241 (2242 (c)(4)(D), (E)). Exemptions for firms distributing only institutional fixed-income research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Disclosure</td>
<td>Required by Equity Research Rule?</td>
<td>Required by Fixed-Income Research Rule?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading as principal in the fixed-income securities (or related derivatives) that are the subject of the research report</td>
<td>If the member trades or may trade as principal in the debt securities (or in related derivatives) that are the subject of the fixed-income research report.</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2242(c)(4)(F)). Not required for firms distributing only institutional fixed-income research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meaning of ratings</td>
<td>If a research report contains a rating, the firm must define in the research report the meaning of each rating used by the firm in its rating system, including time horizon and any benchmark.</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2241(c)(2)).</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2242(c)(2)). Not required for firms distributing only institutional fixed-income research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Disclosure</td>
<td>Required by Equity Research Rule?</td>
<td>Required by Fixed-Income Research Rule?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of ratings</td>
<td>A firm must disclose in each research report the percentage of all securities rated by the firm to which the firm would assign a “buy,” “hold/neutral,” or “sell” rating. In each research report, the firm must disclose the percentage of subject companies within each of these three categories for whom the firm has provided investment banking services within the previous twelve months.</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2241(c)(2)(A)).</td>
<td>Yes, except that the disclosure requires the percentage of all subject companies (rather than securities) to which the firm has assigned the particular rating (FINRA Rule 2242(c)(2)(A)). Not required for firms distributing only institutional fixed-income research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price Chart</td>
<td>If a research report contains either a rating or a price target, and the firm has assigned a rating or price target to the subject company’s securities rating for at least one year, the research report must include a line graph of the security’s daily prices.</td>
<td>Same as FINRA Rule 2711 (FINRA Rule 2241(c)(3)).</td>
<td>Yes, except that there is no reference to a price target and, accordingly, no requirement to have a line graph of the security’s daily closing prices. Instead, there must be disclosure of each date on which the firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Disclosure</td>
<td>Required by Equity Research Rule?</td>
<td>Required by Fixed-Income Research Rule?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing prices</td>
<td>closing prices for the period that the firm has assigned any rating or price target or for a three-year period, whichever is shorter.</td>
<td>assigned the rating and the rating assigned (FINRA Rule 2242(c)(3)).</td>
<td>Not required for firms distributing only institutional fixed-income research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price targets and ratings</td>
<td>Any recommendation, rating, or price target has a reasonable basis and is accompanied by a clear explanation of any valuation method used and a fair presentation of the risks that may impede achievement of the recommendation, rating, or price target.</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2241(c)(1)(B)).</td>
<td>Same as FINRA Rule 2241, except that reference to price targets is eliminated (FINRA Rule 2242(c)(1)(B)). Not required for firms distributing only institutional fixed-income research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market making</td>
<td>If firm was making a market in the subject company's securities at the time that the research report was published.</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2241(c)(4)(G)).</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Broker-Dealer Reg., Rel. #14, 9/18) 49–65
Unlike the FINRA Research Rules, the Global Settlement only requires generic disclosures regarding potential conflicts of interest.\textsuperscript{131} While the Global Settlement does not require the disclosure of any information to assist investors in making investment decisions, it does require the settling firms to provide independent research from at least three providers.\textsuperscript{132}

\section*{§ 49:5.9 Firewalls and Chaperoning}

Firewalls are the policies and practices that are implemented to restrict the transmission of MNPI or limit conflicts of interest of a financial institution. In the context of research and investment banking, firewalls refer to the restrictions on interaction between research and personnel outside the research department.

The FINRA Research Rules generally permit communications between research and non-research personnel that are not expressly prohibited,\textsuperscript{133} but do require the establishment of information barriers to ensure that research analysts are insulated from review, pressure, or

\begin{table}
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\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
Topic & Disclosure & Required by Equity Research Rule? & Required by Fixed-Income Research Rule? \\
\hline
Exemptions for certain disclosures that would disclose MNPI & A member or research analyst will not be required to make a disclosure required by paragraph (c)(4) to the extent such disclosure would reveal material nonpublic information regarding specific potential future investment banking transactions. & Yes (FINRA Rule 2241(c)(5)). & Yes (FINRA Rule 2242(c)(5)). \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

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\end{flushright}
oversight of investment banking personnel (and, in the Fixed-Income Research Rule, sales and trading and principal trading personnel) and are not subject to retaliation as a result of an unfavorable research report. In addition, firms must be mindful to ensure that investment banking personnel do not direct research personnel to engage in communications with subject companies or investors. \(^{134}\) Investment banking personnel and other employees who are not directly responsible for investment research are generally prohibited from reviewing research reports before publication. \(^{135}\) Non-investment banking personnel, however, are permitted to review equity research reports prior to publication to the extent necessary to verify the factual information in the report, and, in the case of fixed-income research, personnel other than investment banking, principal trading, and sales and trading personnel are permitted to do the same. \(^{136}\)

Application of information barriers required by the Fixed-Income Research Rule represents a cultural shift, as firms often employ individuals to provide analytical support for fixed-income trading desks, and those brief analyses (termed “trader commentary,” “trade ideas,” or “desk commentary”) were sometimes distributed externally. Under the Bond Market Association’s Guiding Principles, \(^{137}\) those types of written analyses were excluded from the definition of fixed-income research report and the policy-and-procedure requirements of the Guiding Principles were therefore not applicable to those analyses. The Fixed-Income Research Rule, however, has no such specific exclusion for trader commentaries, and given the breadth of the rule’s definition of “debt research report,” \(^{138}\) some trader commentaries could be viewed as triggering regulation under the Fixed-Income Research Rule. Although the Fixed-Income Research Rule exempts firms distributing only institutional research from many of its policy-and-procedure requirements, even such firms are required to establish information barriers to insulate fixed-income research analysts from

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134. FINRA Rule 2241[b][2][M]; FINRA Rule 2242[b][2][M].
135. FINRA Rule 2241[b][2][A]; FINRA Rule 2242[b][2][A].
136. FINRA Rule 2241 SM .05; FINRA Rule 2242 SM .05.
137. SIFMA, Guiding Principles to Promote the Integrity of Fixed Income Research [May 2004]. The Guiding Principles were a collaboration of member firms of the Bond Market Association to enhance investor protection by establishing an industry-standard approach to issues around fixed-income research, including conflicts of interest. Adherence to the Guiding Principles was voluntary.
138. The rule defines a debt research report as “any written [including electronic] communication that includes an analysis of a debt security or an issuer of a debt security, and that provides information reasonably sufficient upon which to base an investment decision,” subject to certain exclusions. FINRA Rule 2242[a][3].
pressure from persons engaged in principal trading or sales and trading. Some have interpreted that obligation to mean that personnel generating such commentaries could not continue to sit on the trading desk. Although FINRA has expressed a view that at least some trader commentaries should not be viewed as fixed-income research reports, it has acknowledged the conundrum faced by the industry. In May 2017, FINRA requested comment on a limited safe harbor for both fixed-income and equity-desk commentaries that would subject the same to lighter-touch regulation under the relevant rules, but the safe harbor has, at this time, not yet been adopted and there has been no further guidance on this issue.¹³⁹

The firewall requirements in the Global Settlement are more restrictive and generally prohibit all communications between research analysts and investment banking personnel, unless such communications are expressly permitted.¹⁴⁰ Research analysts and investment banking personnel must be physically separated to prevent flow of information between the two.¹⁴¹ In addition, firewalls must be designed to reasonably prohibit communications between research and investment banking personnel relating to investment banking or research activities.¹⁴² The Global Settlement permits communications between research analysts and non-research personnel in certain limited circumstances:

- Investment banking personnel may seek views of research analysts on the merits of a proposed transaction, a potential candidate for a transaction, or market or industry trends (referred to as vetting calls).¹⁴³ Research analysts can seek information regarding market or industry conditions, provided that such communications are consistent with those an analyst might have with investing customers (referred to as industry calls).¹⁴⁴ All such communications must be made in the presence of a chaperone.¹⁴⁵


¹⁴⁰. See JOINT REPORT BY NASD AND THE NYSE, supra note 133, at 9.


¹⁴². See Global Settlement, add. A, sec. I, ¶ 10. See also Global Settlement, add. A, sec. I, ¶ 10(g) [permitting without restriction communications between research analysts and investment banking personnel that are not related to investment banking or research activities].


¹⁴⁴. Id.

¹⁴⁵. Id.
• Research analysts and investment banking personnel can participate together in commitment committee discussions, provided that the research analysts have an opportunity to express their views outside the presence of investment banking personnel. ¹⁴⁶

• Research analysts may assist in confirming the adequacy of disclosures for a transaction based on their communications with the company and other third parties.¹⁴⁷ Chaperones must be present if such communications between the research analyst and the company or third parties are later disclosed to investment banking personnel. ¹⁴⁸

• Research analysts may also conduct “joint due diligence” with investment banking personnel.¹⁴⁹

• Research analysts can assist the equity capital markets group with the pricing and structuring of transactions when the financial institution receives an investment banking mandate or a request for the submission of a transaction proposal.¹⁵⁰

• When the financial institution receives an investment banking mandate or a request for the submission of a transaction proposal, research analysts can assist with the education of the firm’s sales force regarding the transaction.¹⁵¹ However, research personnel may not appear jointly with investment banking personnel or the issuer’s management during such communications with the sales force.¹⁵² The contents of communications by research analysts must have a reasonable basis, and be fair and balanced, that is, “fair and balanced,” as generally understood under FINRA Rule 2210(d)(1) and after taking into consideration the overall context in which such communications are made.¹⁵³

• Research analysts can attend or participate in widely attended conferences or events that are also attended by investment banking personnel or in which investment banking personnel participate.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁶. See Global Settlement, add. A, sec. I, ¶ 10[b].
¹⁴⁷. See Global Settlement, add. A, sec. I, ¶ 10[c].
¹⁴⁸. See Global Settlement, add. A, sec. I, ¶ 10[c][ii].
¹⁴⁹. See Global Settlement, add. A, sec. I, ¶ 10[c][i].
¹⁵⁰. See Global Settlement, add. A, sec. I, ¶ 10[d][i]–[ii].
¹⁵¹. See Global Settlement, add. A, sec. I, ¶ 10[d][i]–[iii].
¹⁵². Id.
¹⁵³. Id.
¹⁵⁴. See Global Settlement, add. A, sec. I, ¶ 10[e].
• Research analysts and investment banking personnel can also attend or participate in firm meetings at which matters of general firm interest are discussed. They may communicate with each other with respect to legal or compliance issues, provided that chaperones are present.

Firms subject to the Global Settlement, therefore, are required to have teams of compliance chaperones to attend calls between investment banking and research personnel and review and approve electronic communications between them.

Maintenance of information barriers for firms with research operations is critical to ensure not only compliance with the FINRA Research Rules’ provisions regarding conflicts of interest, but also to ensure that MNPI is not leaked from the research department. One research FINRA enforcement action was directed against a firm for not taking sufficient measures to restrict access to equity research department “hoots” that contained MNPI regarding upcoming research reports.

§ 49:5.10 Joint Due Diligence

Despite the restrictions described above on the relationship between investment banking and research, the FINRA Research Rules and the Global Settlement permit research analysts and investment banking personnel to conduct due diligence jointly. Under the Global Settlement, joint due diligence is permitted only if the following conditions are met:

• the session must be for the limited purpose of gathering or confirming information about the company or the proposed transaction;

• the firm must have received an investment banking mandate or a request for the submission of a transaction proposal in connection with a block bid or competitive follow-on offering; and

• chaperones must be present during such joint due diligence sessions. If the joint due diligence session is in connection with a request for a transaction proposal, joint diligence sessions are permitted only if the firm’s legal or compliance staff reasonably

156. Id.
believes that there will not be a meaningful opportunity to conduct separate due diligence prior to the award of a mandate.

The FINRA Research Rules prohibit joint due diligence prior to the selection of underwriters, except in the case of Emerging Growth Companies if such prohibition is contrary to the JOBS Act.\(^{159}\)

§ 49:5.11 Further Separation of Research Analysts from Banking Personnel

Both the FINRA Research Rules and the Global Settlement place additional restrictions in order to ensure the independence of research analysts from non-research personnel. These additional restrictions are described in Chart 49-3 below.

**Chart 49-3**

**FINRA Research Rules and the Global Settlement Additional Restrictions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Restriction</th>
<th>Required by Equity Research Rule?</th>
<th>Required by Fixed-Income Research Rule?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supervision by non-research personnel</td>
<td>No research analyst may be subject to the supervision or control of any employee of the firm’s investment banking department.</td>
<td>Yes (2241(b)(2)(C)).</td>
<td>Policies and procedures must limit supervision to persons not engaged in investment banking services transactions, principal trading activities, or sales and trading (FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(D)).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^{159}\) FINRA Rule 2241 SM .02; FINRA Rule 2242 SM .09; FINRA Regulatory Notice 15-30.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Restriction</th>
<th>Required by Equity Research Rule?</th>
<th>Required by Fixed-Income Research Rule?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment banking personnel directions regarding marketing</td>
<td>Investment banking personnel may not direct analyst to engage in sales or marketing efforts relating to investment banking services transactions, or to communicate with current or prospective customer regarding investment banking services transactions.</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2241(b)(2)(M)).</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(M)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition on basing analyst compensation upon certain factors</td>
<td>Prohibit compensation based upon specific investment banking services transactions or contributions to a member’s investment banking services activities.</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2241(b)(2)(E)).</td>
<td>Yes, and prohibition expanded to include compensation on the basis of specific trading transactions or contributions to trading activities (FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(F)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Restriction</td>
<td>Required by Equity Research Rule?</td>
<td>Required by Fixed-Income Research Rule?</td>
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</table>
| Prohibition on influence over/input into analyst compensation by non-research personnel | No personnel engaged in investment banking activities may have any influence or control over the compensatory evaluation of a research analyst. | Yes (FINRA Rule 2241(b)(2)(C)). | Similar to 2241, but instead of referencing influence or control, precludes “input into the compensation of debt research analysts.” That prohibition is expanded to include persons engaged in principal trading activities (FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(D)).
<p>|                                           |                                                                             |                                   | Not required for firms distributing only institutional fixed-income research. |</p>
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<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
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<th>Required by Equity Research Rule?</th>
<th>Required by Fixed-Income Research Rule?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analyst compensation</td>
<td>Compensation of a research analyst must be reviewed and approved at least annually by a committee that reports to the firm’s board of directors. This committee may not have representation from the firm’s investment banking department. The committee must consider the following factors: [A] individual performance, including the analyst’s productivity and the quality of the analyst’s research; [B] the correlation between the research analyst’s recommendations and the stock price performance; and [C] the overall ratings received from clients, sales force, peers independent of the firm’s</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2241(b)(2)(F)).</td>
<td>Same as 2241, except participation of principal trading personnel is also prohibited, the committee does not need to consider correlation between the analyst’s recommendations and the performance of the recommended securities, and no requirement to consider ratings from sales force. Sales and trading personnel expressly permitted to provide input to fixed-income research management in order to convey customer feedback (FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(G)). Not required for firms distributing only</td>
</tr>
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### Topic Restriction Required by Equity Research Rule? Required by Fixed-Income Research Rule?

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<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
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<th>Required by Fixed-Income Research Rule?</th>
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<tr>
<td>investment banking department and other independent ratings services. The committee may not consider as a factor in reviewing and approving such a research analyst's compensation his or her contributions to the firm’s investment banking business.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>institutional fixed-income research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research department budget determined by senior management</td>
<td>Limit determination of the research department budget to senior management, excluding senior management engaged in investment banking services activities.</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2241(b)(2)(D)).</td>
<td>Same as FINRA Rule 2241, except that also excludes senior management engaged in principal trading activities. Expressly permits revenues and results of the firm as a whole to be considered, and expressly permits input from any personnel to senior management regarding demand for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Restriction</td>
<td>Required by Equity Research Rule?</td>
<td>Required by Fixed-Income Research Rule?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prohibition on retaliation against analysts</td>
<td>Prohibit direct or indirect retaliation or threat of retaliation against research analysts employed by the member or its affiliates by persons engaged in investment banking services activities or other employees as the result of an adverse, negative, or otherwise unfavorable research report or public appearance written or made by the research analyst that may adversely affect the member’s present or prospective business interests.</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2241(b)(2)(H)).</td>
<td>Yes (FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(I)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fixed-income research including product trends and customer research interests (FINRA Rule 2242(b)(2)(E)). Not required for firms distributing only institutional fixed-income research.</td>
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</table>
§ 49:5.12 Road Shows and Investor Education

The FINRA Research Rules prohibit research analysts from participating in road shows relating to investment banking transactions. They also prohibit research analysts from communicating with customers about such transactions in the presence of investment banking personnel or company management.

The Global Settlement permits research analysts to communicate with investors regarding public offerings of securities, provided the firm has received an investment banking mandate. However, research analysts may not appear jointly with investment banking personnel or issuer’s management when making such communications.

The Global Settlement requires that oral communications that express a recommendation or view regarding the offering must have a reasonable basis. Additionally, oral communications that are made to a group of ten or more investors must be “fair and balanced,” as generally understood under FINRA Rule 2210(d)(1) and after taking into consideration the overall context in which such communications are made.

Also common in the industry are “investor education” presentations, where a research analyst will meet with institutional investors to discuss an industry sector or a company, sometimes even with company management present. Such meetings must be carefully screened to ensure that they do not either constitute an offer of securities in connection with a forthcoming transaction or a violation of Regulation FD by the issuer.

§ 49:5.13 Publication of Research During Securities Offerings

The Equity Research Rule imposes “quiet periods,” during which a firm is restricted from publishing research reports and making public appearances regarding a subject company. The quiet period restrictions are:

- Firms that have acted as underwriters or dealers in IPOs may not publish a research report or make a public appearance...
regarding the subject company for ten calendar days following the date of the offering. 167

- For secondary offerings, firms that have acted as managers or co-managers may not publish a research report or make a public appearance regarding the subject company for three calendar days following the date of the offering. 168

The quiet period restrictions are not applicable for the following:

- Research reports and public appearances relating to significant news or events that occur within the applicable quiet period. 169

- Research reports and public appearances made pursuant to SEC Rule 139 regarding subject companies with “actively traded securities.” 170

In addition to the considerations related to the Equity Research Rule noted above, publication of research shortly after a securities offering by a member of the offering’s syndicate must take into account Securities Act considerations. For example, for twenty-five days following an IPO, aftermarket sales by dealers must be accompanied by a prospectus or a notice regarding its availability. In consideration of that requirement, IPO syndicates as a prudential measure generally voluntarily impose a twenty-five-day research quiet period following an IPO.

167. See FINRA Rule 2241(b)(2)(I)(i). Although the quiet period required by the Equity Research Rule is ten calendar days, many syndicates have chosen to maintain a twenty-five-day quiet period in consideration of certain prospectus rules.

168. See FINRA Rule 2241(b)(2)(I)(ii).

169. See FINRA Rule 2241(b)(2)(I)(iii). In such circumstances, the research report or the public appearance must be pre-authorized by legal or compliance personnel. Id.

170. Id. SEC Rule 139 permits the publication and distribution of issuer-specific research reports and industry reports, and deems them to not constitute offers for the sale of securities if certain requirements relating to the subject companies are satisfied. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.139. In addition, Regulation M defines actively traded securities as securities having an average daily trading value of $1 million, and that are issued by companies having common equity securities having a public float value of at least $150 million. 17 C.F.R. § 232.101(c)(1).
§ 49:6 Compensation Structures

§ 49:6.1 FINRA Corporate Financing Rules

[A] General Overview and Policy Background

FINRA Rule 5110, otherwise known as the Corporate Financing Rule, is the principal rule regulating compensation to underwriters and other FINRA-member participants in public offerings of securities. As a general matter, the Corporate Financing Rule prohibits FINRA members from participating in any public offering in which the underwriting compensation is “unfair or unreasonable.”

The restrictions of Rule 5110 apply to FINRA members and persons associated with a FINRA member who “participate in any manner” in a public offering of securities subject to the Corporate Financing Rules. Traditionally, “participation” in the offering has been understood expansively, but in May 2014, the SEC approved amendments to Rule 5110 that specifically exclude from Rule 5110’s coverage an independent financial adviser that provides advisory or consulting services to the issuer.

[B] Operation of the Corporate Financing Rules

The Corporate Financing Rule regulates compensation in three ways: (i) by aggregating all “items of value” received by underwriters and other related persons in connection with the public offering and deeming such items of value to be compensation in connection with the public offering; (ii) placing a prohibition on the receipt of certain items of value in connection with participation in a public offering; and (iii) requiring disclosure of all items of value that are deemed to be compensation to the underwriters in connection with the public offering.

Generally, the total demand value of all items of underwriters’ compensation may not exceed a certain “reasonable” amount, which many believe to be approximately 9% in larger IPOs and approximately 8% in most other offerings. FINRA has not published the compensation limits.

[C] Items of Value That Are Per Se Unreasonable

FINRA has provided guidance as to certain items of value that are per se unreasonable:

- Reimbursement of underwriter salaries, overhead, or supplies;
- Reimbursement of expenses other than out-of-pocket expenses;

171. FINRA Rule 5110(c).
172. FINRA Rule 5110(f)(2).
• Certain warrants or options given to underwriters or related persons;
• Receipt of “indeterminate” compensation;
• Overallotment options in excess of 15%; and
• “Tail fees” and rights of first refusal (ROFRs) that do not comply with the requirements described below.

The SEC has clarified the circumstances under which termination fees and ROFRs are permitted. Previously, both tail fees and ROFRs were considered “per se unreasonable” items of value except in very limited situations.

Under FINRA Rule 5110(f)(2)(D)(ii), termination fees or “tail” fees are now permitted where:

• the agreement between the participating member and the issuer specifies that the issuer has a right of “termination for cause”;
• the issuer’s exercise of its right of “termination for cause” eliminates any obligations of the issuer with respect to the payment of any termination fee;
• the amount of any specified termination fee is reasonable in relation to the services contemplated in the written agreement; or
• the issuer is not responsible for paying the termination fee unless an offering or other type of transaction is consummated by the issuer (without involvement of the FINRA member) within two years of the date the issuer terminates the engagement with the participating member.

Note that in order for tail fees and ROFRs to be permissible items of value, any engagement letters entered into between the participating member and the issuer must specifically set out the conditions set out above, in particular the specific termination rights of the issuer. FINRA may require any engagement letter that does not meet these conditions to be amended.

Similarly, FINRA reevaluated its position with respect to ROFRs granted in offerings that are not completed, and has permitted participating members to retain ROFRs to participate in future transactions even if the public offering in which the ROFR was granted is not so consummated. Specifically, under FINRA Rule 5110(f)(2)(D)(ii), such continuing ROFRs are permitted where:

• The agreement between the participating member and issuer specifies that the issuer has a right of termination for cause;
• The issuer’s exercise of its right of termination for cause eliminates any obligation of the issuer with respect to the provision of any ROFR; and

• Any fees arising from services provided under a ROFR are customary for those types of services.

In addition, FINRA Rule 5110(f)(2)(E) continues to provide that the duration of any ROFR must not be in excess of three years from (i) the date of commencement of sales in the public offering or (ii) the date the issuer terminates the engagement. In either case, the agreement may not provide for more than one opportunity to waive or terminate the ROFR in consideration of any payment or fee.

[D] Defining “Compensation”

Compensation under the Corporate Financing Rule is stated broadly in Rule 5110(c)(2)(B) as “all items of value received or to be received from any source by the underwriter and related persons which are deemed to be in connection with or related to the distribution of the public offering [. . .].”

If an underwriter or related person receives an “item of value” from the issuer during the 180-day period preceding the filing of a registration statement or a prospectus supplement, it will be deemed to be compensation.

[E] Items of Value

The term “items of value” is broadly defined in Rule 5110(c)(3) and includes (without limitation):

1. The underwriter’s discount or commission;
2. Securities received for providing certain services in connection with an investment in unregistered securities;
3. Reimbursement of expenses to or on behalf of the underwriter and related persons;
4. Fees and expenses of underwriter’s counsel (except for reimbursement of “blue sky” fees);
5. Finder’s fees, whether in the form of cash, securities, or any other item of value;
6. Fees paid to Qualified Independent Underwriters (QIUs);
7. Rights of first refusal; and
8. Special sales incentive items.
The following are not “items of value”:

(1) Cash compensation for providing services in connection with a [a] private placement; [b] loan or credit facility; or [c] merger or acquisition.

(2) Certain expenses that are normally paid by the issuer [for example, “blue sky” fees, FINRA filing fees, and printing costs]. Reimbursement of underwriter’s counsel fees are not included within this exception.

(3) Securities listed on U.S. and designated offshore securities markets that are purchased “in a public market transaction.”

(4) Non-convertible or non-exchangeable debt securities and derivative instruments will not be considered items of value if such securities were acquired:
   (a) For a fair price;
   (b) In the ordinary course of business; and
   (c) In transactions unrelated to the public offering.

[F] Conflicts of Interest

An offering is subject to FINRA Rule 5121 when a “conflict of interest,” as defined, exists. That rule prohibits a member that has a conflict of interest from participating in a public offering unless the offering complies with the requirements of Rule 5121. A conflict of interest exists if:

- the securities are to be issued by the member;
- the issuer controls, is controlled by or is under common control with the member or the member’s associated persons;
- at least 5% of the net offering proceeds, not including underwriting compensation, are intended to:
  - reduce or retire a credit facility extended by the member or its affiliates; or
  - a typical “conflict of interest” under Rule 5121 is the repayment of indebtedness to a lender that is a related person of one of the underwriters. A downsizing of the offering may trigger the application of Rule 5121 if the reduction in the total amount of proceeds causes the amount of proceeds directed to the underwriter-related lender to exceed the 5% threshold under this rule.
be otherwise directed to the member or its affiliates; or

- under the rule, the receipt of 5% or more of the net offering proceeds by any individual underwriter or its affiliate can give rise to a “conflict of interest”;

- as a result of the public offering and any transactions contemplated at the time of the public offering, the member will:
  - be an affiliate of the issuer;
  - become publicly owned; or
  - the issuer will become a member or form a broker-dealer subsidiary.

**[F][1] Definition of “Affiliate”**

Rule 5121 defines “affiliate” to mean an entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with a member. “Control” is defined as:

- Beneficial (economic) ownership of 10% or more of an entity’s outstanding equity or debt including, in each case, any right to receive such securities within sixty days of the member’s participation in the public offering;

- The right to 10% or more of the distributable profits or losses of an entity that is a partnership, including the right to receive an interest in such distributable profits or losses within sixty days of the member’s participation in the public offering; or

- The power to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of an entity.

**[F][2] Compliance in the Event of a Conflict of Interest**

If there is a conflict of interest under Rule 5121, then a broker-dealer may not participate in the public offering unless the offering complies with Rule 5121(a)(1) or 5121(a)(2).

Rule 5121(a)(1) mandates that prominent disclosure is made regarding the nature of the conflict. For offering documents that are subject to SEC regulation S-K, “prominent disclosure” requires including a separate notation (to be called “Conflict of Interest”) that is placed in the Table of Contents of the Registration Statement, the Summary, and the Plan of Distribution/Underwriting sections. For other offering documents that are not subject to SEC Regulation S-K, prominent disclosure requires providing disclosure on the front page, a cross-reference to the discussion within the offering documents, and in the summary.
Under Rule 5121(a)(2), the participation of a qualified independent underwriter (QIU) may be required. FINRA Rule 5121(f)(12) defines the characteristics of a QIU. Generally, a QIU is an underwriter:

(A) that does not have a conflict of interest and is not an affiliate of any member that has a conflict of interest;

(B) that does not beneficially own as of the date of the member’s participation in the public offering, more than 5% of the class of securities that would give rise to a conflict of interest, including any right to receive any such securities exercisable within sixty days;

(C) that has agreed in acting as a qualified independent underwriter to undertake the legal responsibilities and liabilities of an underwriter under the Securities Act, specifically including those inherent in section 11 thereof; and

(D) that has served as underwriter in at least three public offerings of a similar size and type during the three-year period immediately preceding the filing of the registration statement or the date of first sale in an offering without a registration statement.

Generally, a QIU is required when there is a conflict of interest unless one of the following conditions is met:

- The book-running manager or dealer manager does not have a conflict of interest, is not an affiliate of any member that does have a conflict of interest, and meets the disciplinary history requirements of Rule 5121;

- The securities offered have a “bona fide public market”;

- The securities offered are fixed-income or preferred securities that have been rated investment grade or are in the same series that have equal rights and obligations as investment grade securities.

173. A bona fide public market is defined in Rule 5121(f)(3) as a market for a security of an issuer that has been reporting under the Exchange Act for at least ninety days and is current in its reporting requirements, and whose securities are traded on a national securities exchange with an Average Daily Trading Volume (as used in SEC Regulation M) of at least $1 million, provided that the issuer’s common equity securities have a public float value of at least $150 million.

174. Investment grade securities are those securities rated by a nationally recognized statistical ratings organization in one of its four highest generic ratings categories. See Rule 5121(f)(8).
Filing Requirements Under Rule 5121

Generally, notwithstanding the availability of a filing exemption under Rule 5110, a transaction requiring a QIU must be filed with FINRA. An exception exists for a shelf-takedown where the base prospectus has previously been cleared with FINRA.

§ 49:6.2 FED/SEC Guidance Regarding Individual Compensation

Investment banker compensation structures at broker-dealers with public holding companies are subject to disclosure in public filings pursuant to Regulation S-K. Item 402[s] of Regulation S-K requires discussion of the relationship between compensation policies and practices for all employees, including non-executive officers, as they relate to risk management practices and risk-taking incentives. Disclosure is required with respect to compensation policies and practices that create risks that are reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on the company.¹⁷⁵ This discussion must be presented separately from the Compensation Discussion and Analysis disclosures, which relate to a company’s compensation program for named executive officers.¹⁷⁶

Item 402[s] provides some illustrative examples of situations that may trigger this disclosure requirement, such as:

- compensation policies and practices at a business unit that carries a significant portion of the company’s risk profile;
- compensation policies and practices at a business unit with compensation structured significantly differently than other units;
- compensation policies and practices at a business unit that is significantly more profitable than others;
- compensation policies and practices at a business unit where compensation expense is a significant percentage of the unit’s revenues; and
- compensation policies and practices that vary significantly from the overall risk and reward structure of the company, such as when bonuses are awarded upon accomplishment of a task.

¹⁷⁵ See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402[s]. The “reasonably likely” threshold is the same as that used in the SEC’s rules for the Management’s Discussion and Analysis. See SEC Implementing Release No. 33-9089, at 12–13 (Feb. 28, 2010).

while the income and risk to the company from the task extend over a significantly longer period of time.

Item 402(s) also provides illustrative examples of issues that must be addressed in the disclosure, such as:

- general design philosophy of compensation policies and practices for employees whose behavior would be most affected, as such policies and practices relate to or affect risk-taking, and the manner of their implementation;

- risk assessment or incentive considerations in structuring compensation policies and practices or in awarding and paying compensation;

- how the compensation policies and practices relate to the realization of risks resulting from the actions of employees in both the short-term and the long-term, such as through policies requiring clawbacks or imposing holding periods;

- policies regarding adjustments to compensation policies and practices to address changes in the company’s risk profile, as well as material adjustments that have been made as a result of changes in the company’s risk profile; and

- monitoring of compensation policies and practices to determine whether risk management objectives are being met with respect to incentivizing its employees.

The Federal Reserve System’s (“Federal Reserve”) Commercial Bank Examination Manual provides guidance on sound incentive compensation policies.\(^{177}\)

The Federal Reserve’s guidance applies to incentive compensation arrangements for (i) senior executives and others who are responsible for oversight of the organization’s firm-wide activities or material business lines; (ii) individual employees, including nonexecutive employees, whose activities may expose the organization to material amounts of risk; and (iii) groups of employees who are subject to the same or similar compensation policies and procedures, and who, in the aggregate, may expose the organization to material amounts of risk, even if no individual employee is likely to expose the organization to material risk.\(^{178}\)

Three principles govern incentive compensation arrangements at banking organizations: (i) provision of incentives that appropriately

\(^{177}\). See COMMERCIAL BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL, sec. 4008.1, Sound Incentive Compensation Policies.

\(^{178}\). Id. at 3.
balance risks and rewards in a manner that does not encourage imprudent risk-taking; (ii) creation of effective controls and risk management processes that reinforce and support the development and maintenance of balanced incentive compensation arrangements; and (iii) strong corporate governance, including active and effective oversight of incentive compensation arrangements by the organization’s board of directors.\(^{179}\)

The Federal Reserve’s guidance does not mandate or prohibit any particular forms of compensation policies or procedures. Instead, incentive compensation arrangements are expected to reflect the principles discussed above in a manner tailored to the business, risk profile, and other attributes of the banking organization.\(^{180}\) However, large banking organizations [LBOs] are recommended to implement and adhere to systematic and formalized policies, procedures, and processes.\(^{181}\) Smaller banking organizations may have less extensive, formalized, and detailed policies, procedures, and processes.\(^{182}\)

The *Commercial Bank Examination Manual* also notes that federal supervisory agencies may take enforcement action if a banking organization’s incentive compensation arrangements or risk management, control, or governance processes pose a risk to the organization’s safety and soundness.\(^{183}\)

In June 2016, the Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, OTS, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the National Credit Union, and the SEC published for comment revised proposed rules to implement section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act.\(^{184}\) The re-proposed rule prohibits incentive-based compensation arrangements that encourage inappropriate risks by providing compensation that is excessive or that could lead to natural financial loss. The re-proposed rule also requires covered financial institutions to implement policies with respect to incentive-based compensation arrangements and to submit reports regarding the same to federal supervisory agencies. The re-proposed rule would be applicable to covered financial institutions with average total consolidated assets of over $1 billion, with progressively more rigorous requirements applicable to covered institutions with average total consolidated assets of $50 billion and $250 billion.

\(^{179}\) *Id.* at 4, 9, 11.


\(^{182}\) *Id.* at 3.

\(^{183}\) *Id.*

\(^{184}\) 81 Fed. Reg. 37,670 [June 10, 2016].
In 2014, certain remuneration measures came into effect as part of the revised EU Capital Requirements Directive ("CRD IV"). CRD IV set out applicable prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms across the European Union. The measures included a cap on bankers’ bonuses, which limits the basic salary-to-bonus ratio to 1:1. This ratio can be increased to up to 1:2 with shareholder approval. In addition, at least 25% of any bonus exceeding 100% of salary must be deferred for at least five years. The scope of these restrictions has been the subject of continued controversy, particularly in the United Kingdom. There has been much press speculation about whether the United Kingdom will continue to apply these restrictions following its withdrawal from the European Union (anticipated to take place in March 2019), but no official announcements have been made.

§ 49:7 Gifts and Entertainment

§ 49:7.1 Gifts Over $100 Are Not Permitted

FINRA Rule 3220 (Influencing or Rewarding Employees of Others) provides that: “No member or person associated with a member shall, directly or indirectly, give or permit to be given anything of value, including gratuities, in excess of one hundred dollars per individual per year to any person, principal, proprietor, employee, agent or representative of another person where such payment or gratuity is in relation to the business of the employer of the recipient of the payment or gratuity.”

The prohibitions of this rule are intended to avoid improprieties, or the appearance thereof, that may arise in consequence of a broker-dealer or associated persons receiving substantial gifts from or making payments to certain other persons without those persons’ employers’ authorization and approval.

The basic prohibition is meant to prevent behavior that may create a conflict of interest between the recipient of the gift and his or her employer.

185. See Caroline Binham, Bankers’ Bonus Cap Could Be Scrapped After Brexit, Says Carney, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), http://www.ft.com/content/dea0611c-d51c-11e7-a303-9060cb1e5f44.

186. FINRA Notice to Members 93-8 (Feb. 1993) (announcing SEC approval of an amendment to Article III, section 10[a] of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice, which section was designated as NASD Rule 3060 in 1996, which subsequently was superseded by FINRA Rule 3220 in the FINRA rulebook consolidation process).
[A] Scope and Exclusions of Rule 3220

The scope of the rule is limited by the connection of the gift to the business of the employer.

Presumptively, a gift the cost of which is borne by the employer, directly or indirectly, is a gift “in relation to the business of the employer.” However, gifts of de minimis value or promotional paraphernalia of nominal value are exempt from the rule. For this exemption to apply, the gift in question must be substantially below the $100 limit. Thus such items as pens, notebooks, or logo-bearing tote bags and umbrellas meet the criteria.

Also excluded from the prohibitions of Rule 3220 are decorative items commemorating a business transaction. In such cases, gifts are permissible even when their cost is greater than $100. It is important, however, that the gift has no other use apart from decoration; otherwise the exemption does not apply.

Bereavement gifts, which are “customarily perishable and intended to comfort the recipient or the recipient’s family during their time of mourning,” are deemed not be “in relation to the business of the employer of the recipient,” and are therefore not within the ambit of FINRA Rule 3220. There is no fixed spending limit for bereavement gifts; however, such gifts must be reasonable and customary.

[B] Supervision and Recordkeeping

Rule 3110 mandates that broker-dealers have in place a supervisory system designed to meet the requirements of Rule 3220. In pertinent part, Rule 3110 provides that “Each member shall establish and maintain a system to supervise the activities of each registered representative, registered principal, and other associated person that is reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations, and with applicable FINRA Rules.” Accordingly, broker-dealers are required to ensure that gifts connected to the business of the firm are “[i] reported to the firm, (ii) reviewed for compliance with Rule 3220 and (iii) maintained in the firm’s records.”

187. FINRA Notice to Members 06-69, at 2 (Dec. 2006) [providing additional guidance on Rule 3220].
188. Id.
190. FINRA Rule 3110[b].
191. FINRA Notice to Members 06-69, at 3 (Dec. 2006) [providing additional guidance on Rule 3220]. This requirement is typically met through the maintenance of a gifts log. In many [but not all] cases, these are now automated.
The prohibitions of Rule 3220 are against gifts of $100 or more per individual person per year. It is therefore necessary that firms aggregate all gifts given by them and their affiliates to individual persons in the course of a year. Where a gift is given to a group the value should still be accounted, on a pro rata basis, for each individual. The firm must then state, in accordance with FINRA guidance, whether the aggregated figure for each individual recipient is computed on a calendar year, fiscal year or on a rolling basis. The value of gifts recorded by a broker-dealer should be accounted at the higher of cost or market value minus tax and delivery charges. For tickets, the value to be used for accounting purposes is the higher of the cost or the face value.

§ 49:7.2 Entertainment Must Be Reasonable and Customary

[A] Generally

The NASD, in a 1999 interpretive letter, made a distinction between gifts and business entertainment. The letter established that firms are permitted to offer “ordinary and usual business entertainment” to persons covered under FINRA Rule 3220 [at the time, NASD Conduct Rule 3060] without consideration of the $100 limit, provided the entertainment is “neither so frequent nor so extensive as to raise any question of propriety.”

In 2006, the NASD proposed interpretative material to Conduct Rule 3060 [IM-3060] so as to provide more guidance on the conduct of business entertainment. As with the guidance concerning gifts, the overarching principle of IM 3060 is to prevent conduct that is intended to cause, or may appear to have the effect of causing, the employee of a client to act contrary to the interests of his or her employer.

Business entertainment, under IM-3060, consists of any social, charitable, entertainment and such other event, and the associated transportation and accommodation, in which a firm or an associated person participates. (Whatever item of value not considered “business entertainment” that is given to a person in connection with an employer’s business constitutes a gift under Rule 3220.)

192. Id. at 2.
193. Id.
194. Letter from FINRA, to T. Rowe Price Investment Services, Inc. [June 10, 1999].
[B] Supervision and Recordkeeping

Compliance guidelines in relation to business entertainment:

• Firms must define the suitable forms of business entertainment with specificity, highlighting, for example, appropriate and inappropriate venues.

• Without necessarily prescribing a figure, IM-3060 requires firms to establish dollar limits or thresholds for entertainment expenditure and to approve such expenditure in advance.

• Firms must also maintain policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable gifts and entertainment regulations.

• Records should be maintained of business entertainment activities and expenses and such information made available upon request to employers, in relation to their employees, with whom the broker-dealer does business.

• Written procedures should also provide for the proper training of personnel concerning business entertainment and that persons designated to oversee this matter are qualified to do so.

§ 49:7.3 FINRA Has Proposed Revisions to Its Gifts Rule

In December 2014, FINRA published a report regarding its review of its gifts, gratuities, and non-cash compensation rules. In the report, FINRA recommended exploring certain rule amendments to better align investor protection benefits and the economic impacts. In August 2016, FINRA requested comment on certain proposed revisions to its current rule and guidance. The comment period expired in September 2016, but since that time there have been no further official communications from FINRA regarding the proposed rule changes and FINRA has not submitted a rule change proposal to the SEC in this respect.

The proposed revisions on which FINRA requested comment would, among other changes:

• Increase the $100 limit on gifts (per recipient, per year) to $175, which would take into account the rate of inflation since the current limit was adopted in 1992.

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197. FINRA Regulatory Notice 16-29 [Aug. 2016].
• Incorporate into the rule certain interpretive guidance previously issued, including NASD Notice to Members 06-69 and the Bereavement Gift Guidance Letter, both discussed above.

• Establish a separate rule regarding business entertainment, to be numbered FINRA Rule 3222. This rule would consolidate existing interpretive guidance regarding business entertainment, and require each member to adopt written policies and procedures relating to business entertainment tailored to its business needs under a principles-based approach.

§ 49:8 Licensing, Registration, and Exemptions from Registration

§ 49:8.1 U.S. Licensing: Series 7, 24, and 79

[A] Generally

Broker-dealer personnel are subject to individual registration under FINRA rules. Individuals ("associated persons") of a broker-dealer may, depending on their function, be required to be registered. The broker-dealer with whom associated persons are registered bears the responsibility for monitoring the individual's business dealings. There are two categories of registration—representatives and principals.

Representatives are persons associated with a FINRA member "who are engaged in the investment banking or securities business for the member including the functions of supervision, solicitation or conduct of business in securities or who are engaged in the training of persons associated with a member for any of these functions."198

The "principal" category encompasses persons "who are actively engaged in the management of the member’s investment banking or securities business, including supervision, solicitation, conduct of business or the training of persons associated with a member for any of these functions."199 Under FINRA rules, all members are required to have at least two registered principals.200

Both representatives and principals are required to take qualification examinations, often referenced by series numbers, the successful completion of which is a prerequisite for registration.

In October 2017, FINRA announced that the SEC had approved proposed rule changes, which, (i) consolidate FINRA’s registration rules;

198. NASD Membership and Registration Rule 1031(b).
199. NASD Membership and Registration Rule 1021(b).
200. NASD Membership and Registration Rule 1021(e)(1).
(ii) make a number of technical changes to permissible registration categories and related rules; and (iii) restructure the representative-level qualification examinations.201 These proposed rule changes are scheduled to take effect on October 1, 2018.202

[B] Series 7

This examination is the General Securities Representative Qualification Examination. It is intended to “assess the competency of entry-level General Securities Representatives.”203 The purpose of the assessment is to protect the investing public by ensuring the competency of broker-dealers.

[C] Series 24

This examination is the General Securities Principal Qualification Examination. It is “designed to test a candidate’s knowledge of the rules and statutory provisions applicable to the management of a general securities broker-dealer.”204 The purpose of the assessment is to ensure that principals are able to effectively supervise broker-dealer activity and observe compliance with pertinent rules and regulations.

[D] Series 79

This examination is the Investment Banking Representative Qualification Examination. It assesses the competency of entry-level investment bankers with the aim of protecting “the investing public by seeking to measure the degree to which each candidate possesses the knowledge, skills and abilities needed to perform the major functions of an entry-level investment banker.”205

__________________

202. Note that once changes to FINRA’s registration rules become effective, NASD Registration Rules will be renumbered FINRA Rules 1210–1240.
203. FINRA General Securities Representative Qualification Examination: Content Outline [2012].
204. FINRA General Securities Principal Qualification Examination: Study Outline [2012].
205. FINRA Investment Banking Representative Qualification Examination: Content Outline [2012]. Under Rule 1032(i), an associated person engaged in advising or facilitating private or public offerings of securities, or advising or facilitating mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, financial restructuring, asset sales and divestitures, or corporate reorganization is required to pass the Series 79 examination. Note, however, that the sales function by itself does not require that license if conducted outside of structuring and/or organization.
Effective October 1, 2018, individuals seeking representative-level registration will be required to pass the Securities Industry Essentials (SIE) examination, as well as a revised function-specific qualification examination (for example, Series 7). The SIE is designed to eliminate redundant testing of general securities knowledge across the representative-level examinations, including knowledge of basic products, the structure and function of the securities industry, the regulatory agencies and their functions, and regulated and prohibited practices. The revised function-specific examinations will focus on knowledge relevant to the day-to-day activities, responsibilities, and job functions of representatives. Individuals will be able to schedule the SIE and any function-specific examination(s) on the same day, subject to testing center availability. The SIE will be subject to a four-year expiration period, unlike the two-year registration lapse period that will continue to be applicable for representative- and principal-level registrations.

Under FINRA’s new consolidated registration rules, certain current and former registered representatives will be given credit for passing the SIE without having to sit for the exam:

- individuals whose registration as a representative was terminated between October 1, 2014, and September 30, 2018, provided they re-register as a representative within four years from the date of their last registration; and
- individuals who registered as representatives prior to October 1, 2018, and who continue to maintain those registrations on or after October 1, 2018.

FINRA’s upcoming consolidated registration rules will also retire a number of existing representative-level registration categories (for example, Government Securities Limited Representative (Series 72) and Assistant Representative—Order Processing (Series 11)).

An individual currently registered in one of these retired categories may maintain his or her existing registration until the individual is terminated and remains terminated for a period of two years.
Chart 49-4
Proposed Rules Changes to Principal-and Representative-Level Examination and Registration

The below chart captures the principal- and representative-level examination and registration changes under the Proposed Rules, as well as the addition of the Principal Financial Officer and Principal Operations Officer designations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registration Category</th>
<th>Existing Requirements and Prerequisites</th>
<th>Requirements and Prerequisites Under the Proposed Rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Representative-Level Registrations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment Company Representative</td>
<td>Series 6</td>
<td>SIE and Revised Series 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Securities Representative</td>
<td>Series 7</td>
<td>SIE and Revised Series 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Representative—Order Processing</td>
<td>Series 11</td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K. Securities Representative</td>
<td>Series 17</td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Participation Programs Representative</td>
<td>Series 22</td>
<td>SIE and Revised Series 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada Securities Representative—With Options</td>
<td>Series 37</td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada Securities Representative—No Options</td>
<td>Series 38</td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered Options Representative</td>
<td>Series 42</td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities Trader</td>
<td>Series 57</td>
<td>SIE and Revised Series 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Securities Representative</td>
<td>Series 62</td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Securities Limited Representative</td>
<td>Series 72</td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Registration Category** | **Existing Requirements and Prerequisites** | **Requirements and Prerequisites Under the Proposed Rules**
---|---|---
Investment Banking Representative | Series 79 | SIE and Revised Series 79
Private Securities Offerings Representative | Series 82 | SIE and Revised Series 82
Research Analyst | Series 7, 86, and 87 | SIE and Revised Series 86 and 87
Operations Professional | Series 99 | SIE and Revised Series 99

**Principal-Level Registration Changes and Additions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compliance Officer</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Unless an exemption is available, either registration as a General Securities Representative and Series 24 (General Securities Principal), or Series 14 (Compliance Official)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment Banking Principal</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Unless an exemption is available, registration as an Investment Banking Representative and Series 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Securities Offerings Principal</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Unless an exemption is available, registration as a Private Securities Offerings Representative and Series 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Principal</td>
<td>Series 24 and either the Series 16 or Series 87</td>
<td>Series 24 and either the Series 16 or the Series 86 and 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisory Analyst</td>
<td>Series 16 and at least three years of experience</td>
<td>Series 16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### New Principal Financial Officer and Principal Operations Officer Requirements Under FINRA’s Consolidated Registration Rules

Effective October 1, 2018, FINRA-member firms will be required to designate a:

- Principal Financial Officer with primary responsibility for financial filings and the related books and records; and

- Principal Operations Officer with primary responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the business, including overseeing the receipt and delivery of securities and funds; safeguarding customer and firm assets; calculation and collection of margin from customers; processing dividend receivables and payables;
and organization of redemptions, and maintaining books and records related to such activities.

While the day-to-day duties of these positions may be delegated to other principals of the firm, the ultimate responsibility for the functions must remain with the Principal Financial Officer and the Principal Operations Officer.

These designations will replace the existing requirement that all member firms designate a Chief Financial Officer, and that FINRA and NYSE dual-member firms also designate a Chief Operations Officer, and will apply to all firms, regardless of whether the firm is exempt from the requirement to have a Financial and Operations Principal ("FinOp") or an Introducing Broker-Dealer FinOp. Principal Financial Officers and Principal Operations Officers will be required to be registered as either a FinOp or Introducing Broker-Dealer FinOp, as applicable, and must be registered in the CRD system as Operations Professionals. With respect to these requirements, because Principal Financial Officers and Principal Operations Officers must also be registered as either FinOps or Introducing Broker-Dealer FinOps, they will not be required to pass the Operations Professional (Series 99) examination in order to register as Operations Professionals, as they already hold a qualifying registration.

Firms that are not self-clearing or do not provide clearing services are not required to designate separate individuals to serve as the Principal Financial Officer, Principal Operations Officer, and FinOp or Introducing Broker-Dealer FinOp. Firms that self-clear or provide clearing services, unless granted a limited-size waiver from FINRA, must designate separate individuals to serve as Principal Financial Officer and Principal Operations Officer. Such individuals, however, may also carry out FinOp responsibilities. A firm may designate multiple Principal Operations Officers in accordance with FINRA’s consolidated registration rules, but may not designate multiple Principal Financial Officers.

[H] Accepting Orders from Customers Under FINRA’s Consolidated Registration Rules

Effective October 1, 2018, unregistered persons will not be allowed to accept an order from a customer under any circumstances. In the event that a registered person is unavailable, an unregistered person will be permitted to transcribe order details if a customer contacts a firm to place an unsolicited order for the purchase or sale of securities. A registered person, however, will be required to subsequently contact

206. See FINRA Rule 1230.01 (noting that “[t]he function of accepting customer orders is not considered a clerical or ministerial function”).

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the customer to confirm the order details prior to the order being accepted.

§ 49:8.2 Activities of Non-U.S. Broker-Dealers

Broker-dealers located outside the United States that undertake securities transactions in the United States are required to register with the SEC. However, Rule 15a-6 allows foreign broker-dealers, who are not registered under the Exchange Act, to conduct certain limited activities in the United States and with U.S. persons without registering with the SEC. Under the rule, foreign broker-dealers may, subject to several conditions:

(i) effect “transactions in securities with or for persons that have not been solicited by the foreign broker or dealer,”207

(ii) furnish “research reports to major U.S. institutional investors, and effect transactions in the securities discussed in the research reports with or for those major U.S. institutional investors,”208

(iii) “induce the purchase or sale of any security by a U.S. institutional investor or a major U.S. institutional investor,”209 and, among other things, and

(iv) enter into securities transactions with SEC-registered broker-dealers, certain qualified U.S. banks, specific multilateral organizations, foreign persons temporarily in the United States, U.S. citizens resident abroad, and foreign branches and agencies of U.S. Persons.210

The Staff of the Division issued two important “no-action” letters, one in 2012 and the other in 2013, describing different means by which a non-U.S. broker-dealer may engage in certain M&A advisory activities without registration in accordance with Rule 15a-6.211 The 2012 letter, to E&Y Canada, stated that a Canadian M&A advisor could advise in respect of U.S. M&A transactions, provided that the following criteria are met:

• the transaction is a “private placement of stock or other forms of equity securities in the context of mergers or acquisitions that

207. SEC Rule 15a-6.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. SEC No-Action Letter [Re: Merger and Acquisition Activities of Foreign Firms in Reliance on Rule 15a-6] [July 12, 2012].
would result in the transfer of control of an entire company or business unit,”

- the customer’s total assets amount to $100 million, including assets that do not qualify as “financial” assets under the Nine Firms Letter (but excluding cash and cash equivalents),

- the total assets are calculated without factoring in the potential transaction, as described in the Nine Firms Letter,

- the customer’s balance sheet, or comparable financial statement, is prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles by a certified public accountant (or the non-U.S. equivalent, if appropriate), and

- if goodwill or intangibles are included in calculating the $100 million threshold, the customer’s financial statements must be (a) audited and (b) prepared in accordance with, or reconciled to, U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (or International Financial Reporting Standards, if appropriate).

The 2013 letter, to Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, permits a non-U.S. advisor to act in the following ways in respect of M&A transactions:

- initiate contact directly with potential U.S. targets and engage in certain additional activities,

- interact with “a U.S. target that is using internal or group level personnel with relevant M&A experience to negotiate the transaction, if the internal or group level personnel described above are not associated with a U.S. registered broker-dealer, provided [the advisor’s] personnel engaged in any contacts with U.S. Targets in the United States are limited to persons whom [the advisor] would have determined satisfy the requirements for ‘foreign associated persons’ in Rule 15(a)-6(a)(3)(B),” or

212.  *Id.*


214.  *Id.* “[T]otal assets,” under the Nine Firms Letter, are “calculated on a gross basis, without deduction for liabilities of the company, based on the balance sheet or comparable financial statements of the company prepared in the ordinary course of business.”


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• interact with “a U.S. Target that is using the services of an external advisor, such as a broker-dealer, attorney or other professional with relevant experience,” provided that:

• the M&A advisor “will not represent any U.S. Target and will not receive, acquire or hold funds or securities.”

§ 49:8.3 January 2014 FINRA Letter Regarding M&A Brokers

On January 31, 2014, the Staff of the Division issued a “no-action” letter permitting persons who qualify as “M&A Brokers” to facilitate the sale of private companies without registering with the SEC as broker-dealers, provided that the following criteria are met:

• the M&A Broker must not have the ability to bind either party to the M&A transaction;

• the M&A Broker must not provide financing for the transaction, and if the M&A Broker assists in finding financing, it must disclose any compensation in connection with that role in writing to the client;

• the M&A Broker must not control securities or funds related to the transaction;

• the transaction cannot involve a public offering;

• if the M&A Broker represents both parties, written disclosure and consent must be obtained;

• the M&A Broker can only facilitate a transaction with multiple buyers if the group was formed without assistance of the M&A Broker;

• the buyer must control and actively operate the company when the transaction is complete;

• the transaction cannot transfer an interest to a passive buyer;

• any securities the M&A Broker or the buyer receive must be restricted securities;

• the M&A Broker cannot have been suspended or barred from association with a broker-dealer by the SEC, FINRA, or any state regulator; and

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216. Id.
217. Id.
• the M&A Broker cannot engage in certain activities traditionally associated with a broker-dealer, such as participation in private placements (other than M&A transactions, as described), intermedation of secondary market transactions (including private sales of “less than” control stakes), market making, other secondary market trading; securities lending and finance (including advisory), underwriting or other capital leasing, public M&A (M&A transactions involving a public offering); and receipt of other than restricted securities by the M&A Broker.

§ 49:9 Anti-Money Laundering (AML)

§ 49:9.1 AML Program

The PATRIOT Act requires financial institutions to establish AML programs. The minimum AML standards are provided under section 352 of the PATRIOT Act. Broker-dealers are deemed to be compliant if they observe the AML programs required by their federal regulators or designated SRO.

Financial institutions are further required to comply with the economic and trade sanctions programs administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Prior to the opening of a new account or commencement of a transaction, broker-dealers must ensure that potential clients are not listed on the OFAC’s Specifically Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”) or are “Prohibited Persons” under OFAC’s sanctions program, and that prohibited financial instruments are not folded into the transaction.

Prior to the implementation of the Customer Due Diligence Rule (the “CDD Rule”), discussed in greater detail in section 49:9.4 below, broker-dealers were required to develop and implement an AML program that incorporated “four pillars” enumerated in the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). These four pillars are:

• the establishment and implementation of policies, procedures, and internal controls reasonably designed to achieve compliance

220. SIFMA’s Anti-Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Committee, 2008: Guidance for Deterring Money Laundering and Terrorist Financial Activity, at 4 (Feb. 2008). One recent issue U.S. financial institutions have had to consider is the AML treatment of customers that are involved in marijuana-related business that are legal on the state level. In 2014, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued Guidance FIN-2014-G001 clarifying Bank Secrecy Act expectations for financial institutions seeking to provide services to marijuana-related businesses.
with the applicable provisions of the BSA and the implementing regulations thereunder;

- independent testing for compliance to be conducted by the broker-dealer’s personnel or by a qualified outside party;

- designation of an individual or individuals responsible for implementing and monitoring the operations and internal controls of the program; and

- ongoing training for appropriate persons.\textsuperscript{222}

The CDD Rule adds a “fifth pillar” to these requirements:

appropriate risk-based procedures for conducting ongoing customer due diligence, to include, but not be limited to: (i) understanding the nature and purpose of customer relationships for the purpose of developing a customer risk profile; and (ii) conducting ongoing monitoring to identify and report suspicious transactions and, on a risk basis, to maintain and update customer information.\textsuperscript{223}

\section*{§ 49:9.2 OFAC Compliance}

A broker-dealer’s OFAC obligations continue after the establishment of a customer account.

The SDN List is periodically updated. As a result, firms need to periodically screen their databases of existing accounts and securities in custody against the updated lists.

In the event that a firm discovers any prohibited securities or accounts held by, or on behalf of, a Prohibited Person, it should take appropriate action depending on the applicable sanctions regime. The firm may be “obligated either to (a) reject the transaction, or (b) freeze the funds or securities and establish a blocked account to hold the frozen assets.”\textsuperscript{224}

\begin{enumerate}[222.]
\item SIFMA, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMITTEE, 2008: GUIDANCE FOR DETERRING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCIAL ACTIVITY, at 4 [Feb. 2008].
\end{enumerate}
Following the rejection of a transaction or the freezing of an account, the broker-dealer is required to notify OFAC by the submission of the applicable reporting form within ten days. An annual report on blocked property must also be filed with OFAC by September 30 of each year.\footnote{225} Broker-dealers, though not required by law to implement this, are advised to create internal OFAC compliance programs appropriate for their individual risk profiles. A firm’s risk profile may be determined by a combined analysis of its products, services, client base, and geographic location. The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council has on its website a manual to assist in this connection.\footnote{226}

As a general matter, a broker-dealer’s OFAC compliance program should have an appointed person with an oversight function and be subject to independent verification of its effectiveness. In addition, appropriate personnel must receive proper training in OFAC compliance.

\section*{§ 49:9.3 KYC Compliance}

A firm’s Know Your Customer (KYC) policy is a cornerstone of an AML compliance program. On October 1, 2003, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the SEC jointly issued the customer identification program rule (the “CIP Rule”) for broker-dealers.

The CIP Rule requires broker-dealers to implement, document, and maintain a written CIP that is integrated within the firm’s general AML program. Pursuant to FINRA Rule 3310, a broker-dealer’s CIP must be approved by its senior management. Overall, a firm’s CIP must provide it with grounds for a reasonable belief that it knows the persons with whom it transacts.

Key aspects of the CIP Rule include collecting sufficient identification information from customers upon the opening of new accounts and subsequently verifying that information within a reasonable time by, among other things, checking for customer identities on known and suspected terrorist lists.

Under the CIP Rule, a customer is a person who opens a new account with a broker-dealer or a person who opens a new account on behalf of another person or of an entity.\footnote{227} There are exclusions from the definition of customer, which cover, inter alia, entities that have existing accounts with a broker-dealer, entities that present little
danger of money laundering such as government entities, and entities regulated by the federal government in other ways. In 2016, FinCEN adopted new anti-money laundering regulations that impose additional customer due diligence requirements on covered financial institutions, including broker-dealers, referred to as the “CDD Rule.” The effective date for CDD Rule compliance was May 11, 2018. For more information on the CDD Rule, see section 49:9.4 below.228

The definition of the term “account” under the CIP Rule is very broad, and encompasses not only traditional transactions such as the purchase and sale of securities but also such dealings as securities lending and borrowing and the holding of securities or other assets for safekeeping or as collateral.229 However, accounts acquired by broker-dealers through acquisition, merger, purchase of assets, or assumption of liabilities, or accounts opened for the purpose of participating in an ERISA employee benefit plan are not considered “accounts” under the CIP Rule.230

There are three items that broker-dealers must undertake to comply with the CIP Rule: (1) broker-dealers must obtain certain specified information regarding each customer before opening an account; (2) they must verify such information within a reasonable time before or after the opening of the account; and (3) they must specify in their CIP procedures when they will rely on identification procedures that are documentary (for example, photographic ID) or non-documentary (for example, checking the customer’s references with other financial institutions). In addition, the CIP Rule requires broker-dealers to maintain records of the preceding measures and the descriptions of the manner in which discrepancies discovered in the client identification process are resolved.

A broker-dealer may rely on the performance of CIP procedures by another financial institution with which it has an account relationship. Such reliance is subject to the following provisions: (1) that it be reasonable under the circumstances, (2) that the other financial institution be regulated by a federal functional regulator and required to implement an AML compliance program, and [3] that

228. A “legal entity customer” is defined as any corporation, limited liability company, or other entity that is created by the filing of a public document with a secretary of state or similar office, a general partnership, and any similar entity formed under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, that opens an account. Note that public companies and certain entities that are subject to a pre-existing regulatory regime, such as generally registered investment companies, investment advisers, and broker-dealers are excluded from the definition of “legal entity customer.” See CDD Rule, 31 C.F.R. § 1010.230(e)(1) and 31 C.F.R. § 1010.230(e)(2).


the broker-dealer has annually certified to the relying financial institution requiring the latter to attest that it has an AML program meeting the applicable requirements and will undertake the performance of specified CIP obligations.\textsuperscript{231}

\section*{\textsection{} 49:9.4 \ Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions (the “CDD Rule”)}

\textbf{[A]} \textbf{The CDD Rule}

May 11, 2018, marked the compliance date for the CDD Rule issued by FinCEN on May 11, 2016\textsuperscript{232} [as later amended on September 28, 2017, to make certain technical corrections\textsuperscript{233}].\textsuperscript{234}

The CDD Rule represents a departure from prior FinCEN rules, under which financial institutions exercised their own judgment, making risk-based assessments as to when and how to identify and verify beneficial owner information for legal entity accounts, except in respect of specific cases.

Under the CDD Rule, “covered financial institutions”\textsuperscript{235} must establish procedures to:

\begin{itemize}
  \item insured banks (as defined in section 3[h] of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act);
  \item commercial banks;
  \item agencies or branches of a foreign bank in the United States;
  \item federally insured credit unions;
  \item savings associations;
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{231} 31 C.F.R. § 103.122[b][6]. Note also that in accordance with specified SEC guidance, reliance on the CIP of a U.S. registered investment adviser is permitted, notwithstanding that investment advisers are not formally required to maintain AML programs.


\textsuperscript{235} Covered Financial Institution. The CDD Rule applies to all financial institutions currently subject to CIP requirements, which include:
• identify each natural person that directly or indirectly owns 25% or more of the equity interests of a “legal entity customer” (the “ownership prong”);

236. Legal Entity Customer. The CDD Rule requires covered financial institutions to obtain beneficial ownership information for a “corporation, limited liability company or other entity that is created by the filing of a public document with a Secretary of State or similar office, a general partnership and any similar entity formed under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction that opens an account.” Entities that are excluded from the definition of legal entity customer include:

• financial institutions regulated by a federal functional regulator or banks regulated by a state bank regulator;
• departments or agencies of the United States, of any state, or of any political subdivision of a state;
• entities (other than a bank) whose common stock or analogous equity interests are listed on the New York, American, or NASDAQ stock exchanges;
• issuers of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act or that are required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act;
• investment companies, as defined in section 3 of the Investment Company Act, registered with the SEC;
• SEC-registered investment advisers, as defined in section 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940;
• exchanges, clearing agencies, or any other entity registered with the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act;
• registered entities, commodity pool operators, commodity trading advisors, retail foreign exchange dealers, swap dealers, or major swap participants, defined in section 1a of the Commodity Exchange Act, registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission;

(Broker-Dealer Reg., Rel. #14, 9/18) 49–107
• identify one natural person with “significant responsibility to control, manage or direct” a legal entity customer, including an executive officer or senior manager (for example, a Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Operating Officer, Managing Member, General Partner, President, Vice President, or Treasurer); or any other individual who regularly performs similar functions \(^{237}\) (the “control prong”), which may be a person reported under the ownership prong; and

• verify the identities of those persons according to risk-based procedures, which procedures must include the elements currently required under the CIP Rule at a minimum.

Identification of those beneficial owners of a “legal entity customer” must be conducted at the time a new “account”\(^{238}\) is opened. In addition, covered financial institutions are required to obtain a

• bank holding companies, as defined in section 2 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956;

• pooled investment vehicles operated or advised by a financial institution excluded from the beneficial ownership requirement;

• insurance companies regulated by a state;

• financial market utilities designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council under Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act;

• non-U.S. financial institutions established in a jurisdiction where such institution’s regulator maintains beneficial ownership information regarding such institution; and

• legal entities opening private banking accounts.

237. This list of positions is illustrative, not exclusive, as there is significant diversity in how legal entities are structured.

238. Account. Generally, “account” means a formal relationship established to provide or engage in services, dealings, or other financial transactions, but its definition depends on the entity hosting the account.

• For banks, “account” means a formal banking relationship established to provide or engage in services, dealings, or other financial transactions, including a deposit account, a transaction or asset account, a credit account, or other extension of credit. “Account” also includes a relationship established to provide a safety deposit box or other safekeeping services, or cash management, custodian, and trust services.

• For broker-dealers, “account” means a formal relationship established to effect transactions in securities, including, but not limited to, the purchase or sale of securities and securities loaned and borrowed activity, and to hold securities or other assets for safekeeping or as collateral.

• For mutual funds, “account” means any contractual or other business relationship between a person and a mutual fund established to effect
certification from the individual opening an account on behalf of a legal entity customer that identifies any individuals who meet the definitions under the ownership or control prongs.

Under the CDD rule, a financial institution is required to verify the identity of such persons using risk-based procedures that include, at minimum, the same documentary and non-documentary elements required under the CIP Rule (although under the CDD Rule, non-original documents may be accepted, subject to conditions). The institution is not, however, required to verify the fact of the identified beneficial owner’s relationship to the legal entity, absent a financial institution’s knowledge to the contrary. Therefore, for example, a financial institution does not need to independently verify whether or not the individual(s) presented as 25% owners are the only individuals who fall within the ownership prong.

FinCEN has stated that financial institutions should use the collected beneficial ownership information as they use other information they gather regarding customers (for example, through compliance with CIP requirements), including for compliance with OFAC regulations and currency transaction reporting (CTR) aggregation requirements.

The CDD Rule only applies to accounts opened on or after May 11, 2018, but FinCEN noted that institutions may, as a prudential matter, decide to collect the same information from accounts opened prior to May 11, 2018. The CDD Rule provides important exclusions and exemptions for pooled investment vehicles, as well as other entity types.

[B] FINRA Rule 3310

In anticipation of the compliance date of the CDD Rule, FINRA amended Rule 3310 (Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Program) (“Rule 3310”) to better align the rule’s language with that of the CDD Rule.239

The amendments add a new subsection [f] to Rule 3310, which require that member broker-dealer’s AML programs include appropriate risk-based procedures for conducting ongoing customer due

transactions in securities issued by the mutual fund, including the purchase or sale of securities.

• For futures commission merchants or introducing brokers in commodities, “account” means a formal relationship, including, but not limited to, those established to effect transactions in contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, options on any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery, or options on a commodity.

diligence, to include, but not be limited to: (i) understanding the nature and purpose of customer relationships for the purpose of developing a customer risk profile; and (ii) conducting ongoing monitoring to identify and report suspicious transactions and, on a risk basis, to maintain and update customer information [including information regarding the beneficial owners of legal entity customers].

In adopting these amendments, FINRA echoed language in the CDD Rule that the amendments to Rule 3310 do not represent “new law,” and in FINRA’s view merely codify existing expectations for firms, and reminded firms to ensure that their AML programs were updated, as necessary, to comply with the May 11, 2018, CDD Rule compliance date and Rule 3310 effective date.

§ 49:10 IPO Allocation and Client Sophistication

§ 49:10.1 IPO Allocation

[A] Overview

FINRA Rules 5130 and 5131 restrict FINRA members with respect to the purchase, sale, and allocation of new issues. Rules 5130 and 5131 serve an overarching purpose: to prevent broker-dealers from allocating securities to individuals in a position to direct brokerage or investment banking business back to the broker-dealer. FINRA Rule 5130 specifically aims to prevent the allocation of securities to other broker-dealers and other restricted persons (as defined below) to prevent quid-pro-quo arrangements with individuals in a position to direct brokerage business back to the allocating broker-dealer. Correspondingly, Rule 5131 aims to prevent the allocation of IPO securities to persons that are in a position to direct investment banking business back to the allocating broker. As a practical matter, investment funds face certification requirements under Rules 5130 and 5131 by making annual representations about their eligibility to acquire new issues.

[B] FINRA Rule 5130—the “New Issue” Rule

Rule 5130 prohibits the purchase and sale of new issue securities to accounts in which a “restricted person” has a beneficial interest. 240

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240. “Restricted persons” include FINRA members and other broker-dealers, broker-dealer personnel, finders and fiduciaries, portfolio managers, owners of broker-dealers, and certain immediate family members of these persons. Principals and employees of fund managers are generally restricted persons. For a complete list, see FINRA Rule 5130(i)(10)(A)-(E).
In addition to exempting certain types of accounts, the Rule creates a *de minimis* holdings exception. Rule 5130(c)(4) exempts accounts from IPO allocation restrictions where holdings of restricted persons, in the aggregate, comprise no more than 10% of the beneficial holdings.

Both Rule 5130 and 5131 except from their prohibitions certain types of accounts. These accounts include:

1. An investment company registered under the Investment Company Act;
2. A common trust fund or similar fund as described in section 3(a)(12)(A)(iii) of the Exchange Act, provided that:
   - the fund has investments from 1,000 or more accounts; and
   - the fund does not limit beneficial interests in the fund principally to trust accounts of restricted persons;
3. An insurance company general, separate or investment account, provided that:
   - the account is funded by premiums from 1,000 or more policyholders, or, if a general account, the insurance company has 1,000 or more policyholders; and
   - the insurance company does not limit the policyholders whose premiums are used to fund the account principally to restricted persons, or, if a general account, the insurance company does not limit its policyholders principally to restricted persons;
4. An account if the beneficial interests of restricted persons do not exceed in the aggregate 10% of such account;
5. A publicly traded entity (other than a broker-dealer or an affiliate of a broker-dealer where such broker-dealer is authorized to engage in the public offering of new issues either as a selling group member or underwriter) that:
   - is listed on a national securities exchange; or
   - is a foreign issuer whose securities meet the quantitative designation criteria for listing on a national securities exchange;
6. An investment company organized under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, provided that:
   - the investment company is listed on a foreign exchange for sale to the public or authorized for sale to the public by a foreign regulatory authority; and
   - no person owning more than 5% of the shares of the investment company is a restricted person;
7. An Employee Retirement Income Security Act benefits plan that is qualified under Section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, provided that such plan is not sponsored solely by a broker-dealer;
8. A state or municipal government benefits plan that is subject to state and/or municipal regulation;
9. A tax-exempt charitable organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code; or

(Broker-Dealer Reg., Rel. #14, 9/18) 49–111
ownership of the collective investment account. The investment vehicle may comply with the 10% “de minimis” exemption by limiting the profit and loss from new issue securities allocated to restricted persons to no more than 10% through a “carve-down” or similar procedure. This “carve-down” procedure is one of the principal ways in which investment funds comply with the Rule.

[C] Practical Compliance Steps

In order to comply with the requirements of Rule 5130, broker-dealers must ask private investment funds, including hedge funds, to make a representation regarding their eligibility to acquire IPO securities.

In order to make that representation, collective investment vehicles such as funds will need to confirm that the aggregate beneficial ownership of restricted persons among their investors has not changed since the certifications made in the subscription documents and that this aggregate does not exceed the 10% threshold.

Third-party vendors collect databases of eligible purchasers and make those databases available to broker-dealers.

[D] Frequency of Representation

FINRA members must ensure that these representations are given annually, while the initial representation by a fund manager to a FINRA member must be an affirmative representation, thereafter may be updated annually using negative consent letters.

[E] FINRA Rule 5131(b): The Prohibition on Spinning

[E][1] Generally

Rule 5131(b) prohibits the allocation by a FINRA member of new issue securities to any account (including, as in Rule 5130, any investment fund or other collective investment vehicle) in which an

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[10] A church plan under section 414(e) of the Internal Revenue Code. See FINRA Rule 5130(c)(1)–(10) and FINRA Rule 5131(b)(2) adopting the exceptions laid out in FINRA Rule 5130(c).

242. “Beneficial interest” or “beneficial ownership” is defined in Rule 5130(j)(1) to mean any economic interest, such as the right to share in gains or losses. The receipt of a management- or performance-based fee for operating a collective investment account, or other fees for acting in a fiduciary capacity, is not considered to be a beneficial interest in the account.
executive officer or director of a “public company”\textsuperscript{243} or “covered nonpublic company”\textsuperscript{244} has a beneficial economic interest, \textsuperscript{245} [including the right to share in gains or losses], if:

(1) the company is currently an investment banking client of the member;

(2) in the twelve-month period prior to the allocation, the member received compensation from the company for investment banking services;

(3) the FINRA member expects to provide or be retained for investment banking services in the three-month period following the allocation; or

(4) such allocation is made on the condition that such executive officer or director, on behalf of the company, retain the member for performance of future investment banking services.

\textbf{[E][2] 25% De Minimis Test for Collective Investment Accounts}

Rule 5131 permits allocations of new issues to an account, including a collective investment vehicle such as a fund, in which the collective beneficial interests of executive officers and directors of a particular company and persons materially supported by such executive officers and directors in the aggregate are less than 25% of such account. By contrast, the analogous exemption in Rule 5130 described above applies to accounts in which restricted persons have an aggregate beneficial interest of no greater than 10%.\textsuperscript{246}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{243} A “public company” is any company that is registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act or files periodic reports pursuant to section 15(d) thereof. FINRA Rule 5131(e)[1].
\item \textsuperscript{244} “Covered nonpublic company” means any nonpublic company satisfying the following criteria: (i) income of at least $1 million in the last fiscal year or in two of the last three fiscal years and shareholders’ equity of at least $15 million; (ii) shareholders’ equity of at least $30 million and a two-year operating history; or (iii) total assets and total revenue of at least $75 million in the latest fiscal year or in two of the last three fiscal years. FINRA Rule 5131(e)[3].
\item \textsuperscript{245} See FINRA Rule 5131(e)(2) adopting the definition of “beneficial interest” as set out in FINRA Rule 5130(i)[1].
\item \textsuperscript{246} Additionally, Rule 5131, like Rule 5130, is both a threshold exemption and an allocation device, permitting a fund to limit the profit and loss from new issue securities to no more than 25%.
\end{itemize}
[F] **2013 Amendment to Rule 5131**

In 2013, the SEC approved an amendment to Rule 5131 that allowed a fund-of-funds to rely on a written representation obtained within the prior twelve months from an unaffiliated private fund that does not look through to its beneficial owners, provided that the unaffiliated private fund meets certain other indicia of independence. Specifically, the unaffiliated private fund must: (a) be managed by an investment adviser; (b) have assets greater than $50 million; (c) own less than 25% of the account and not be a fund in which a single investor has a beneficial interest of 25% or more; and (d) not have been formed for the specific purpose of investing in the account.²⁴⁷

The amendment’s relief does not extend to beneficial owners that are control persons of the investment adviser to the applicable unaffiliated private fund. The account (for example, fund-of-funds) does, therefore, need to look through to its beneficial owners to the extent that such beneficial owners are control persons of the applicable unaffiliated private fund.

[F][1] **Other IPO Allocation Regulations Set Forth in Rule 5131**

[F][1][a] **Quid Pro Quo Allocations**

Rule 5131(a) prohibits the offer of new issue securities or the threat to withhold new issue securities as consideration or inducement for the receipt of compensation that is “excessive” in relation to the services provided to the customer by the FINRA member.²⁴⁸

[F][1][b] **Policies Concerning Flipping**

Rule 5131(c) prohibits FINRA members from penalizing registered representatives of a FINRA member whose customers have “flipped” a new issue, unless a penalty bid has been imposed on the member by the managing underwriter.

FINRA members must promptly record and maintain information regarding any penalties or disincentives assessed on their associated persons in connection with a penalty bid.

²⁴⁷. For more information on the amendment to Rule 5131, see SHEARMAN & STERLING, SEC APPROVES AMENDMENT TO FINRA IPO ALLOCATION RULE 5131, EASING COMPLIANCE FOR FUND INVESTORS [Dec. 6, 2013] (client publication). FINRA has in its interpretive guidance clarified that, for purposes of this provision, a family office qualifies as an “investment adviser.”

²⁴⁸. See FINRA Rule 5131(a). Whether or not compensation is “excessive” is based upon all of the relevant facts and circumstances, including, where applicable, the level of risk and effort involved in the transaction and the rates generally charged for such services. Regulatory Notice 10-60 adopting the rule [hereinafter SEC Adopting Notice].
[F][1][c] New Issue Pricing and Trading Practices

[F][1][c][i] Reports of Indications of Interest and Final Allocations

Under FINRA Rule 5131(d)(1), the book-running lead manager must provide to the issuer a report of indications of interest, including the names of interested institutional investors and the number of shares indicated by each, and a report of aggregate demand from retail investors, and after the IPO settlement date, a report of the final allocation of shares.249

[F][1][c][ii] Restriction on Transfer of the Issuer’s Shares by Officers and Directors of the Issuer

Under Rule 5131(d)(2), any lock-up agreement or other restriction on the transfer of the issuer’s shares by officers and directors of the issuer entered into in connection with a new issue must provide that such restrictions will also apply to any issuer-directed shares received by such officers or directors.

The agreement must also require that at least two business days prior to the release of any lock-up, the lead manager will notify the issuer and make an announcement through a major news service. In essence, underwriters are not permitted to waive lock-ups without providing prior notice to market participants.250

[F][1][c][iii] Agreement Among Underwriters

Under Rule 5131(d)(3), the agreement among syndicate members must provide that, to the extent not inconsistent with Regulation M, shares trading at a premium to the IPO price returned by a purchaser to a syndicate member after trading commences will be allotted to the syndicate short position.251

[F][1][c][iv] Market Orders

Under Rule 5131(d)(4), no FINRA member may accept a market order for the purchase of shares of a new issue in the secondary market

249. See FINRA Rule 5131(d)(1).
250. FINRA confirms that these provisions apply only to lock-up agreements entered into in connection with a new issue. See Rule 5131(d)(2) and the SEC Adopting Notice, supra note 248, at 18. See FINRA Rule 5131(d)(2).
251. If no short position exists, the member must offer returned shares at the public offering price to unfilled customers’ orders pursuant to a random allocation methodology or sell returned shares on the secondary market and donate profits from the sale to an unaffiliated charitable organization with the condition that the donation be treated as an anonymous donation to avoid any reputational benefit to the member. See FINRA Rule 5131(d)(3).
prior to the commencement of trading of such shares in the secondary market.

§ 49:10.2 QIB Certification

[A] Introduction

Rule 144A is a safe harbor exemption from the registration requirements of section 5 of the Securities Act for certain offers and sales of qualifying securities by certain persons other than the issuer of the securities. The exemption applies so long as the seller has a “reasonable belief” that the buyers of the securities are qualified institutional buyers, commonly referred to as “QIBs.”

[B] Qualification As a QIB

In general, a QIB is any entity included within one of the categories of “accredited investor” defined in Rule 501 of Regulation D, acting for its own account or the accounts of other QIBs, that in the aggregate owns and invests on a discretionary basis at least $100 million in securities of issuers not affiliated with the entity. While a QIB may be formed merely for the purpose of investing in a Rule 144A transaction, the amount of securities to be purchased in the Rule 144A offering cannot be included in calculating the amount of securities owned or invested by a QIB.252

[C] How a Broker-Dealer Qualifies As a QIB

In general, a broker-dealer qualifies as a QIB if it owns or invests on a discretionary basis at least $10 million in securities of issuers not affiliated with the entity. A broker-dealer acting as a riskless principal for an identified QIB would itself be deemed a QIB. To qualify as a riskless principal, the broker-dealer must have a commitment from the QIB that it will simultaneously purchase the securities from the broker-dealer. The QIB status must be effective at the time of purchase in the Rule 144A transaction.

[D] Reasonable Belief

To satisfy the “Reasonable Belief” requirement, the reseller (and any person acting on any of the reseller’s behalf) may rely on the following, provided the information is of a date not more than sixteen months (or eighteen months for a foreign purchaser) preceding the sale:

- The purchaser’s most recent publicly available annual financial statements;

• Information filed with (a) the SEC, another U.S. federal, state or local governmental agency, or a self-regulatory organization, or (b) a foreign governmental agency or foreign self-regulatory organization;

• Information in a recognized securities manual; or

• A certification by the purchaser’s chief financial or other executive officer specifying the amount of securities owned and invested as of a date on, or since, the end of the buyer’s most recent fiscal year.

§ 49:10.3 FINRA Regulation of Suitability

[A] Introduction

FINRA Rule 2111 requires that a broker-dealer, prior to the recommendation of a transaction or investment strategy involving a security or securities, must have a reasonable basis to believe that the recommendation is suitable for the customer. The test for suitability is based on information obtained through the reasonable diligence of the member or associated person in ascertaining the customer’s investor profile. There is no automatic or self-executing exception or exclusion from the suitability requirement for institutional or investment banking activities.

[B] Components of Suitability Obligations

Rule 2111 is composed of three main obligations: (1) reasonable-basis suitability, (2) customer-specific suitability, and (3) quantitative suitability.

[B][1] The Reasonable Basis Obligation

This obligation requires a member or associated person to have a reasonable basis to believe, based on reasonable diligence, that the recommendation is suitable for at least some investors. What constitutes reasonable diligence will vary depending on the facts of the situation.253

[B][2] The Customer-Specific Obligation

This obligation requires that a broker-dealer have a reasonable basis to believe that the recommendation is suitable for a particular

253. Facts to be considered are the complexity of and risks associated with the security or investment strategy and the member’s or associated person’s familiarity with the security or investment strategy. See Supplementary Materials to Rule 2111.
customer based on that customer’s investment profile, as delineated in Rule 2111(a).

[B][3] Quantitative Suitability

This requires a member or associated person who has actual or de facto control over a customer account to have a reasonable basis for believing that a series of recommended transactions, even if suitable when viewed in isolation, are not excessive and unsuitable for the customer when taken together in light of the customer’s investment profile, as delineated in Rule 2111(a).

[C] Customers and Potential Investors

The suitability obligations attach when the transaction occurs but the suitability of the recommendation is evaluated based on the circumstances that existed at the time the recommendation to the customer was made.

[D] Institutional Suitability

FINRA Rule 2111(b) provides an exemption to customer-specific suitability for recommendations to institutional customers under certain circumstances. FINRA Rule 2111(b) defines an “institutional account” by reference to FINRA’s “books and records” rule, Rule 4512(c). “Institutional account” means the account of a bank, savings and loan association, insurance company, registered investment company, registered investment adviser, or any other person (whether a natural person, corporation, partnership, trust, or otherwise) with total assets of at least $50 million.\(^{254}\)

A firm that receives an affirmative attestation of independent investment analysis and decision-making from an institutional customer fulfills its customer-specific obligation, but not its reasonable basis and quantitative obligations under the suitability rule. FINRA has emphasized that, even when institutional customers are involved, it is crucial that brokers understand the securities they recommend and that those securities are appropriate for at least some investors. FINRA also believes that it is important that a firm not recommend an unsuitable number of transactions in those circumstances where it has control over the account. FINRA emphasizes, however, that quantitative suitability generally would apply only with regard to that portion of an institutional customer’s portfolio that the firm controls and only with regard to the firm’s recommended transactions.

\(^{254}\) See FINRA Rule 4512(c).
[E] **Suitability Requirements for Institutional Accounts**

A broker-dealer fulfills the customer-specific obligation for an institutional account if:

1. The member or associated person has a reasonable basis to believe that the institutional customer is capable of evaluating investment risks independently; and

2. The institutional customer affirmatively indicates that it is exercising independent judgment in evaluating the broker dealer’s recommendations. With respect to having to indicate affirmatively that it is exercising independent judgment in evaluating the member’s or associated person’s recommendations, an institutional customer may indicate that it is exercising independent judgment on a trade-by-trade basis, on an asset-class-by-asset-class basis, or in terms of all potential transactions for its account.

[F] **Compliance with the Exception**

In general, FINRA has stated that Rule 2111 generally does not impose explicit documentation requirements. Firms may take a risk-based approach to document compliance with the suitability rule.255 The level of documented analysis will vary based on the complexity and risks associated with a particular security or investment strategy.256 Although third-party vendors have created “Institutional Suitability Certificates” to facilitate compliance with the institutional customer exemption by obtaining suitability waivers from various institutional clients, FINRA has not approved or endorsed any specific certificate created by a third-party vendor. Furthermore, as FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-25 emphasizes, FINRA does not require broker-dealers to use such certificates to comply with the exemption in Rule 2111(b). There are a number of ways to comply with the Institutional Customer Exemption. Some suggestions are enumerated below.

Firms may:

- Tailor account opening documents or separate forms or certificates through which the institutional customer acknowledges in writing that it will exercise independent judgment in evaluating recommendations.

- Contact institutional customers to discuss affirmative indications and documentation of the conversation.

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255. As stated in Regulatory Notices 11-25, 12-25, 12-55.
256. Regulatory Notice 12-55.
• Use third-party vendors to verify the institutional status and sophistication of customers.

[GG] SEC Proposed Rule: Regulation Best Interest

In April 2018, the SEC took the long-awaited step of issuing a proposed rulemaking that, if adopted, would impose a “best interest” standard of care on broker-dealers making recommendations to retail investors. The broker-dealer standard of care, and its divergence from the fiduciary standard applicable to U.S. Registered Investment Advisers, had been a prominent regulatory topic for some time. The Dodd-Frank Act required the SEC to evaluate regulatory standards of care, and in 2011, the SEC Staff released a study and made several recommendations addressing retail customer confusion about the differing standards of care applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers.

Although only applicable to recommendations made to retail investors, Regulation Best Interest is worthy of note in an investment banking context both for the broad shift it would represent in the industry generally, and with respect to any offers and sales made to retail customers in respect of an investment banking transaction. Proposed Regulation Best Interest, to be implemented under the Exchange Act, would create a principles-based standard that requires brokers, dealers, or associated persons of a broker-dealer to act in the best interest of a retail customer,257 without placing their financial or other interests ahead of the customer, when recommending a securities transaction or investment strategy involving securities.258 This best interest obligation is satisfied if the broker, dealer, or associated person complies with separate disclosure,259 conflicts of interest,260 and care obligations.

257. For purposes of Regulation Best Interest, a retail customer is a person who uses the recommendation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

258. Critically, the standard of care proposed in Regulation Best Interest would apply solely to broker-dealers. Regulation Best Interest does not represent a uniform broker-dealer and investment adviser standard. In this regard, the SEC proposes certain interpretations of the investment adviser’s fiduciary duty, and in doing so notes that the standards of conduct for broker-dealers and investment advisers retain differences on account of “different relationship types and models for providing advice.”

259. This prong of the best interest obligation requires broker-dealers or associated persons, prior to providing a recommendation to a retail customer, to reasonably disclose in writing, the material facts relating to the relationship with the retail investor, including all material conflicts of interest.

260. This obligation requires broker-dealers to establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and, at
The care obligation closely tracks the language of FINRA Rule 2111 and requires a broker-dealer or associated person to exercise reasonable diligence, care, skill, and prudence to:

- Understand the potential risks and rewards of the recommendation, and have a reasonable basis to believe that the recommendation could be in the best interest of at least some retail investors;
- Have a reasonable basis to believe that the recommendation is in the best interest of the particular retail investor; and
- Have a reasonable basis to conclude that a series of recommendations, when viewed together, is not excessive and in the retail investor’s best interest.

Given the scope of the proposed Regulation Best Interest and the volume of questions on which the SEC solicited comment, it seems likely that the regulation would not be adopted and effective for some time.

§ 49:11 Books and Records

§ 49:11.1 SEC Recordkeeping Requirements

[A] Introduction

SEC Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4 under the Exchange Act prescribe minimum standards for the creation, retention and preservation of records that apply to broker-dealers. The general principle behind the regulatory framework governing recordkeeping is that a FINRA broker-dealer must maintain records if it “intends to communicate, or permits its associated persons to communicate, through social media sites” and those electronic communications “relate to the firm’s business as such.”261 In that respect, two core aspects of any record-retention program relating to an investment banking business are (1) email retention and (2) retention of the “deal file.”

minimum, disclose or eliminate all material conflicts of interest associated with a recommendation, and to identify, disclose, and mitigate, or eliminate material conflicts of interest that arise from any financial incentives associated with a recommendation.

§ 49:11.1 BROKER-DEALER REGULATION

[B] Retention of E-mail and Text Messages

In the Electronic Records Release, issued in 1997, the SEC described the application of recordkeeping requirements to electronic communications.\(^{262}\) Although electronic communications technology has evolved, the Electronic Records Release still establishes the basic principle underlying record-keeping requirements applicable to e-mail and text messages. The SEC in the Electronic Records Release stated that for record-retention purposes under Rule 17a-4, the content of the electronic communication is determinative. Therefore, broker-dealers must retain those e-mail and Internet communications which relate to the broker-dealer’s “business as such.”\(^{263}\) Broker-dealers are required to preserve for a period of not less than three years, the first two years in an easily accessible place, originals of all communications received and copies of all communications sent by the firm or its employees relating to its business. These rules apply to electronic communications and text messaging as well.\(^{264}\) Therefore, firms must ensure that their use of e-mails and text messages is consistent with these supervisory and retention obligations.

[C] Rule 17a-3 Recordkeeping Requirements

The required retention periods for various types of documents relating to a broker-dealer’s business are set forth in Rule 17a-3. Most documents must be retained for periods of either three or six years, in either case for the first two years in an easily accessible place. However, certain kinds of documents must be retained for the life of the enterprise.

Some examples of applicable retention periods are as follows:

- Trade blotters, ledgers: Not less than six (6) years; two (2) years easily accessible.
- Order tickets: Not less than three (3) years; two (2) years easily accessible.
- Net capital records: Not less than three (3) years; two (2) years easily accessible.
- Business communications: Not less than three (3) years; two (2) years easily accessible.

\(^{263}\) Electronic Records Release, infra note 267, at 16.
\(^{264}\) See, for example, the July 2016 FINRA enforcement action against Motilal Oswal Securities, in which FINRA imposed a fine for failure to retain WhatsApp and Bloomberg messages related to its business as such. See Motilal Oswal Sec. Int’l Priv. Ltd., Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent (July 6, 2016).
• Employment records: At least three (3) years after the “associated person” has terminated employment.

• Fingerprint records: Life of enterprise, at least two (2) years easily accessible.

• Regulatory inquiries: Until three (3) years after date of the report, easily accessible.

• Exception reports: Until eighteen (18) months after the report was generated easily accessible and until three (3) years after termination of use.

[D] Communications with the Public

Rule 17a-3[a][20] requires broker-dealers to document that they have complied with, or adopted policies and procedures reasonably designed to comply with, federal and SRO rules requiring that advertisements, sales literature, and other communications with the public be approved by a supervisory principal.

FINRA Rule 2210[b][4][A] sets forth the recordkeeping requirements for retail and institutional communications; generally, these requirements mirror current recordkeeping requirements. This provision incorporates by reference the recordkeeping format, medium and retention period requirements of SEC Rule 17a-4.265 Specifically, Rule 2210[b][4][A] mandates that records must include:

(i) a copy of the communication and the dates of first and last use;

(ii) the name of the registered principal who approved the communication and the date approval was given;

(iii) in the case of a communication for which principal pre-use approval was not required, the name of the person who prepared or distributed the communication;

(iv) information concerning the source of any statistical table, chart, graph, or other illustration used in the communication; and

(v) for retail communications that rely on the exception under 2210[b][1][C], the name of the firm that filed the retail communication with FINRA and a copy of the Advertising Regulation Department’s review letter.

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265. See the discussion of the record-retention requirements set forth in Rule 17a-4[b][4] at infra section 49:11.2[A].
FINRA Rule 2211(b)(2) requires firms to maintain records of institutional sales material for a period of three years.

Rule 17a-3(a)(22) requires broker-dealers to prepare a list of each principal of the firm responsible for establishing policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure compliance with any applicable federal or SRO rule requiring the approval of a record by a principal.266

The SEC defers to SRO rules, including FINRA Rule 2210 (Communications with the Public) and Rule 2220 (Options Communications), for specific requirements regarding the content of advertisements, sales literature, and general correspondence.

§ 49:11.2 Electronic Communications

[A] Introduction

Two key releases by the SEC in 1996 and 1997 still serve to establish the basic principles that underlie current regulatory policy on electronic communication. The first release discussed the use of electronic media to deliver information to customers ("Electronic Delivery Release"); the second described the application of recordkeeping requirements to electronic communications ("Electronic Records Release").267

The Electronic Records Release states:

For record retention purposes under Rule 17a-4, the content of the electronic communication is determinative, and therefore broker-dealers must retain only those e-mail and Internet communications (including inter-office communications) which relate to the broker-dealer’s "business as such."268

Rule 17a-4(b)(4) requires the preservation of almost every electronic document, including e-mail, letter, memoranda, and potentially instant messaging as well.269 Under the Rule, all external and internal communications of the broker-dealer relating to its business must be retained.

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266. SEC Rule 17a-3(h)(2) defines a “principal” as any individual registered as a principal or branch manager of the firm, or any other person who has been delegated supervisory responsibility over associated persons by the firm.
269. SEC Rule 17a-4(b)(4).
[B] Key Elements of an Electronic Mail Compliance System

FINRA Rules do not specifically require member firms to review or approve internal communications. However, members must be certain that they have established a system that adequately supervises the activities of each registered representative and associated person, including their use of electronic communications technology.

Rule 17a-4(b)(3) and FINRA Rule 3110 require firms to preserve for a period of not less than three years, the first two in an easily accessible place, originals of all communications received and copies of all communications sent by the firm or its employees relating to its business. This includes electronic communications.

Records must be preserved “exclusively in a non-rewriteable, non-erasable format.” The archival system must have the ability to download indexes and records to practically any electronic medium required by the Commission or FINRA. A backup archive must be maintained in a separate location. Prior to implementing the electronic storage media system, the member, broker, or dealer is required to provide written notice to its examining authority. In many cases, this notice is required ninety days prior to implementation. The notice must confirm that the electronic storage media system the broker-dealer has employed meets the requirements of Rule 17a-4(f)(2)(ii)(A)–(D).

[C] Role of Third-Party Vendors

Under Rule 17a-4(f)(3)(vii), broker-dealers must have at least one independent third party with access to and the ability to download all exclusively electronically stored information. The third-party vendor must file a written undertaking with the designated examining authority agreeing to comply with Rule 17a-4 and provide the records upon reasonable request. The vendor must preserve those records in its custody and make them available upon request of the broker-dealer, to the SEC or FINRA.

§ 49:11.3 Social Networking and Social Media

[A] Static Content Regulation

FINRA considers static postings that are accessible to the public to constitute “retail communications” under Rule 2110, and as such requires an appropriately qualified registered principal of the firm to approve each retail communication before the earlier of its use or filing with FINRA. It is also necessary to keep records of all content and changes made. Examples of static content are static postings on blogs,

social network profiles (such as LinkedIn profiles), and social network background images.

[B] Interactive Content Regulation

Prior principal approval is not required under Rule 2210 for interactive electronic forums. However, firms must supervise these interactive electronic communications under FINRA Rule 3110 in a manner reasonably designed to ensure that they do not violate the content requirements of FINRA's communications rules.

[C] Personal Devices in Business Communications

Due to the development of new technologies and their ability to aid persons of the firm to perform their duties as well as serve their clients, FINRA permits the use of any personal communication device, but requires that business communications of FINRA members be retained, regardless of the storage format.

[C] Compliance on a Personal Device

The firm representative must have the ability to retain, retrieve, and supervise the communication, which must be of a business matter. Practically speaking, this means that whether a person is communicating on social networks via a smartphone, iPad, or computer, they must retain their business communications for recordkeeping purposes.

[D] Third-Party Posts

[D] Overview

Generally, customer and other third-party posts on a social media website are not considered firm communications and do not trigger Rule 2210 requirements.

[D] Exceptions

Exceptions to the general rule that may result in attribution of third-party posts to the firm include “entanglement,” where the firm was involved in the preparation of the content, and “adoption,” where the firm has given its explicit or implicit endorsement or approval of the content.\textsuperscript{271} As such, if the firm arranges for an “influencer” to promote the firm’s brand, products, or services through arranging for a comment or post to be made, FINRA would regard the firm as entangled in the communication.\textsuperscript{272}

\textsuperscript{271} This guidance was reiterated by FINRA in 2017 in Regulatory Notice 17-18.
\textsuperscript{272} Regulatory Notice 17-18, Question 7.
[D][3]  Compliance Strategies

To avoid a finding of entanglement or adoption, FINRA has provided the following guidance as suggested best practices when dealing with third-party posts:

- Monitor third-party posts;
- Include a disclaimer on firm sites;
- Establish user guidelines for third parties that post on firm sites;
- Establish screening procedures for third-party content; and
- Disclose policies with respect to firm responsibility for third-party posts.

[E]  Third-Party Links

Firms may not establish a link to any third-party site that it knows or has reason to know contains false or misleading content, as by sharing or linking to specific content FINRA views the firm as adopting the content to which the link refers.273 A firm that co-brands any party of a third-party site, such as by placing the firm’s logo prominently on the site, is responsible for the content of the entire site.

[F]  Data Feeds

Firms must adopt procedures to manage data feeds into their own websites. Firms must be familiar with the proficiency of the vendor of the data and its ability to provide data that is accurate as of the time it is presented on the firm’s website.

Firms should regularly review aspects of these data feeds for any red flags that indicate the data might not be accurate, and should promptly take necessary measures to correct any inaccurate data.

[G]  Recordkeeping

The key principle in keeping records of communication via social networks remains the same across all communication media: broker-dealers must retain electronic social media in a manner that can be reproduced as of any prior time.

Specifically, Regulatory Notice 11-39 builds on guidance given in Regulatory Notice 10-06 by providing that firms must be able to retain, retrieve, and supervise business communications regardless of whether they are conducted from a device owned by the firm or an associated person.274

273.  See Regulatory Notice 17-18, Question 3.
274.  FINRA reiterated this guidance in 2017 in Regulatory Notice 17-18.
Firms or associated persons may not sponsor social media sites or use devices that include technology which automatically erases or deletes content.

[H] **Retention**

All communications completed by members, brokers, or dealers relating to a firm’s business (including originals of all communications received, copies of all communications sent, and approvals granted) must be retained for a period of not less than three years.

[I] **Supervision**

Firms must supervise interactive electronic communications in a manner reasonably designed to ensure they do not violate the content requirements of FINRA’s communications rules as set forth in FINRA Rules 2110 and 2220.

Firms must adopt policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that “associated persons who participate in social media sites for business purposes are appropriately supervised, have the necessary training and background to engage in such activities, and do not present undue risks to investors.” FINRA Rule 3110 sets forth detailed supervisory parameters. Regulatory Notice 07-59, pertaining to supervision of electronic communications, provides guidance to FINRA Rule 3110.

Firms may use risk-based principles to determine the extent to which proper supervision of their business requires the review of electronic communications.

[I][1] **General Elements of Social Media Supervision**

- A registered principal must review, prior to use by consumers, any social media site that an associated person intends to employ for business purposes.
- Associated persons should receive appropriate training about such policies and procedures prior to engaging in interactive electronic business communications.
- The firm should monitor compliance of all policies and procedures by associated persons.
- As part of a compliance program, broker-dealers should consider imposing restrictions on social media activity by high-risk associated persons along with corresponding disciplinary action for violations.
§ 49:12 Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity is, at root, the protection of the confidential and business data of an entity from unauthorized access or unanticipated data loss. By virtue of the very nature of investment banking transactions, broker-dealers engaged in investment banking are, at any given time, in possession of valuable and confidential information, making investment banks of all sizes an attractive target for cybersecurity breach.

There are a number of specific federal and state laws and regulations relating to the protection of information that is stored in electronic format. These include federal laws such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), which sets criminal and civil penalties for those who illicitly access or modify digitally stored financial records, and important rules promulgated under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), including the Red Flags Rule, which requires financial institutions and certain creditors to implement procedures protecting consumers against identity theft. 275 Many of the rules that seek to protect the confidential information of individuals are inapplicable to investment banking businesses, inasmuch as those businesses rarely receive personal information.

Similarly, a number of states, including Massachusetts and New York, have also implemented data security rules in recent years, many of which require certain customer and state notification in respect of data breaches involving personal information. More important, however, for investment banks, is the guidance and statements of the SEC and FINRA regarding their expectations regarding broker-dealer cybersecurity programs. These documents regard what is at the core of a prudent investment bank’s data security program, namely, procedures for controlling access to sensitive information and for preventing the loss of that data to accidents and cyber incidents.

§ 49:12.1 SEC and FINRA Cybersecurity Guidance

The SEC and FINRA have provided important guidance regarding broker-dealer cybersecurity obligations under the securities laws and applicable regulations. 276 Not surprisingly, given investment banks’


276. In addition to the OCIE and FINRA reports discussed below that specifically address broker-dealer and investment advisor cybersecurity, in 2018, the SEC issued interpretive guidance regarding public company
particular data security risks, this guidance emphasizes the importance of firms implementing, maintaining, and testing procedures for controlling and monitoring access to the firm’s sensitive information.

[A] SEC Guidance

In October 2011, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance issued guidance on existing disclosure obligations related to cybersecurity risks and incidents to assist public companies in framing disclosures of cybersecurity issues. That guidance makes clear that material information regarding cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents is required to be disclosed.

In terms of regulations, Regulation S-P requires firms to adopt written policies and procedures to protect customer information against cyberattacks and other forms of unauthorized access. Specifically, Rule 30(a) (the “Safeguards Rule”) mandates that firms must adopt written policies and procedures that address administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for the protection of customer records and information. These policies and procedures must be reasonably designed to:

1. Ensure the security and confidentiality of customer records and information;
2. Protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of customer records and information; and
3. Protect against unauthorized access to or use of customer records or information that could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.

Regulation S-P also prohibits broker-dealers from disclosing any “nonpublic personal information” about a consumer unless the consumer receives proper notice and a “reasonable opportunity” to opt out of the disclosure. “Nonpublic personal information” specifically includes “any list of individuals’ names and street addresses that is derived in whole or in part using personally identifiable financial information that is not publicly available . . . .” An exception under Regulation S-P allows disclosure of nonpublic personal information when disclosure is necessary to comply with a subpoena or respond to judicial process, such as a court order.


278. 17 C.F.R. § 248.30.
Regulation S-ID ("Identity Theft Red Flags")\textsuperscript{279} outlines a firm's duties regarding the detection, prevention, and mitigation of identity theft. A firm must develop and implement a written Identity Theft Prevention Program, which "must be appropriate to the size and complexity of the financial institution and the nature and scope of its activities." The program must include policies and procedures reasonably to:

1. Identify relevant Red Flags for the accounts that the firm offers or maintains, and incorporate those Red Flags into its program;
2. Detect Red Flags that have been incorporated into the program;
3. Respond Appropriately to Red Flags detected to prevent/mitigate identity theft; and
4. Ensure that the program is updated periodically to reflect changes in risks to customers and to the safety and soundness of the financial institution from identity theft. (This includes program approval and oversight from the board of directors and/or senior management, as well as effective oversight of service providers.)

In addition, SEC Rule 17a-4\textsuperscript{280} specifies the manner and length of time that records required under Rule 17a-3 must be maintained. When broker-dealers use electronic storage media to retain records, Rule 17a-4[f](2)[ii] requires the firms to "[p]reserve the records exclusively in a non-rewritable, non-erasable" or WORM ("write once, read many") format.

**[B] FINRA Rules**

Related to SEC Rule 17a-4 above, FINRA Rule 4511 provides, in part, that each member "shall make and preserve books and records as required under the FINRA rules, the Exchange Act and the applicable Exchange Act rules" and all "books and records required to be made pursuant to the FINRA rules shall be preserved in a format and media that complies with" Rule 17a-4.

Elsewhere, FINRA Rule 4370 requires that members create and maintain a written business continuity plan identifying procedures relating to an emergency or significant business disruption. Such procedures must be reasonably designed to enable the member to meet its existing obligations to customers. Each member must update

\begin{footnotes}
\item[279] 17 C.F.R. § 248.201–.202.
\item[280] 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4[f].
\end{footnotes}
its plan in the event of any material change to the member’s operations, structure, business, or location. Each member must also conduct an annual review of its business continuity plan to determine whether any modifications are necessary in light of changes to the member’s operations, structure, business or location. The rule gives broker-dealers flexibility in designing a business continuity plan, tailored to the size and needs of the firm, but at a minimum a plan must address the following elements:

- Data back-up and recovery (hard copy and electronic);
- All mission critical systems;
- Financial and operational assessments;
- Alternate communications between customers and the member;
- Alternate communications between the member and its employees;
- Alternate physical location of employees;
- Critical business constituent, bank, and counter-party impact;
- Regulatory reporting;
- Communications with regulators; and
- How the member will assure customers’ prompt access to their funds and securities in the event that the member determines that it is unable to continue its business.

[C] OCIE and FINRA Reports

In February 2015, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspection and Examination completed a study of cybersecurity practices in the broker-dealer and investment advisor industries, reporting on the practices of a sample of each type of firm (“OCIE Cybersecurity Report”).

The OCIE Report found that most such firms had been subject to some form of a cybersecurity breach incident, of varying scale. Most interviewed firms had written information security policies, and the OCIE Cybersecurity Report suggests that maintaining policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to enhance cybersecurity is a baseline requirement for broker-dealers.

The OCIE Cybersecurity Report also noted that firms’ written business continuity plans:

- Often addressed the impact of cyberattacks on operations.
- Often utilized external best practice standards for cybersecurity management. This was especially true among the broker-dealers
surveyed. One of the widely used standards, NIST, is described below in section 49:12.2.

- Almost all firms used computer encryption to protect at least some sensitive information.
- The vast majority of firms routinely conducted firm-wide cyber risk assessments, identifying threats, vulnerabilities, and potential consequences to cyber intrusion.
- A small majority of broker-dealers and a minority of advisers carried cybersecurity insurance. Many firms used best practices on the sharing of information on cyberattacks with peers.281

In February 2015, FINRA issued a report on broker-dealers’ cybersecurity practices ("FINRA Report"), aiming to assist firms’ efforts to protect client and proprietary information. Among the hallmarks of an effective cybersecurity program, the FINRA Report found foremost to be:

- Sound corporate governance frameworks and strong leadership;
- Routine risk assessments to keep the firm up to date on current threats and vulnerabilities;
- Technical controls (for example, encryption and permission/entitlement) individualized to the firm’s needs and business;
- Incident response plans, including containment, mitigation, investigation, and notification procedures that are fully implemented and routinely tested;
- Strong due diligence regarding vendors that handle sensitive data; and
- Cybersecurity intelligence-sharing with other firms and with government agencies.282

FINRA has increasingly pursued enforcement action with respect to cybersecurity breaches, including one 2016 enforcement in which a firm used a cloud record retention vendor. FINRA alleged that the firm failed to ensure that the vendor had sufficient encryption and antivirus protection.283

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§ 49:12.2 Frameworks

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) cybersecurity framework is widely used and/or used as a reference by investment banks and other financial institutions. The framework “is a set of cybersecurity activities outcomes, and informative references that are common across critical infrastructure sectors, providing the detailed guidance for developing individual organizational Profiles.”

Following the pilot 2014 Cybersecurity Assessment, FFIEC issued a Cybersecurity Assessment Tool (“Assessment”) that banks may use to evaluate their risks and cybersecurity preparedness. Beginning in 2015, OCC examiners began gradually incorporating the Assessment into examinations of financial institutions of all sizes. While use of the Assessment is optional for financial institutions, OCC examiners will use it to supplement exam work to gain a more complete understanding of an institution’s inherent risk, risk management practices, and controls related to cybersecurity. The FFIEC Assessment Tool is a valuable reference and comparison for financial institutions that are not banks, such as investment banks.

The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) proposed guidance on risk management for large financial institutions describes core principles of effective senior management, management of business lines, and independent risk management and controls for large financial institutions. Independent Risk Management (responsible for conducting ongoing objective and critical assessments of a firm’s risks using personnel independent of the firm’s business line managers) should evaluate whether the firm’s risk tolerance appropriately captures the firm’s material risks and confirm that the risk tolerance is consistent with the capacity of the risk management framework. In addition, Independent Risk Management should evaluate whether the risk tolerance “[i]ncludes risks associated with the firm’s revenue generating activities, as well as other aspects of risks inherent to the business, such as compliance, information technology, and cybersecurity. . . .”

§ 49:13 “Big Data” and Artificial Intelligence

“Big data”—along with the artificial intelligence (AI) and computational techniques that can be applied to large data sets—have already

impacted a wide spectrum of industries, and the securities industry is no exception. Today, AI and other big data applications are being rapidly adopted for a range of applications in the financial services industry, from automating and optimizing client interactions, to regulatory surveillance, to operations-focused applications such as trade execution optimization and detection of trading signals, among many other applications.

Although AI and big data are already making an impact on the broker-dealer community, their use is still nascent and evolving rapidly, and regulatory responses will develop and evolve in the coming years. To date, regulators’ statements regarding AI and big data have generally remained higher-level and in the spirit of beginning a dialogue regarding potential risks and benefits, rather than rulemaking or prescriptive guidance.287 FINRA notes that it is actively monitoring financial technology-related developments in the securities industry, and has addressed big data analytics and AI-related considerations in both dedicated roundtables and as part of its annual conference. Both FINRA and the SEC have publicly noted their own use of big data analytics and AI to monitor market risk and identify possible fraud and misconduct, including the SEC’s establishment of the Center for Risk and Quantitative Analytics within the Division of Enforcement.288

Any analysis of key issues presented by AI and big data for broker-dealers must necessarily be preliminary at this early stage, and developments should be monitored closely.

§ 49:13.1 Participating in the Big Data Market

As data capture and analytic tools become ever more widespread and robust, many new kinds of data are being both generated and used by securities market participants.289 Naturally, financial data and data regarding securities transactions is of special interest to investors, but recently data more removed from the financial markets—tied to


289. Among the cited drivers for the expansion of big data analytics has been the proliferation of electronic market trading platforms, which has led to an increase in the availability of high quality market data in structured formats. FSB on AI and Machine Learning, supra note 287, at 8.
diverse subjects such as consumer spending, weather, traffic patterns, port activity, utility and cell phone usage, geolocation, employment statistics, internet search, news or social media “sentiment” analysis, among others—have drawn increasing interest. Collectively, these data generally are referred to as either “alternative data” or “big data,” and significant marketplaces comprised of both buyers and sellers have sprung up around them.

Among the types of non-traditional data that are increasingly of interest are data that broker-dealers generate or have access to in the course of their business. For example, firms with retail customers may have access to valuable data regarding their customers’ behavior (such as website browsing patterns) or financial background. Institutional broker-dealers will have access to large volumes of data regarding trading patterns and, by way of example that has received recent media attention, their clients’ reading patterns for distributed research reports.

As the interest in obtaining such data grows, broker-dealers will increasingly need to evaluate the benefits and risks of selling access to that data, and correspondingly greater prominence is being given to related legal and regulatory considerations. These include privacy, contracting and licensing, intellectual property, unfair competition, anti-discrimination, and other considerations. While each of those topics warrants detailed discussion in its own right, the remainder of this section focuses on briefly introducing certain U.S. regulatory registration considerations and providing a brief description of other key sources of liability.

It is, however, also important to note that in many cases, direct regulation of data is either highly fragmented (for example, consider the variety of different U.S. and non-U.S. authorities with an interest in privacy regulation) or non-existent. The concept of data at the scale and variety in which now available—and the concept of diffuse data sources as commercially valuable and important to securities market participants—is still new enough that comprehensive legal treatment remains over the horizon.

290. Examples of usage of this data include: using invoices from a large transport and logistics company to construct a contemporaneous gauge of local trade, ahead of the release of monthly official trade data; using satellite images to gauge manufacturing activity in jurisdictions where official data has been subject to criticism; and tracking downloads and reviews of a retailer’s mobile app to determine consumer engagement. Robin Wigglesworth, Investors Mine Big Data for Cutting-Edge Strategies, FIN. TIMES [Mar. 30, 2016]. One example of the use of social media sentiment analysis is shown in a Banca d’Italia study in which data derived from Twitter posts was used to gauge retail depositors’ trust in banks, which was used to challenge banks’ retail funding model. FSB on AI and Machine Learning, supra note 287, at 21–22.
[A] U.S. Securities Laws—Registration Considerations

Firms selling data to securities market participants will need to evaluate the implications of doing so from a registered broker-dealer platform. As entities subject to FINRA and SEC regulation and examination, broker-dealer activities are closely reviewed in the examination context, and are subject to a broad FINRA and SEC ruleset. As such, broker-dealers engaging in data sales may be subject to additional scrutiny as compared to non-registered firms.

On the other hand, firms selling data from an un-registered platform should consider whether their businesses implicate registration obligations under U.S. law and regulation, notably under investment adviser, broker-dealer, and CFTC and NFA rules governing “research” and “advice.” As a general matter, data sellers often believe that they are handling data of a type that does not rise to the level of research or advice. This is pursuant to exceptions from research and advice rules typically designed for “raw” or “non-customized” data. But those exceptions—while often directly applicable and helpful—tend to be dated and not always well developed.

[B] Other Select Sources of U.S. Regulatory Liability

In addition to consideration of registration obligations, key considerations relating to sale or use of big data include:

- **Material Nonpublic Information.** Both sellers and users of data must be comfortable that the data does not represent MNPI.291

- **Data Ownership and Use.** All participants must be comfortable that the various licensors and sub-licensors in a data chain have the ownership rights necessary to provide the data to a buyer. This often requires consideration of the quality of consents obtained from those who might have originally generated or had a claim to the data.

- **Personal Information.** Various laws and regulation throughout the world aim to protect consumers’ personal information or

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291. SEC v. Bonan Huang, et al., No. 16-2390 [3d Cir. Apr. 10, 2017], although it involved fraudulent activity of an employee rather than data sales, does illustrate how firms’ data may constitute MNPI. A data analyst in Capital One’s fraud department searched a nonpublic company database that recorded the credit card activity for millions of customers at predominantly consumer retail corporations. The analyst conducted thousands of searches of the database, which allowed him to view and analyze aggregated sales data for the companies he searched. He then used this information to make profitable securities transactions in advance of the public release of quarterly sales announcements by these companies.
personal data. A common way around such issues for big data transfers or usages is to anonymize the data. However, even if the data used or provided does not on its face contain personal information, care must be given to the possibility of reverse engineering that might reveal personal information. Moreover, consideration should be given as to whether the person that obtained or that is holding or transferring the data gave sufficient notice or has sufficient consent from relevant “data subjects” in respect of the proposed usage that is to be made of the data, even if this is to take place on an anonymized basis. It is also the case that what constitutes “personal information” is constantly evolving and can vary by geography. For example, changes to law in Europe have resulted in IP addresses now constituting personal data, even if there is no directly related information in the same database as to the private individual using such addresses. Cross-border transfers of personal data may also be restricted.

- **Web scraping.** “Web scraping,” which refers to the automated collection of data from websites, is increasingly common in many commercial applications, but also implicates a wide variety of potential concerns, up to and including criminal anti-hacking laws. Web scraping also should be considered in light of each target website’s terms of use and the potential for copyright infringement.

More generally, the FINRA rulebook, SEC regulation, and firms’ legal and compliance structures have been designed to address traditional potential conflicts of interest implicated by a broad broker-dealer business: potential conflicts between investment banking and research, between proprietary interests and sales-and-trading clients, and among sales-and-trading clients, among others. Whereas the contours of these conflicts and adequate mitigating measures have, at this point, been analyzed by the industry for several decades, the potential conflicts presented by data sales are relatively new [and explored further in the following section]. That newness may implicate increased regulatory risks, as standard industry and regulatory views have not yet fully developed.

**[C] Business Considerations**

In addition to the regulatory and general liability considerations discussed above, broker-dealers considering selling data must consider the shift in business model implied by the same. Transitioning into the selling of data reimagines the business as one not limited to traditional broker-dealer functions, but rather expanding to become a technology and product provider. That reimagining creates both new opportunities
and new risks. It may suggest, for example, additional resources to evaluate and mitigate the risks related to data sales, and additional resources to identify and take advantage of the new opportunities presented.

Among the risks are new potential conflicts of interest with the firm’s current clients that may present not only regulatory considerations but significant customer relationship risks. Some investment managers have expressed concerns about the use of data derived from their activities by investment banks.

One example is concerns over tracking of research report usage patterns. It has been reported that banks have been approached by parties seeking to purchase a stream of aggregated research data (such as what notes were the most read or longest read). Investment managers have expressed concern that such data, if sold, could allow other market participants to trade ahead of them, and have asked firms to limit tracking of their reading history.

Although only one example, the selling of research usage data highlights the potential for data sales to strain existing customer relationships. Firms’ processes should consider the same in additional to regulatory and liability considerations.

§ 49:13.2 Artificial Intelligence

AI applications are being rapidly adopted for a range of applications in the financial services industry, including customer-facing, operational, and regulatory compliance uses. Some key developing areas for artificial intelligence relevant to broker-dealers include:

• Client-Facing Applications:
  • Automation of client interactions, such as chatbots.

• Operational Applications:
  • Optimization of KYC process through image recognition and calculation of risk scores.
  • Minimizing trading execution costs, including through more accurate estimation of impact of the firm’s own trading.
  • Finding trading signals to increase returns.

292. Telis Demos, Big Investors Don’t Want Wall Street Analysts Snooping on Them: Investors Are Concerned that Sharing Readership Habits with Banks’ Other Clients Could Give Rivals an Edge, WALL ST. J. [June 14, 2018].
• Particularly for firms providing market access, AI risk modelling may help identify trading accounts with increased risk profiles that warrant intervention.

• Optimizing use of capital by centralizing risks from different business lines.

• Compliance Applications: 293
  • Enhanced ability to comply with product suitability requirements.
  • Voice-to-text and AI tools monitoring trader communications for compliance with market regulations. For example, they may be able to flag communications that contain representations affecting trade pricing.

Regulators have begun to highlight some of the potential benefits and macro-economic risks related to the same. In particular, it has been noted that AI may reduce information asymmetries and contribute to the efficiency and stability of markets, and lower market participants’ trading costs. Further, AI tools may assist firms to implement compliance processes for complex and detailed regulations. On the other hand, some AI applications may implicate a lack of interpretability or “auditability” of the AI methods, and that opacity could represent a macro-level risk. Further, the application of AI and machine learning could result in new and unexpected forms of interconnectedness between financial markets and institutions. These and other concerns could to financial stability risks.

For broker-dealers considering using AI tools, key considerations include:

• To the extent that AI products from third-party vendors are used:
  • Broker-dealers’ traditional responsibilities to conduct due diligence on the vendor will apply. Broker-dealers can outsource tasks, but retain the ultimate regulatory responsibility to ensure that their business functions comply with applicable law and regulation, regardless of whether they are conducted by the broker-dealer or a vendor.
  • Functions requiring FINRA registration, such as customer-facing securities sales activities, generally cannot be conducted from outside the broker-dealer.

293. The total “RegTech” market is expected to reach $6.45 billion by 2020, growing at a CAGR of 76%. FSB on AI and Machine Learning, supra note 287, at 19.
• There should be close scrutiny of contractual indemnification provisions that would apply if the AI tool leads to trading losses or other liabilities.

• AI has been implicated in resulting in discriminatory practices that may be unlawful. Particularly for customer-facing applications, including those that may impact the decision to extend credit or provide services, these considerations should be evaluated.

• Data ownership rights and protections are being revised in several jurisdictions, including the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). AI tools must comply with these privacy laws including, where applicable, SEC Regulation S-P.

FINRA guidance on supervision and control practices for algorithmic trading strategies should also be considered for relevant AI applications.294 FINRA notes that a firm’s supervisory efforts should not be limited to trading activity conducted under the algorithm, but that a firm’s supervisory efforts should be focused on every stage in the process of developing algorithmic strategies to avoid, for example, wash sales and excessive levels of message traffic. Further, broker-dealer associated persons primarily responsible for the design, development, or significant modification of an algorithmic strategy, or for its day-to-day supervision, are generally required to have the Securities Trader (Series 57) license. These considerations related to algorithmic trading should be considered with respect to any AI application that would constitute an algorithmic strategy under the relevant FINRA rules.

294. See FINRA Regulatory Notice 15-09.