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TRANSCRIPT

January 28, 2014

COMMITTEE HEARING

REP. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN AND REP. TED POE

CHAIRMEN

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE  
EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION,  
AND TRADE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

REP. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN AND REP. TED POE HOLD A JOINT HEARING ON  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL

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MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,  
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JANUARY 28, 2014

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DAVID ALBRIGHT,  
FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT,  
INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you all for being here. We're going to try to get our opening statements in before we have some votes. So we'll need -- Mr. Deutch, timing is everything in life.

Thank you so much, so the joint subcommittee will come

to order. After recognizing myself, ranking member Deutch, and of course we will hear from our Foreign Affairs full committee chairman, Mr. Royce. We will hear from Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Sherman for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, and then due to time limitations we will go directly to our witnesses testimony.

ROS-LEHTINEN: And without objection the witnesses prepared statements will be made a part of the record, and members may have five days to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation and the rules.

The chair now recognizes herself for five minutes.

On November 24th, 2013, Secretary Kerry announced that an interim negotiated settlement had been reached between the P5+1 and Iran on its nuclear program.

The announcement contained the broad strokes but was short on the details. The picture that was painted was that Iran would agree to modest limits on its enrichment capabilities, increased International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring, the cessation of manufacturing centrifuges and it would not fuel the Arak -- A-R-A-K -- heavy water reactor.

In exchange, Iran would receive an easing of sanctions on its oil sales and the suspension of certain sanctions from on the import of precious metals and exports from Iran's auto and petrochemical sectors.

No doubt President Obama will tout this deal as the ultimate achievement for diplomacy and peace while excoriating those of us who had the temerity to say, hey, wait a minute. I don't trust the Iranian regime.

Let's have a back-up plan to increase sanctions on Iran if it's found to be acting unfaithfully, which its history has shown it is not out of the realm of possibility.

But though the announcement was made in November, it wasn't until January 20th that the technical details were agreed upon and finally implemented.

The most glaring deficiency with this interim deal is its lopsidedness. Iran got a sweetheart deal and the rest of the world is not any safer from an Iranian bomb than before.

Our closest ally and friend in the region, the democratic Jewish state of Israel, has been very concerned with what this deal means for its security from the get-go. And other countries in the Gulf region feel slighted by our approach to this issue.

But let's set aside the dangerous precedent that this sets for the rest of the world and the bridges that we have burned with allies to reach this agreement. Remember, this agreement doesn't even live up to the obligations set forth by the U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iran and is afar and far from our policy of disarmament from only 10 years ago, and focus on what Iran is allowed to do.

Iran is allowed to keep its nuclear weapons program infrastructure intact and will still be allowed to enrich. Sure are there are caps to the enrichment. And it will have to convert some of its uranium to oxide but Iran will maintain the ability, know-how and proficiency that if it decides to break the agreement, it can continue toward breakout capability with only a minor setback in any timetable.

It's a shame that we have seemingly acquiesced to Iran's demand that it has some sort of right to enrich. Iran had long ago abandoned all claims to a right of enrichment when it decided to conduct a covert nuclear program and was in violation of its international obligations under the NPT and other treaties.

It is there -- it therefore must not be allowed to enrich and I fear that by starting out where the P5+1 did here, Iran will never be pushed off this stance in a final comprehensive agreement.

The interim deal focuses on the nuclear aspect and falls short on Iran's weaponization efforts and its ballistic missile program, which it now has more time to advance and there is nothing in the interim agreement that allows for the International Atomic Energy Agency access to Iran's military

sites.

And for me, that's really at the crux of the issue here, time. From announcement to implementation, two months' time has passed. This gave the regime plenty of time to continue to make advancements while the parties hashed out all the technical details.

I don't believe this was done by mistake on their part as Rouhani is an expert in delayed tactics and double talk.

In the two months after Secretary Kerry's press conference in Geneva, Tehran has announced that it has made advances in its ICBM technology, it has designed a new generation of uranium centrifuges and was ready to manufacture them and that it would continue construction at its heavy water reactor in Arak.

I envision a scenario in which Iran may comply with this agreement for six months, but even if Iran does violate the terms of the agreement, that the joint commission that it established in the final document has murky authority at best to conduct oversight, enforce compliance or impose strict consequences.

There is no mechanism that allows for adjudication of violations in this deal and that is very troublesome. Bottom line, as long as the infrastructure is in place for Iran to continue its nuclear program, the threat that it can create a nuclear weapon will always be all too real, and that where P5+1 momentarily failed in this interim agreement.

And with Rouhani and Zarif stating just last week that Iran would not dismantle any part of its nuclear program under any circumstance, it leaves me fearing that the administration will accept -- it has me fearing what the administration will accept in a final comprehensive agreement.

I look forward to hearing from our witness' testimonies and the views of my colleagues. And now I turn to my good friend, the ranking member, Ted Deutch of Florida.

DEUTCH: Thank you, Madam Chairman, Chairman Poe, for

holding this hearing to examine the implementation of the first phase of the Iran nuclear deal.

And thank you to our panel of very distinguished experts for appearing here today. We welcome your expertise and your insight as we determine the efficacy of Iran's sanctions under the JPOA and the next steps in reaching a final agreement to achieve our ultimate goal of preventing a nuclear armed Iran.

Let me be clear from the outset: there's no doubt that resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis through diplomacy has always been the preferred track of the administration, and of the Congress. I think we all recognize the significant achievement of the U.S. efforts to bring Iran to the table.

But, there are many members on both sides of the aisle who feel it is appropriate for Congress, the body that built the sanctions architecture that brought Iran to the table to remind the Iranians that full sanctions relief will come only when a deal acceptable to the P5 Plus One and our regional allies is reached. This relief can only come if Congress acts. So I would suggest that it's appropriate to send Iran a reminder as well as to remind the companies lining up to visit Tehran a message of what is at stake if Iran violates the terms of the joint plan of action.

A deal is in place, and if we're going to move forward with a final deal we have to focus on ensuring that Iran fulfills its obligations while beginning to define the acceptable parameters of a comprehensive solution. We're eight days into the implementation of the joint plan of action, a six month deal to freeze Iran's activities resulting in a complete cessation of Iran's 20 percent enrichment, and the conversion of its current stockpile as well as to open up Iran's nuclear program to intrusive inspections.

And, while these caps on Iran's program are substantial, we know they cannot be the terms of a long-term deal. We must ultimately see serious permanent roll backs of the program, not just easily reversible freezes.

We know that the joint plan of action sets the course

for Iran to maintain a mutually defined enrichment program consistent with practical needs. Iran continues to claim a right to enrich for nuclear power, but we must understand that none of Iran's current enrichment activities are useful for a civilian nuclear program.

Consider, Iran has a nuclear energy reactor in Bushehr that is running on imported Russian fuel. In fact, the Russian deal requires the use of Russian imported fuel, just as other offers from Western nations to fill Iran's nuclear power needs are contingent on the use of imported fuel from those nations.

It would take Iran years to build the technology necessary to turn its low enriched uranium into fuel for a power reactor. We must remember that none of Iran's current stock pile of domestically enriched uranium can be used in its nuclear reactor.

To that end, the majority of nations with nuclear power don't domestically enrich uranium and instead import the fuel from other countries.

So, what does this all mean?

The Iranian stock pile is essentially useless for their domestic energy program. However, 19,000 centrifuges and 7 tons of enriched uranium are highly useful when a nation is trying to build a nuclear weapon. We can all agree that nuclear science is complicated, but it seems that even someone with only a cursory knowledge of nuclear technology understands the dangers posed by Iran's nuclear enrichment activities.

Despite the access granted under the JPA to IAEA to inspect centrifuge manufacturing facilities, can we be sure that we're going to be able to see the manufacturing of all the various parts that make up -- can we be sure that Iran is not continuing to manufacture more centrifuges at other locations, moreover, can we verify that Iran has not already commenced a third unknown enrichment site?

It should not be lost on us that both Fordow and Natans were also constructed in secret until being exposed by the

international community in 2002 and 2009 respectively, and Iran has long said that it intends to have up to 10 enrichment facilities.

Under the JPA, Iran may continue its research and development allowing them to continue work on centrifuge development. Mr. Albright, you note in your testimony, that centrifuge R&D could lead to breakthroughs in materials or methods that would further strengthen a secret breakout effort.

How concerned should we be that continued R&D will simply allow Iran to install highly advanced centrifuges in six months, or in a year, or in five years?

These are the kinds of difficult questions that have to be answered if the P5 Plus One are to reach an acceptable final deal. But perhaps, most critically, before any long term deal is reached, Iran must come clean about all aspects of its program.

This includes finally addressing all outstanding IAEA concerns, or the possible military dimensions, the development of nuclear explosive devices, procurement of nuclear related materials by the IRGC and military-run activities at the parching site.

The Institute for Science and International Security described the parching site as a huge site dedicated to the research, development and production of ammunition, rockets and high explosives. Iran must know at the outset that they will not be able to sweep these allegations under the rug.

I look forward to discussing with our witness the path forward to halting what is the greatest threat to international security: A nuclear armed Iran.

And I yield back.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you, very much Mr. Deutch.

And now we turn to our full committee chairman, Mr. Royce for his opening statement.

ROYCE: Well, thank you very much Chairman Ros-Lehtinen.

And, I thank you. I thank, Mr. Ted Poe -- Chairman Ted Poe and also Mr. Deutch for that very well reasoned argument that he just laid out. And Ileana, I think you laid out a compelling case as well.

I think all of us are a little stunned.

I think we're stunned that not only does Iran continue to enrich uranium, but they're very, very vocal about the fact that they're going to continue the research and development on faster and faster spinning of centrifuges.

And for them to be making this pronouncement in the middle of this interim agreement on how they're -- they're reaching this capability to develop and spin these centrifuges at supersonic speeds, setting new records, implies a certain intent on undetectable nuclear breakout capability.

I think this is what members worry about. We worry that, you know, as you try to work out an agreement here, and we talk about the plutonium reactor, the heavy water reactor facility in Iraq, they make the point that they're going to continue performing work at that site.

I think the large quantities of existing stock piles -- when they make the comment that, no, they're not going to draw down on those stock piles, all of this sends a message in terms of what their intent is. And quite simply, these elements of a nuclear program -- which we're talking about right now -- will continue to operate as the talks go on.

So I think for the members of the House here on the Foreign Affairs Committee, we're a little -- we're a little concerned that unless Iran is pressed to fully reveal Iran's extensive activities to develop and test a nuclear device, unless we get that out on the table, and as we will hear today there's a great deal of evidence that Iran has devoted much effort to this over the years -- unless we have the details I think we're left wondering about Iran's clear intentions here.

And I don't think we want them to cover up that extensive evidence either.

And, part of it is because we watch Iran's actions, over 400 executions last year of political and of religious opposition in the country. Stoning is still going on in Iran as a penalty, for a capital offense, for things such as adultery. As has been mentioned a number of times, a regime that's stoning women with one hand shouldn't be allowed with the other hand to get its grip on a nuclear weapon.

I mean, this is just logical that we be concerned about this.

And, if a comprehensive agreement is reached, the threat of a nuclear armed Iran is not going to be over for a couple of other reasons.

One of today's witnesses has estimated that even if we were to force Iran to dismantle 80 percent of its 19,000 installed centrifuges -- and of course they say they won't dismantle one of them -- even if we were to force it to close its entire enrichment facility at Fordow, even if we were to dismantle or convert its planned heavy water reactor to a light water reactor and agree to a multi-decade intrusive inspections regime, the fact is that Iran would still be six months away from nuclear breakout.

So if we are in a situation right now where they won't give ground on any of these points that I've just raised, I think we have something of a problem on our hands.

So even if the administration were to achieve this agreement, which increasingly many say might be a 50-50 proposition -- I think that was the administration's assumption -- especially now that we have let up on sanctions pressure, Iran will likely still possess the capability of very quickly producing a nuclear weapon.

ROYCE: Why do I say that? Because when you let up on sanctions pressure you let up on the one thing you had that made it hard for them to get hard currency, that might make the Ayatollah make the tough choice between compromising on the nuclear program or economic implosion. So that's gone

now. The message is out.

You know, Iran is open for business. You see the headlines, you know, the next day in "The Wall Street Journal," businesses rush to Iran to cut business deals. You see their stock market go back up, their currency go back up in value.

So we could end up, if we're not careful, ending up on a track to have us face a permanent nuclear threat from Iran because we rehabilitate their capabilities.

And so that's why I thank the chairwoman and I thank Mr. Poe, Mr. Deutch for their observations on this, but I especially thank the panel of witnesses because our four witnesses today are true experts in this field and we look forward to their testimony.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Well put. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

We now turn to the ranking member of the TNT subcommittee, Mr. Sherman.

SHERMAN: In November agreement was supposed to last six months but not until two months after it was signed. Eight months, it can be extended for another six months. We're looking at 14 months. What happens during the 14 months?

They're at 20 percent stockpile. Half gets oxidized but it's still 20 percent. Another half gets diluted and oxidized. More low enriched uranium is created and stockpiled, albeit in oxidized form.

Work on centrifuge technology continues, though certain of the centrifuges will not be used. This delays only for a short time when Iran would have a nuclear weapon because the 20 percent oxidized uranium can be converted back to gas quite quickly.

Iran uses that same technology to convert yellow cake into gaseous uranium. And at the end of this agreement, Iran may be a little bit further than they were in November from their first bomb, but will be closer to a cache of five to 10 bombs because they will have all of the additional low

enriched uranium that they create during the dependency of the deal.

The sanctions relief has been very substantial because it's changed the business climate. It's not just the content of the relief. There are loopholes in our existing sanctions laws. Companies have been reluctant to exploit those because they figure the next sanctions law was around the corner.

Well, now it's not. And so we see a rush to do business with Iran.

The disagreement here in Washington is actually rather modest. There tend -- there seems to be agreement that we're not adopting new statutory sanctions until July or at least not letting them become effective until July.

The administration, significantly, has agreed to enforce existing sanctions and would do that even if the Iranians threatened to walk out of the agreement. Secretary Kerry was in this room -- where you're sitting -- the witnesses are sitting now.

He agreed that he would continue enforcing the existing law within a day they designated roughly a dozen entities. The Iranians walked out. They came back.

So we agree to enforce existing laws. We agree no new laws will become effective until July.

So the question is under what circumstances will new sanctions become ineffective in July, the -- go into effect and who will make that decision? The president alone or the president with Congress?

Will we -- who will decide that Iran is just engaged in a delay program or that we've reached sufficient progress?

I don't think Congress should surrender this role because Congress has been right and three administrations have been wrong. From 1996 to 2010 we -- Congress didn't enact major sanctions legislation.

Why? Because three administrations sought so

effectively, usually in the Senate, to prevent the adoption of that legislation. Congress was right; the House was more right than the Senate and Congress was more right than three different administrations.

Now we're being asked, oh, just don't do anything. Trust the president, he'll do the right thing.

The fact is that we're told by the administration we can adopt new sanctions in a nanosecond should we decide that that is important.

What he really means is -- what the administration means is we can adopt nanoseconds -- new sanctions in a nanosecond if the administration agrees with them.

But if they don't, their capacity for delay and obfuscation, for dilution and defeat of sanctions has been proven. It was proven effective in 2009; it was proven effective for the 8 years of the prior administration.

What are our choices?

We can act now and adopt sanctions that will go into effect in July but also schedule a vote in July where Congress could decide by joint resolution to suspend or prevent the sanctions from becoming effective, and we would do so if adequate progress is made.

We can have a compromise approach, right, and conference on the sanctions, and schedule a vote, affirmative vote, of both houses of Congress without delay, without filibuster, without obfuscation, without further division between the committees and the houses as to what the content would be and pass new legislation if warranted in July and soon enough to prevent any pocket veto since we go out in August.

The final approach is what I call the narcolepsy approach. Go to sleep until the administration decides to wake us up. Then they say -- then we'll get around to thinking about something in July because we'll notice that the six months -- which is eight months -- has passed.

At that point you can be sure that this administration,

like the prior two administrations, will be for delay, dilution and defeat, and we will be in session only a few weeks between the end of July and the end of the year.

So Iran will get a full year of relief from sanctions in actually 14 months.

I think the one thing for this hearing to establish is that we're not going to adopt the narcolepsy approach, that we're going to have sanctions that Iran will know will go into effect in July if adequate progress determined by Congress is not reached.

And with that I think our negotiators will be far more effective than if Congress is regarded as on vacation.

I yield back.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so much, Mr. Sherman.

And now we go to the chairman of the TNT subcommittee, Mr. -- Judge Poe from Texas.

POE: Thank you, Madam Chair.

"The world power surrendered to the Iranian nation's will." Those are the words of Iranian President Rouhani. It should not surprise any of us that the Iranians view this agreement as a win for them, a loss for us and a loss for a safer world.

Iran's foreign minister boasted, "We did not agree to dismantle anything," referring to their enrichment activities.

He's right. Iran not only gets to keep its infrastructure intact, it gets to keep enriching. Or it gets to keep its yellow cake and eat it, too.

The U.N. has voted on five occasions, saying Iran is cheated in its nuclear capability and they should not be able to enrich at all. In one deal Iran just wiped away all of those U.N. resolutions.

When the United States negotiates a deal that makes the U.N. look tough, we got a problem. Just as bad, none of the changes agreed to are permanent and verification is difficult.

Hours after Iran signed the agreement, their top nuclear negotiator bragged on Iranian TV that they could, quote, "return to the previous situation in one day."

In reality, estimates suggest the Iranians could still achieve nuclear breakout capability in six months. This agreement doesn't force Iran to stop its nuclear program.

Rouhani is a snake oil salesman. He sold poison medicine to us and the State Department gave away the farm and the mineral rights in exchange. This agreement bars Iran from installing nuclear equipment at its heavy water reactor, Arak, but allows them to continue to construct its nuclear reactor.

The problem is that Arak reactor size and design is too big for a peaceful reactor. Experts say it's -- more closely resembles a nuclear weapons facility. Well, no kidding.

When asked if he thought that Arak could be used for peaceful purposes, former State Department non-proliferation official Robert Einhorn said, yes, it could. A 12-inch hunting knife could also be used to spread jam on your toast in the morning.

In this deal, Iran will get \$6 million in cash payments over six months. Iran also gets billions more as companies who were sitting on the sidelines out of fear of the sanctions now say it's OK to do business as usual with Iran. This could inject about \$20 billion into Iran's economy, according to sanctions expert Mark Dubowitz (ph).

The Iranians know there's no enforcement mechanism once a final agreement is reached because all sanctions will be lifted.

Despite what the White House says, it will be nearly impossible to restart punishing sanctions if Iran cheats or lies. You can't turn on sanctions -- can't turn them on and

off like a light switch.

POE: I talked to Prime Minister Netanyahu right after this deal was signed. He is correct, this is a bad deal for Israel and a bad deal for the United States. The only leverage we had on Iranian hardliners was tough sanctions that brought the economy to the knees. By easing sanctions we have blunted our sharpest tool to get a peaceful solution. We have made it really -- peace less likely.

This is a flawed appeasement deal that gave away too much to Iran . It's similar to Chamberlain's appeasement to the Nazis in the '30s where the Allies boasted of peace in our time and got World War II.

I think we will see this interim deal extended for another six months while Iran continues to enrich and march closer to a nuclear weapon.

Iran has agreed to freeze its nuclear enrichment. They must dismantle their nuclear weapon program, not just freeze it. The Iranian Supreme Leader hasn't changed his goal. He has said, he wants to destroy Israel. He wants to destroy the United States. I think we should believe him when he says he wants to get rid of us.

So Congress cannot wait. We should pass tougher sanctions, not let up on sanctions at this time. That's just the way it is, Madam Speaker.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you very much, Judge Poe.

And, the bells have rung, but I'm going to introduce our witnesses and I think we'll have time to listen to our first witness, Ambassador Wallace before we break.

First we welcome Ambassador Mark Wallace, chief executive officer of United Against Nuclear Iran, which he founded in 2008. His organization has been a leader in pressuring businesses to end their dealings with Iran, and has promoted sanctions legislation to prevent a nuclear armed Iran.

Prior to this position, Ambassador Wallace was U.S.

ambassador to the United Nations on U.N. management and reform issues.

We welcome you, sir.

Next we welcome Mr. Gregory Jones -- thank you -- senior researcher at the Non-proliferation Policy Education Center.

Mr. Jones has been a defense policy analyst for the past 40 years and brings great expertise in the areas of non-proliferation and counter-proliferation, especially regarding terrorist organizations and regimes attempting to acquire nuclear technology.

Welcome, sir.

Third, we welcome, Mr. Ollie Heinonen -- I'm sorry if I don't say that right -- close enough? Close. Senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Prior to this position, he served for 27 years at the International Atomic Energy Agency including as deputy director general. He led the agency's efforts to identify and dismantle nuclear proliferation networks including overseeing its efforts to monitor and contain Iran's nuclear program.

He has led nuclear programs investigations around the world including to South Africa, Iraq, North Korea and Syria.

Welcome, Ollie.

Last, but not least, we welcome Mr. David Albright, a physicist and founder and president of the Non-profit Institute for Science and International Security.

Mr. Albright has written numerous assessments on secret nuclear weapons programs throughout the world, and has co-authored several books on the subject. Your statements in full will be made a part of the record. And please full free to summarize them.

We will start with you, Mr. Ambassador.

I think you need to -- I don't know if the mic is on.

WALLACE: There we go.

Thank you. Chairman.

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Sherman and Deutch and members of the joint subcommittee thank you for the opportunity to testify before you once again.

I'm honored to sit here on the panel with a group of distinguished and committed colleagues. It's a true honor.

We at UANI sincerely hope that a comprehensive and verifiable agreement that rolls back Iran's nuclear program is reached in six months. But, the prospects appear small and we must confront the difficulties with candor and bipartisan debate.

The joint plan has provided disproportionate sanctions relief to Iran, allowed Iran to retain and continue to develop an advanced and dangerous nuclear program. Under the agreement Tehran will not dismantle a single centrifuge or its heavy water reactor Arak, IR40. Today, Iran retains the ability to produce enough weapons grade uranium for a bomb in as little as two months and Iran has not indicated that it would end its development or the IR40.

At the same time, the sanctions architecture, developed over decades, has been significantly rolled back and enforcement has fallen to a trickle. What is the acceptable scope and size of Iran's program and will we permit them to operate the IR40.

If Iran truly only sought a peaceful nuclear energy program there would be no need for any enrichment or a heavy water reactor. The international community seems to have forgotten that there are multiple U.N. security resolutions calling for Iran to suspend all enrichment. Regrettably, the Geneva joint plan declares that in any final accord, Iran will be permitted to enrich is at best vague regarding the future of the IR40.

Today you will hear a range of opinions on what an acceptable Iranian enrichment program would look like and the dangers of Iran's operation of the IR40. We should all agree

that extending Iran's breakout time from its current 30 to 60 days to well beyond is the imperative.

But, does any serious person believe that Iran is prepared to dismantle between 15,000 and 19,000 centrifuges and forego the installation of more efficient and advanced centrifuges? Clearly not. Sanctions have become so important to this matter. Unfortunately the White House has described the sanctions relief as economically insignificant. We disagree. Iran's economy is blossoming.

Some hard data, the Rial has increased in value by more than 25 percent. The Tehran stock exchange has increased by nearly 100 percent. Dozens of multinational corporations are returning to Iran. Iran's oil exports have increased by nearly 60 percent. Iran's oil exports have risen to 1.2 million barrels per day from a low of 761,000 barrels per day.

Under the joint plan, Iran's oil exports will increase further and if oil sanctions continue unaltered, Iran's oil sales would have continued to drop to as little as 500,000 barrels per day by the end of 2014. Importantly the administration has curtailed its enforcement efforts.

In 2013, the United States Treasury Department designated 183 entities for Iran sanctions violations. Since President Rouhani's election, the United States has blacklisted only 29 entities. The Obama administration must hold to its pledge to enforce sanctions. The White House estimates that Iran stands to receive \$6 billion to \$7 billion in sanctions relief. The true value of sanctions relief is well more than \$20 billion.

Just calculate the increase in oil sales lest there be any doubt.

Now, we believe there will be far less pressure for Iran to actually make material concessions on its nuclear program. The Congress must actively take part in this process and make its position known. We all must agree that Iran will not be permitted to retain an industrial scale nuclear program.

This would entail capping the number of IR-1 centrifuges

to a small fraction of its nearly 20,000 Iran currently possesses or more appropriately none at all. Iran must be kept well over a year away from breakout given its long history of duplicity and hostility.

UANI strongly supports efforts to impose sanctions on Iran in six month time if no final accord is reached. The Congress should pass and the president should sign into law the Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act, which has the support of a bipartisan majority.

It is wrong that the White House is characterizing those who support new sanctions or question the joint plan as dishonest war mongers.

History offers a disturbing precedent. In the 1990s we entered into a similar interim nuclear agreement with North Korea: The Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework became the proverbial can that was kicked down the road. No final agreement was ever struck and the DPRK surprised the world with a nuclear chest.

This time Congress must make clear if there's no final agreement after the joint plan's initial six month term, that Congress will adopt more robust sanctions. We must learn the lessons of history, not repeat its mistakes.

Thank you, Madam Chairman for the opportunity.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

And the subcommittees will recess while we vote and welcome right back to hear the rest of our panelists, and to have members question them.

The subcommittee is in recess.

(RECESS)

ROS-LEHTINEN: The subcommittee will come to order. Thank you for your patience as we voted. We'll have another set of votes at 4:00 so we hope that we can almost wrap it up.

Mr. Jones, you're welcome to make your statement; and

your prepared remarks, as we said, will be made a part of the record. Thank you, sir.

JONES: Thank you.

In early November, Secretary of State Kerry said of the ongoing negotiations with Iran, quote, "We need to get the right deal. No deal is better than a bad deal," unquote.

Unfortunately, the November 24th joint plan of action is a bad deal. This fact has been obscured by both mischaracterization of the deal's benefits and the denial of the deal's great flaw.

President Obama has said that the deal has, quote, "cut off Iran's most likely paths to a bomb," unquote.

This is not true. Before the current nuclear deal, Iran could produce the highly enriched uranium -- HEU -- for a nuclear weapon in just six weeks. Over the next six months, the joint plan of action will increase this interval only slightly to eight weeks.

Iran will remain perilously close to a nuclear weapon. The joint plan of action allows Iran to continue to produce 3.5 percent enriched uranium which is the key starting material for any Iranian effort to produce HEU for weapons. Iran's stockpile of this material will continue to grow during the course of this nuclear deal, though several White House statements, as well as Secretary Kerry, have incorrectly claimed otherwise.

As this stockpile of enriched uranium grows, the number of nuclear weapons that Iran can produce from it will grow as well.

Iran's stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride is not supposed to grow. Iran is supposed to convert the excess into an oxide form, but Iran can easily convert this material back into hexafluoride once it begins to produce nuclear weapons.

This fact is well known to U.S. technical experts, but their input was apparently either not sought or heeded.

The joint plan of action does have some benefits and there are those who have argued that even limited benefits are better than no deal. But this view ignores the great flaw in the deal. It permits Iran to retain centrifuge enrichment. Centrifuge technology puts any country within an arm's reach of the HEU for nuclear weapons. The joint plan of action has already stated that when the follow-on so-called comprehensive solution has expired, Iran, quote, "will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT," unquote.

This means that in, say, five or 10 years, Iran's nuclear program will be under no special restrictions and if the P5+1 members have allowed Iran to keep its centrifuge enrichment program, then not only could it build as many centrifuges as it wants, it could also import centrifuges as part of normal nuclear trade. Iran could then have a larger, more robust centrifuge enrichment program and be much closer to acquiring nuclear weapons than it currently is.

What is worse, the joint plan of action will be setting a precedent for all other non-nuclear weapon countries. After all, if Iran is to be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT, then the reverse would be true as well.

If Iran that has violated its IAEA safeguards by conducting clandestine centrifuge enrichment and has defied multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding that it halt its centrifuge enrichment, is allowed to retain this capability, on what basis can any country that has abided by its IAEA safeguard obligations be denied centrifuge enrichment? The joint plan of action is setting the stage for many countries to acquire centrifuge enrichment, maintaining it very easy for them to produce the HEU for nuclear weapons whenever they desire them.

Unfortunately, there are no good options to head off a nuclear armed Iran. Any negotiated settlement would require major reductions in Iran's centrifuge enrichment program, reductions that Iran has already said it will not agree to.

Further sanctions are unlikely to be effective since

countries such as Russia and China will probably undercut them. Military strikes could easily lead to an ill-advised major war with Iran.

The U.S. instead needs to try to strengthen the overall nonproliferation system which appears to be unraveling. Key to this effort will be to stop countries from using nominally peaceful nuclear activities to acquire the HEU or plutonium needed for nuclear weapons.

The U.S. needs to urge the IAEA to clarify which materials and facilities it can effectively safeguard and which it cannot. A negotiated agreement with Iran that legitimizes its centrifuge enrichment program would be a step in the wrong direction. Thank you.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you very much, Mr. Jones.

Mr. -- help me out --

HEINONEN: Thank you very much.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Heinonen?

HEINONEN: Heinonen.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Got it.

HEINONEN: Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting me to address this hearing.

I will concentrate on my remarks on the verification aspects of this deal which was concluded on the 20th of November, highlight some of the implications from a verification angle and make some minor proposals for the way forward.

The interim agreement is a small but important step forward, which got after a long delay, finally, a good start on 20th of January.

Under this deal Iran continues to produce low enriched uranium, keeps both 5 percent and 20 percent enriched uranium

stocks on its soil, maintain centrifuge production capabilities, including the skills of the workforce and continues with centrifuge R&D and testing.

Iran will produce additional centrifuge rotors only to replace broken ones. But it's not realistic that in its production of other key centrifuge components or raw materials.

No new centrifuges will be installed or new investment locations will be built during this period. Some of the 5 percent enriched uranium and all the 20 percent enriched uranium gets converted to oxides.

In terms of a capacity, that is when Iran is able to produce, enough (inaudible) U.S. six-month (inaudible) for a singular nuclear explosive. The sliding bar will move from two, three weeks to three months as a result of this deal.

In other words, Iran maintains its semi-industrial enrichment capabilities. Post-production work (ph) and non-nuclear parts (ph) is permitted at the Arak IR-40 reactor and reactor component manufacturing proceeds elsewhere.

The production of heavy water continues. The whole thing of the fuel production at Isfahan and prohibiting of the installation of nuclear components delays the commissioning of Arak reactor until 2016.

In November 2003, E.U. three, France, Germany and the U.K. and Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment and reprocessing programs in Iran, implementing probably similarly the additional protocol and providing the IAEA with a complete picture on its past nuclear program. The verification details worked out in 2003 agreement by the IAEA and Iran generally have provided IAEA a much wider access than this agreement.

The 2003 undertaking included inter alia access to the nuclear R&D not involving nuclear material. An example of such access was the IAEA visits to centrifuge mechanical testing facilities in Tehran, Netanz, and Isfahan, and to centrifuge component manufacturing facilities and to key raw material such as high-strength aluminum or martensite steel.

One of the current challenges the IAEA is facing is to establish the actual inventory of centrifuge rotors manufactured by Iran. Iran commits itself not to construct new (inaudible) locations, reconvert uranium back to hexafluoride and that it will not construct any facility capable for reprocessing.

With the access provided currently by Iran and the JPA, the IAEA remains limited in its capabilities to confirm the statements made to this end by Iran, regardless whether it's to do with the centrifuge and centrifuge enrichment (inaudible) or reprocessing.

The preamble of the JPA refers to additional steps between (inaudible) and the final step, which includes addressing the U.N. Security Council resolution. Those include outstanding issues, such as related to the possible military dimension of the uranium nuclear program, in other words, Iran needs, according to those resolutions, to explain -- resolve the questions related to all its studies, missile (inaudible) green salt and certain high explosive studies.

HEINONEN: It has to explained why it's acquired that uranium metal document which was to do with the manufacturing of a nuclear warhead. It has to clarify the parochial maintain R&D activities of military-related institutes and companies, and has to explain the production and nuclear equipment and components by companies related to the military establishment.

Without us addressing these questions, the IAEA secretary will not be able to come to any conclusions that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful use.

This is essential in building confidence of the international community over Iran's nuclear problem.

To this end, I gave in my written statement some proposals how to proceed on this way, gradually to set up and build this confidence about the peaceful nature of the program.

Then at the end, I would like to say that this agreement

serves an interim state. It should not be either an end by itself or be sustained indefinitely behind the allocated time period, up to one year, without endgame in sight.

Further extensions may also run the risk of proliferation consequences in the region, when the states see Iran, not only maintaining its current nuclear breakout capabilities, but slowly advancing them, in particular in areas which remain inaccessible to the IAEA inspectors. Thank you.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you very much for your expertise.

Mr. Albright.

ALBRIGHT: Thank you very much for inviting me today. It's been a great pleasure to be here.

(UNKNOWN): Push the button.

ALBRIGHT: Yes, thank you very much for inviting me today and a great pleasure to be here. And appreciate all your work that you're doing to try to sort through the proper oversight role of Congress, which I personally believe is extremely important in this situation.

I think we've discussed the interim deal of the joint plan of action quite a bit. I think its strengths and weaknesses have been identified.

I think the real test of the joint plan of action is going to lie in negotiating the long-term arrangements, and that's a process that many are not giving a high probability of success. But nonetheless, this long-term comprehensive solution is going to have to create meaningful limits on Iran's nuclear program, combined with adequate verification sufficient to ensure that any attempt by Iran to build nuclear weapons is detected in a timely manner and provide adequate time for international response.

Now, the interim deal isn't, from my point of view, an important confidence-building measure, but it's certainly has its weaknesses, many of which have been talked about.

And yesterday we published an article on problems and loopholes involving centrifuge R&D, which we think rather than criticizing the interim deal I would argue that that has to be fixed in any comprehensive solution, that Iran's ability to make advanced centrifuges has to be severely curtailed, and the process that they are involved in with centrifuge R&D has to be much more transparent, and particularly to deal with some other problems Olli's confronted.

And also I want to agree with what Olli said, that this isn't -- the interim deal should not continue past its planned lifetime. It's by itself it's no means sufficient. And it's -- if you can't get a comprehensive deal, the interim deal is not a substitute in any manner.

I also want to say that a real test of Iran's intentions in the short to medium turn is how it treats the IAEA on these issues involving the allegations of Iran's past work on nuclear weapons and other military programs.

Iran has delayed the meeting with the IAEA that was supposed to happen in January until February 8. It is going to delay it again? And if it has a meeting -- is it going to allow the IAEA to go to Partun (ph) and other facilities and meet with people so the IAEA can get to the bottom of it.

Now on the comprehensive solution, my testimony and in our studies at ISIS (ph) have outlined what we see as a model, and certain things have been talked about. Certainly we want to see much greater breakout times, to meet our national security interest. We think the breakout times should be measured in six to 12 months to allow detection time and response time. And that's going to require Iran to remove over 14,000 centrifuges at Natans (ph) and Fordel (ph).

Also, some of my colleagues have mentioned the problem with oxide. I mean, the stocks of LAU (ph) need to be introduced, particularly the 20 percent stocks. Putting them into oxide may work on an interim deal, but it doesn't work on a comprehensive deal. We all have agreed that the Iraq reactor, that -- Iran's plutonium route to nuclear weapons has to be blocked.

Also we have not talked a lot about it, but there needs to be much greater verification that's put in play. Often Iran says we'll accept an additional protocol. We would argue it has to be the additional protocol plus. There has to be another set of verification conditions in this deal that are going to provide much greater transparency of the program.

The other thing that is also important is to remember is how long these conditions would last. The administration is talking about 20 years. Iran is talking about three to five. I think it's very important that 20 years be the minimum, and that the administration be held to that minimum.

I think if that's done, and these -- in a sense Iran would be on probation for 20 years, that could provide the confidence that Iran has turned a corner. One thing that the additional, or this joint plan of action doesn't deal with is how do they, in a sense, come out of probation. That it is right now implied that the conditions would end from one day to the next. And whatever the length is. Probably some work needs to be done to make sure that the conditions are removed only if Iran has satisfied certain criteria.

I think I've talked enough about the verification, but I do want to re-emphasize that Iran has been very tough on this. It's resisted all kinds of verification. It's resisted it today. And I think another test is going to be whether Iran is fully cooperative with the IAEA and with IAEA's effort to get to the bottom of all these outstanding issues, which are going to require much more intrusive verification, and that would be played out over the next several months if the comprehensive solution is going to be negotiated by the end of this six-month period.

Let me just -- yes, let me just end there. I'm sorry, I realized I'm over time.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you very much, two excellent panelists. We will begin with our set of questions.

My first question is, why is this deal in secret? Why is it that members of Congress have to go to a super-secret secured location, cone of silence, get smart kind of place to

look at the deal.

And, Mr. Acevedo, our subcommittee staff director and I that, and we went into the room, and it's a very easy to read document. One doesn't have to be as an expert, as one of our panelists is, to understand what is there. And it's quite eye opening. I encourage all members to go there and read the document. You can't take notes. You can't take it out.

But why is this -- if this is such a great deal, if this is so good for peace and diplomacy in our time, why is it held in secret, and are you -- do you worry about the details in this plan? Do you worry about what may be or may not be in it?

I just ask that as a general question, because having read it, I just don't -- if the administration is proud of it, I think that they should highlight it.

I'd ask the panelists, what is the greatest worry you have about this deal. And Mr. -- Ambassador Wallace, last week there were reports that Iran could use the money from sanctions relief to fund terrorism against us.

What kind of oversight or mechanisms are in place, do you know, to ensure the proper and adequate use of sanctions relief funds, and can we follow the money once it's released?

So the secretive nature of the deal. Why doesn't the public have it. Why can't we just have it in an open setting, your greatest worry, and can we follow the money? Whoever wants to get at that. Ambassador?

WALLACE: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

My biggest worry about the deal is that we have significantly rolled back the sanctions architecture, which all of you, both sides of the aisle, have carefully constructed and defined a variety of residents over a long time and created the sanctions architecture.

Mr. Sherman said it quite well in his intervention, where he said, "You have to have ever-increasing sanctions for them to be effective. The moment you start dialing them

back they start falling away."

So we have really undercut dramatically the sanctions effort, and the Iranian economy, as I said, is blossoming.

At the same time, we haven't rolled back their nuclear program in any material way. No one on this panel -- and there are true experts on this panel on the complexities of the nuclear physics -- can show that a single centrifuge has been dismantled.

WALLACE: Whatever the range of opinions here, if you believe in no enrichment or some limited enrichment, it means that Iran could only have something like zero to maybe 4,000 IR-1, the most primitive centrifuge. That's the range of opinion probably at this table. I don't want to speak for my colleagues. What are the chances they can dismantle 15,000 to 19,000 of its centrifuges.

I say: None.

So my worry is the interim agreement becomes the permanent agreement.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you.

Any other panelists?

Mr. Jones.

JONES: Can I just say with regard to the terms being somewhat secret, this does bother me, and not necessarily for the reason you think.

It appears to me that the administration has negotiated an agreement it doesn't fully understand. And I don't understand how that can happen, because obviously, there are technical experts in the national labs who can -- who know as much as I, if not more. But, it's clear there are various places and one is this -- the 3.5 percent enriched uranium stockpile won't grow, which is obviously not correct. Another is that this disconnecting the tandem cascades who prevent Iran from producing 20 percent, where we know that they originally produced it with single cascades, which was what

they would be left with.

So I'm left with the impression that the administration doesn't really understand what it's negotiated and that, I find most worrisome.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you, sir.

Mr. Albright? Or Mr. Heinonen.

HEINONEN: Yes. About the document that secret agreement. Actually it's not that unusual. I think similar -- I understand at the time of The Agreed Framework with North Korea. So we have seen those before. But I think it would -- when I look at the technical explanations that were in this -- really especially of the White House -- I didn't see any reason, technically, to keep those a secret.

But there might some other parts of it I just don't know, because I have not seen the document and how big it is. But I think it would clarify a lot of area if it is made public.

And the second thing, my worries. I think that I mentioned my worries in my opening statement. And particularly, really, if this becomes a kind of final, or agreement -- or agreement, it has a long life expectancy, because we really don't get an insight to the content of the Iranian nuclear program with this deal.

It's better than what was a year or two ago the situation, but it's not the final solution.

And I still want to remind from the verification point of view that every day when the IAEA doesn't have access to this so called military dimension it would be more and more difficult to verify what actually took place.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you very much. And Mr. Albright. We'll have to wait for your statement maybe in another set of questions from my colleagues.

And I'd like to encourage our members to please go and read the -- the document. I encourage you to do so.

And before I recognize Ranking Member Deutch, I hear that his older brother is in the front row. Is that right?

DEUTCH: (OFF-MIKE) That's correct.

ROS-LEHTINEN: He told me he was your younger brother.

DEUTCH: (OFF-MIKE) That's -- we like people people (inaudible).

(LAUGHTER)

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so much. Mr. Deutch.

DEUTCH: Thank you, Madam Chairman. That is one I don't believe that I'll live down for (inaudible). That's right, Ranking Member Sherman points out he does have more hair than his younger brother.

(LAUGHTER)

So I want to follow up with Mr. Albright.

If I understand correctly, the quote that I referred to in my opening statement, about Parchin being a huge site dedicated to the development of ammunition, rockets and high explosives, which is owned by Iran's military industry and has hundreds of buildings and test sites is one that came from your organization. Is that correct?

ALBRIGHT: Yes. We've looked at that quite a bit.

DEUTCH: If you can just speak to what is I think the crux of all of this entire debate, we -- this is not about just the centrifuges that are spinning. This is about -- this whole debate is about how to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and that statement, and Parchin, seems to be right at the heart of this, and yet, we don't yet have the details, Mr. Heinonen. You just alluded to this as well.

What do we have to see there? How likely is it -- is it possible for the Iranians to have completely swept clean, Parchin, and when we talk about Iran coming clean on the

possible military dimensions, what is it that they have to provide, and are there examples of other regimes in similar circumstances who have faced this question, and what have we expected from them?

ALBRIGHT: I think, Parchin, there's a site there that is alleged to have been engaged in high explosive work related to nuclear weapons development. The IAEA has evidence of it. They've asked to go for over 18 months and been denied. And in that time, Iran has significantly modified the site to the point where it may not be possible for them to take environmental sampling and find something.

But I think the key thing is one Iran has to allow the visit and they have to allow the follow-up. It's not just a visit. I mean, they -- the IAEA will come, they do things that Iran will have to allow them to do and then they're gonna have to give them access to the people involved based on IAEA information at least and answer the basic question, did they do this work.

DEUTCH: When were the previous inspections?

ALBRIGHT: They've never been to this building or this particular complex. They've been to Parchin, and we can talk about that, but it was a long time ago. And the information available was much less complete than it is now. And so I think the focus now is on this particular -- this site of high explosives.

Now, you asked, there's other sites, too.

There's sites involved -- workshops that are alleged to have made re-entry vehicles prior to 2004. The IAEA's asked to go there in the past and has not been allowed. So I think in cases where it's worked, Libya, South Africa, the country cooperates. And in that cooperation you can see that it can work out and that the IAEA can do its job.

Iran has not shown that level of cooperation. And so one of the things to look for if Iran is going to settle this is, is it cooperating. So the IAEA is able to get the people, get to the information it needs and then is able to ask follow-up questions to get to the very bottom of this.

DEUTCH: But we're not separating in the dark here. We have a list, presumably, and Mr. Heinonen I want to ask you this as well. We -- we know who we'd like -- who that -- the IAEA knows the people that need to be spoken to, correct?

ALBRIGHT: Well, they know some, but they won't know the complete list. I mean it's not possible. I mean, there's -- I know in the case of South Africa, there were people that you wouldn't have expected and provided important information. So...

DEUTCH: But you don't get those other names until you start with the ones that we have?

ALBRIGHT: Those right. You need to start...

DEUTCH: And have we -- and so what -- tell us about -- tell us about the discussions that have taken place thus far. Have we identified those individuals that we wish to speak with and what's the response from...

ALBRIGHT: Yes, but Olli should really answer to the ones we've spoken to.

DEUTCH: Yeah, please.

HEINONEN: Actually those discussions are reflected in the IAEA reports in 2008, March report and then again in the June report of 2008. And at that point in time, when we come to this so-called or possible military dimension, we have an opportunity to discuss with the first director of that so-called (inaudible) center for more than 10 years, but unfortunately he was not able to answer all of the questions and then we wanted to see his successor, which never materialize.

So the IAEA has a good understanding of those. Also about the people who have (inaudible) and equipment that's been used on those experiments. Some scientific publications which have been published by these people. So there's a -- quite a good starting point and then you start to talk and look at the facts and go from here on to see what else you need to see.

DEUTCH: But, is there a -- if I may, Madam Chair. Is there a -- have we -- have we prepared this list, and presented it to the Iranians in all of the talks thus far? And is there an acknowledgment that yes, those are appropriate question and we'll make sure these individuals will respond?

HEINONEN: Well, we when go through an investigative process, you don't keep the whole list. You start with the key persons and then you work your way from there. So, I don't think the IAEA has propose aid very long list at this stage. Only the starting point, and they'll go from there. But that kind of list exists.

DEUTCH: Right, and -- and are -- were those names included in the last report?

HEINONEN: No. Names have -- only one name, I think, has been in the reports, because -- that's another reason the IAEA doesn't want to disclose for a number of reasons the names.

DEUTCH: OK, but that name has been disclosed? Is...

HEINONEN: Yeah, one name has been closed (sic).

DEUTCH: And has -- since that would certainly be a good place to start, and he's already been identified in a report. Has he agreed to engage in these discussions?

HEINONEN: Yes, we met him, I think, twice. But then, at one point in time the process got stopped and we never got to his successor.

DEUTCH: All right.

Madam Chairman, I -- just before I yield back -- I hope later in Mr. Heinonen's testimony -- responses, he might be able to speak to -- elaborate on the comment that he made in his opening statement that, in 2003 in the agreement, there was much greater access provided than there is today.

ALBRIGHT: Can I have one thing to add to Ollie's answer?

ROS-LEHTINEN: Go right ahead.

ALBRIGHT: (inaudible) has been identified. Ollie was talking about Shah Marati (ph) who ran the physics research center. So there's lists of names that have been made public. And no, I don't think they've -- any of them have ever talked about anything to do with the military dimension.

Shah Marati (ph) -- correct me if I am wrong, Ollie -- but he talked about work he did as a professor at Sharif University, but he didn't talk about the physics research center or...

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so have, Mr. Deutch.

And we appreciate the brother get you here on time after the votes. Now we know the weapon when Mrs. Deutch is not available.

Judge Poe?

That's the way it is.

POE: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

I want to say amen to your comments about the deal being public not only for members of Congress, but for American people as well since it affects us. Now, I'm perplexed why it's not. And I still don't know why it's not.

Iran is the mischief-maker in the Middle East. They have the military -- their military's involved in Syria. They support terrorism throughout the world. They're sending rockets to Hezbollah and Lebanon so they can be fired into Israel. They're responsible on the attack of the Iranian dissidents, the MEK in Iraq over the last several years.

The Supreme Leader of Iran said that he wants to destroy Israel.

He wants to destroy the United States.

They are building intercontinental ballistic missiles.

They are expanding their conventional war capabilities.

What in the world are we thinking that they want to deal with us and cut back on their nuclear weapon development?

What incentive?

I mean, they may just not be telling us the truth, that they will cut back. I don't think we should believe anything they say. Contracts, deals are made when both sides agree, and there are inspections, or people act in good faith. Iranians aren't acting in good faith. I don't see any evidence over the last few years they've ever acted in good faith.

Sanctions have worked. And we're now backing off the sanctions. They to be forced not to be able to build nuclear weapons. Now, I agree, peace is the best answer. Negotiations is the best answer down -- I mean, long term, we got to do that. We don't want to be involved in some type of military action, and we have to prevent that from happening.

But long term -- Mr. Albright, you talked about the long-term situation, we look down the road, months, years, it doesn't look too good for the free world (sic) far as nuclear weapons go. These ICBMs, they're are being built not to go to Israel, but go to the west, Europe, go to the United States.

So Ambassador, and I'll let all of you comment on this, long term, how are we going resolve the problem that Iran is determined to have nuclear weapons?

What's the answer to that question question?

WALLACE: I guess I'll take a first crack at that big question.

President Obama recently said that somehow, if we could have a nuclear deal with Iran , that it would resolved sectarian tensions that are plaguing the region.

I disagree with that strongly. Particularly since the nature of this deal seems to not understand their nuclear weapon program.

The U.N. Security council has several resolutions saying that Iran must suspend its enrichment, stop enriching in order to be -- and clarify the military aspects that Ollie and Mr. Albright were talking about.

That hasn't happened.

So I think that we're a long way away of getting to a point where we can use this nuclear file in a vacuum to deal with the problems in the region and the like. And I remain greatly concerned that we seemingly forgot those security council resolutions, which required suspension of enrichment, required clarification on military dimension, and in the agreement it says that Iran will have a mutually defined enrichment program in the final deal.

I thought that was an unfortunate step. I don't think it goes a long way to answering your big question, but I want to allow my colleagues time.

POE: Well, Ambassador, let me ask you this.

Is this correct that Iran is developing ICBMs? Is that correct?

WALLACE: We've seen a variety of evidence that they are looking at the other aspects of obtaining a nuclear weapon, which is the delivery capacity, the ignition capacity and the like. So we've seen a lot of evidence of this and I think that there's a really part of the agreement that hasn't been focused on which is -- of an agreement -- which is clarifying these other military aspects of the program.

We haven't heard from Iran about this. They haven't clarified that.

Those reports are very disturbing.

POE: Mr. Jones, do you want to weigh in on this? Give us the long range answer.

JONES: Well unfortunately I'm always the party-pooper at these things, I believe the ship has sailed, that it is too

late to stop Iran.

POE: So you think they are going to get nuclear weapons.

JONES: That is correct. And, that depresses everyone who hears me talk, but that's what I believe, because as I said in my statement, I can't see how there is going to be any agreement. I don't see how the sanctions with the Russians, Chinese, Indians undercutting them are going to do any good. As you correctly pointed out, I'm not in favor of getting into yet another war with -- in the middle east.

POE: We've even got the Saudis and the Israelis working together. Who would have ever thought of this? I mean, the Saudis are worried about the nuclear weapon capability of Iran, of course, Israel is and they're together announcing this deal?

JONES: it clearly shows the level of threat and the concern in the region.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you very much Judge.

Thank you.

Mr. Sherman is recognized.

SHERMAN: Thank you.

First, if Iran has nuclear weapons Americans shouldn't feel that they are safe, even if missile defense worked, because you can smuggle a nuclear weapon inside a bail of Marijuana.

Second, the best argument for these -- this agreement remaining secret is it must contain wonderful pro-American provisions that hardliners in Iran are unaware of. Unfortunately -- and I know the hardliners look to me for advice and information -- we've seen it...

(UNKNOWN): (OFF-MIKE) I do.

SHERMAN: ... it doesn't. So it is peculiar that this is agreement is not disclosed. Nobody wants just one bomb.

You're a nuclear power when you have got several and you've got -- and you are confident enough to test one.

In July, Iran will have a stock pile of enriched uranium. It'll have about half its 20 percent enriched with that being in oxide form. It will have its low enriched uranium hexafluoride that it has today, and then it will have an additional supply of low enriched uranium oxide.

Assuming that don't do anything with the yellow cake. They're just looking at the enriched uranium that they will have in July.

How many bombs is that? Is that enough uranium for (sic) once they enrich it to weapons grade?

Mr. Jones?

JONES: I'd estimate around four weapons.

SHERMAN: Four?

OK, and how long would it take them -- knowing that they could spend the next six months doing experiments in engineering on their advanced centrifuges, but are not making any more centrifuges as I understand the agreement, but they are learning how to use it better, how long will it take for them to use this stockpile of enriched uranium to make four weapons? Assuming breakout.

JONES: Just what they've got. They get the first in about two months. The four weapons, I don't know, probably four or five months.

SHERMAN: Four to five months.

I'll go down the panel. Does everybody agree with Mr. Jones?

You do agree, Mr. Heinonen.

HEINONEN: I would like to add to the picture another part which is the unknowns. It's an easy to talk about this what we see, but the most important thing is to realize the

amount of unknowns. Are there additional centrifuges, if there are other additional stocks. And I think this is where the whole focus....

SHERMAN: Based on what we do know and one of the advantages of this agreement is we're inspecting a few things we hadn't been inspecting before, but answering the question Mr. Jones did, do you agree with him, you know, basically four weapons in four months?

HEINONEN: I think it will take longer than four months, but first weapons will be there in two three months.s

SHERMAN: OK. And, Mr. Albright.

ALBRIGHT: It's -- in terms of the first one in two months, around that. But, I think to get to four, five I'd probably just multiply that number by four or five.

So it's -- you're talking about eight...

SHERMAN: Eight months.

ALBRIGHT: Eight months.

And there may be...

(CROSSTALK)

SHERMAN: There would be (inaudible) tend to agree first weapon two, fourth weapon in four to eight.

I'd point out, that if we lose this game it is not because of who was calling the plays in the final quarter. We didn't field a team for the first three quarters. From 1996 to 2010 almost this committee did everything possible to pass new sanctions. They were stopped by three successive administrations. We are -- our effective sanctions against Iran began in 2010. Their program began in 2010. Their program began 10 years sooner. We now are committed to this goal line stand just a few yards from the goal line. And it's not clear which play we could possibly call, but we've got three.

We've got the voluntary sanctions, which is what we have now. That is to say we have the sanctions we can get other countries to agree to.

Then there's secondary sanctions where you basically threaten a cut off of world trade if they don't radically change their laws. We have -- the Iran Sanctions Act calls for that, but we don't do it.

And then finally there's the prospect of military action. If we took military action, would we be able to turn into rubble the centrifuges at Natanz and Fordo?

Do I have an answer? Mr. Jones?

JONES: Well, I discussed that in my written testimony. Unfortunately the centrifuges are quite resistant to bombardment because you have at Fordo 96 parallel cascades that can run. So certainly you take out some.

A bombing raid, and we saw this in World War II, you knock out the utilities, the plant goes down. But how quickly can it get back? And it turns out...

SHERMAN: Let me put out one other thing. And then the final possibility is that we threaten to hit every oilfield and industrial and strategic target in Iran if they don't allow Mr. Wallace to go in with 400 experts, along with the entire panel, and just clean out everything.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you, Mr. Sherman.

SHERMAN: And I don't think I have time to ask for your comment on that so you can respond in writing.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you. We'll hold that thought, Olli. Thank you.

Mr. Kinzinger?

KINZINGER: Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Mr. Sherman. I thought those were great questions. And to the panel, thank you for being here.

I'm having a hard time actually figuring out what the United States got out of this. I mean you know we got -- the Iranians got a lot. They basically got an implicit right to enrich uranium. And we have allies that are begging us in 321 [ph] agreements to be able to enrich uranium.

We say no to allies. But then to enemies we basically give them the right to enrich uranium as a reward for doing it the wrong way.

I mean I guess I'm really having a hard time figuring out anything that the United States gained besides being able, I guess for the next year, to go in front of the American people and say that we won something. But then that'll only be proven wrong by history.

This to me is like the equivalent of a police officer pulling somebody over for DUI and the person in the car saying, well Mr. Officer, I'd be happy to pull over, but you have to let me have the keys in the car with the engine running and I'm not going to get out. And then the officer saying you know what, that sounds like a fair deal. That's a good deal for me.

I'm having a hard time with that. I also think back to what happened in North Korea. And I remember the agreement that was hailed as the peace in our time of the Korean nuclear agreement in North Korea that they were going to not have a nuclear weapon.

In fact, I remember reading some of the editorial papers that basically said this was a huge victory against the war hawks and for the people that said diplomacy could never work. And then a year later, North Korea has nuclear weapons and that's something we're dealing with today. And that I think is a regime that as threatening as they are is probably less threatening than what would happen if the Iranians got nuclear weapons.

And I think of how the sanctions went down even -- and I know Iraq is a touchy subject, so not talking about the war in 2003, but the inspection regime in the 1990s, this cat and mouse game that occurred and everything like that.

So I'm trying to wonder what the enforcement -- I'm trying to figure out what the enforcement mechanism on our end and the motivation to prevent Iran from playing the cat and mouse game. And the second they do is this a matter of OK, well the deal's off and we're back to the full sanctions? But I get no indication that that's the case either.

I want to ask the members of the panel both about the North Korean parallel here, and something we ought to be concerned with, and your words of wisdom on that. But also if you think back to when we've used sanctions in the past, times that they've been successful and times that they have not been successful.

Pulling the trigger on relieving sanctions too early I think leads to unsuccess. And so I want to know if any of you all have an example of that. Or maybe even a counterexample to what I'm saying. Maybe pulling the trigger early has helped. And then also discuss the North Korean parallel.

Ambassador, I'll start with you.

WALLACE: Sure. I'll try to go to the sanctions question and leave it to my colleagues on some other previous examples.

Look, I think we did pull the trigger well too early on sanctions here. I'm not a sanctions apologist. I run a group that engages in economic pressure and it engages in sanctions promotion. But I -- they don't always work.

Actually, this committee and this Congress showed that they were working in the context of Iran. Iran's economy was veering towards the red zone, and I think that we blinked unfortunately four to six months too early.

There are many more examples of sanctions not working, historically, than they have worked. I would argue that our sanctions on Iran were maybe the most effective, but we unraveled them too quickly.

There's no secret here. There are only four tools in the tool shed: sanctions, diplomacy, a military option, and covert action. A serious foreign policy would engage in all

of them. Unfortunately, we just dialed back the sanctions when they were just about to have the great fundamental impact.

KINZINGER: It's like, in essence, if you look at those old 1980s shows when, you know, the investigator always should punch the bad guy one last time, and you know it, and he walks away, and the bad guys gets up.

Mr. Jones?

WALLACE (?): A road runner episode would -- is coming to mind, so --

JONES: I want to first say that much of what you said sounds like you were reading off my sheet here.

KINZINGER: Maybe I was.

JONES: Thank you.

But I -- I -- on North Korea, I -- I wanted to point out how these failures are damaging U.S. credibility worldwide. I was discussing Iran with some Canadian intelligence analysts a while ago. And I gave my pessimistic views on Iran, and one of the Canadians said, "But the U.S. administration said they're not going to allow Iran to get nuclear weapons." And before I could say anything, one of the other Canadians said, "That's what they said about North Korea, too." And -- and these are our friends.

KINZINGER: Well, and I also think the administration would probably have never said that Fallujah would be taken over by al Qaida again when they left, but that's another issue.

I guess maybe briefly, the last two. I -- my time's expired, but if you will just real quick.

HEINONEN: (inaudible) brings to my mind my discussion in 2003 with my North Korean counterpart when we were kick once more out from North Korea. And I asked, "What next? Is it a nuclear weapon?" He told me that, "Olli, don't worry. We will not build a nuclear weapon. Plutonium is our weapon." Well,

we know now what happened. And I think this is exactly what is the situation with Iran. They are going to...

ROS-LEHTINEN: We'll have you hold that thought, just because -- sir, I have to be fair to everybody, and...

KINZINGER: Thank you, Madam Chair. I'll yield back.

ROS-LEHTINEN: ... and be equally rude to everyone and cut you off. Thank you.

Mr. Higgins is recognized.

HIGGINS: Thank you, Madam Chair.

Let me -- I just want to go back to the elections that brought Rouhani into office.

You know, there were six candidates running. Rouhani ran against the policies that created international isolation. He ran against the policies that created sanctions. And he won the election.

Now, Iranian elections aren't like the United States election. Rouhani could not have won without the Supreme Leader Khamenei willing it. In fact, in Iran, if you don't get 50 percent of the vote, there's a runoff. Rouhani got 50.6 percent of the vote. It tells us that either, you know, the supreme leader is trying to bamboozle the United States into believing that Iran is committed to reform. Or that the supreme leader is allowing Rouhani an opportunity to negotiate a deal. But the big question is, we don't know if it's a deal that we can live with. And we don't know if it's a deal that the international community can live with.

Now, there's three generations of nuclear proliferation in Iran. The first one was basically a glorified national science project. Iran 10 years ago had 164 centrifuges, which is basically the machinery that spins uranium at supersonic speeds to produce weapons grade fuel.

Today, Iran has 19,000 centrifuges. It has a multibillion dollar atomic infrastructure that has given Iran breakout capability. Which means that Iran can produce now

weapons grade material before we can detect it and act against it, which is in fundamental conflict with the objective of the United States. And that is, Iran will not get nuclear weapons -- and that's (ph) the containment of a nuclear weapon once they get it.

So, the objective of prevention may be lost. And in addition to 19,000 centrifuges, Iran also constructed its first heavy water reactor for plutonium enrichment, another bomb fuel.

There wouldn't be this discussion, and Iran wouldn't be at the table, unless we imposed sanctions, because that's the only thing that they respond to. I think if we take sanctions off the table, you take away the leverage, assuming that Rouhani is sincere about this -- he ran the nuclear program for 10 years prior to his election as president -- and the only leverage that we have.

Remember the Iran-Iraq war. They were at war for eight years. It was basically a standoff. Nobody won. Khamenei said that upon basically calling a truce, it was like drinking poison from a chalice.

Then the United States went in Iraq and did in three weeks what Iran couldn't do in eight years. And guess what Iran what Iran stopped (ph) doing: enriching uranium.

So, you know, we've been through this. And I think the United States gets played by leaders in Iraq. They push us away when they're doing well. They pull us in when they're being challenged. Same in Afghanistan and the same in Iran.

I think we need to be very careful as a nation before we begin to provide relief from sanctions. Because the Iranian economy is a mess. It dropped six percentage points last year. They don't even have the capacity to refine the oil that they produce for so many other countries. Europe stopped buying oil from Iran. China, who continues to buy oil from Iran, said, "We'll continue to buy it from you, so long as it's deeply discounted," which further hurts Iran.

Now, there's 90 million people in that country, the vast majority of whom are under the age of 30. They are sick and

tired of these repressive regimes. And because of social media, Twitter, Internet, YouTube, they see how the rest of the world is living. And the tools of social media are not only used for aspirational purposes and seeing how everybody else is living, but it's used highly effectively for organizational purposes.

Iran was always good at suppression. Tehran is not like New York City, it's like Los Angeles. It's spread out. But the regime was always good at keeping people down.

So, I just think that we need to be very, very careful.

I know that I went out a little bit longer here, so I would just ask a brief comment.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you. Maybe we'll have them comment...

HIGGINS: OK.

ROS-LEHTINEN: ... in -- in someone else's question and answer.

HIGGINS: I yield.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so much, Mr. Higgins.

Mr. Perry's recognized.

PERRY: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Gentlemen, just a couple quotes, because I think they bear repeating over and over again. And this is a key quote out of Iran earlier in the decade.

The dilemma was, "If we offered a complete picture, the picture itself could lead us to the U.N. Security Council. And not providing a complete picture would also be a violation of the resolution, and we could have been referred to the Security Council for not implementing the resolution."

And the next one, just from last week, when President Rouhani said, as Judge Poe already indicated, "The Geneva

deal means the surrender of big powers before the great nation of Iran." And in that context, it seems to me that all of the American people -- liberals, conservatives, Republicans, Democrats, people that don't care can see exactly what's happening here. And the only folks that genuinely support this somehow come out of academia with some hope for a better solution that's not based in reality.

My first questions, I guess, would -- I think would go to Mr. Albright.

It seems like you are kind of in favor of the deal, but I just want to get your context. Is -- is -- do you understand -- is the deal about non-proliferation? Is that what we're trying to get to? And is it your opinion that it gets us a little closer to non- proliferation? As quickly as you can.

ALBRIGHT: The goal of the deal is to endure that Iran does not get nuclear weapons. But, again, it's the comprehensive solution that would get this...

PERRY: Right, right.

ALBRIGHT: ... not the interim deal.

PERRY: But we don't trust these folks, and they have no reason to have our trust. They haven't done anything to earn it...

ALBRIGHT: That's right.

PERRY: ... over a period of time. Now, there's this three-year study recently published by The Pentagon that intelligence agencies are not yet organized or fully equipped to direct -- or detect the development of nuclear weapons, or the ramping up of the existing arsenals in foreign countries. Are you familiar?

ALBRIGHT: Yes.

PERRY: So, with that in mind -- have you ever been to Iran?

ALBRIGHT: No, I have not.

PERRY: I mean, you've seen it on a map. It's a big country, right? I mean, it's...

ALBRIGHT: Yeah, I've studied it a lot.

PERRY: Yeah. Hard to find big things and little things in...

ALBRIGHT: Well, but one thing that study -- you have to remember, in Iran, the intelligence community's done pretty well. It's exposed many secret sites. And...

PERRY: Many, which is great. But there's not a lot of margin for error, so can -- do you think the elements of the joint action plan and the implementation agreement can be adequately verified under the current context?

ALBRIGHT: I think, well, this, the interim deal is limited steps. Yeah, I think that can be adequately verified. I think many things that are important are not included in that, and in order to verify those, there's gonna have to be a great deal of stepped-up verification.

In terms of the intelligence community, certainly any efforts to improve their abilities is good, but I would say that on --

PERRY: But by your own testimony -- testimony, didn't you already say that earlier this month, Iran has already been somewhat intractable and non-responsive or not interested?

ALBRIGHT: That's right, but you asked me if it can be done. I think it can be and one of the things that -- one of the verification conditions is --

PERRY: OK, so yeah, in the context that everything in the world is possible, anything can be done.

ALBRIGHT: No, it's not possible. If Iran is not cooperative, they're not abiding by the verification conditions.

PERRY: Right.

ALBRIGHT: And that's an early test of whether they intend --

PERRY: But again, working within the context of there is no, in my mind anyhow, especially if you live in Israel, no margin for error.

ALBRIGHT: I've lived in Israel, so I think there -- there's plenty of room to design a verification re--

PERRY: But you're not in Israel now.

ALBRIGHT: Well, obviously not.

PERRY: OK.

(LAUGHTER)

ALBRIGHT: So there's plenty of --

PERRY: OK. So Ambassador Wallace, have we already moved from prevention to containment?

WALLACE: I certainly hope not, but it's certainly looking that way.

PERRY: How is that measured?

WALLACE: I would just say, particularly with the expertise in this panel, absent countries that fully and 100 percent cooperate, there is no such thing as verification that works. So we're deluding ourselves in the context of Iran that additional protocol, plus, I -- I don't want to speak for my colleagues, you know, are great to ask for.

But absent 100 percent cooperation, verification equals bomb.

PERRY: Right, so back to my other question regarding containment or prevention. Because we've been told by this administration, we're going to prevent, we're going to

prevent, we're going to prevent. Have we moved to containment?

WALLACE: If we had made this deal 10, 15 years ago, and locked in at a very early stage of Iranian nuclear program (sic), I would say we aren't containing. Now, it sure looks like we're containing.

PERRY: Mr. Jones.

JONES: (OFF-MIKE)

PERRY: So when did we get to containment in your opinion?

JONES: In, I don't know, maybe 2008, 2009? I mean, you know, it was a gradual process as they add more and more.

PERRY: Could we, if we kept the sanctions presents, could we have gotten, if we had got to containment at 2008 and 2009 and didn't admit it, if the sanctions would have continued, would we have been able to get back to prevention in your opinion?

JONES: Well, if -- if we'd had the sort of sanctions we're talking about now, back then, or maybe 2006, I think so. Now, I think it's too late.

PERRY: Thank you. Thank you gentlemen.

CHAIRWOMAN(ph): Thank you very much, Mr. Schneider?

SCHNEIDER (ph): I thank you Madame Chair. I want to thank the witnesses for being here today, for sharing your insights. I want to thank you for what you all do every day. I don't think a day goes by where I'm not reading something from Yuani (ph), from Isis, from Belfour (ph), many days, from all three. So, thank you.

I've said before you highlighted here, the joint plan of action is an agreement fraught with dangers. Some Ali (ph), as you said, is some known, some unknown. But I thought that the point was well-taken that the real test of these negotiations is not the joint plan of action, but the final

comprehensive agreement, in my words, ending Iran's nuclear ambitions and rolling back and dismantling their nuclear programs, and that's what we have to work towards.

I -- I consider the joint plan of action as necessary that it not be allowed, as you have all said, to extend beyond its parameters: ideally six months, at the longest, 12 months.

We must block and then close any and all pathways for Iran to get a nuclear weapon. Not just plutonium pathway at the Arak (ph) reactor, I believe uranium enrichment, both in centrifuges, and in laser, and as Mr. Engleman (ph) said, we must address the military aspects.

What you said in your testimony, "a comprehensive deal can only be reached if uncertainties over Iran's military nuclear capability are addressed. I think that's crucial.

Mr. Albright, you've wrapped up your written testimony, and I think it's worth restating, "An adequate, comprehensive solution will depend on the United States and its allies now making clear to Iran what is required of it, and this is indeed a pivotal moment."

I guess this is where I come in. My question to you all is, as we talk about passing a resolution in the House, extending what we passed in last summer on the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act, I am worried that if six months, 12 months, we're not quite there, the question will be, the argument will be don't do more sanctions now because we're close.

I'm worried that 12 months from now, if we're almost there but not quite, the argument's going to be "We must wait now."

I'm further worried that as we sit here today, if we can clearly and transparently indicate to the Iranians not just what's expected, but that the sanctions that will follow a failure of these negotiations will be orders of magnitude greater than what they faced when that brought them to the table back in November. That that makes it easier to stay on this path to peacefully ending their nuclear ambitions.

I guess my question to the panel, and Mr. Albright, I'll start with you, is "If the administration, if the Congress passes a resolution, the House, that says, 'This is what we intend to do if we can't go down this path, but we want to stay on the path that will peacefully end in a comprehensive solution,' why is that not a good strategy?"

ALBRIGHT: I personally think it is. I think it's important to lay out the criteria that the agreement should reach or should ascribe to. That in a sense, minimum conditions need to be laid out. I think it would be very useful. I think it would certainly clarify things to Iran.

It would also make sure that the administration understands what the minimum conditions are, because again, in the heat of the moment, there's tendencies to make compromises. So I think it -- I think Congress has a very important role and hope that it can -- can work out to lay down basic conditions the agreement should reach.

And I think the Senate started that in -- in -- in the recent legislation introduced, and that can be extended. I hope -- I hope it is done, because Iran is certainly doing it. I mean, it's doing it privately inside Iran, I'm sure, and it's doing it publicly.

SCHNEIDER: Ambassador Wallace?

WALLACE: Remember what we're talking about here. We're saying, "We're not going to do business with you. We're going to close our pocketbook." We're not invading them. We're just simply saying, "We don't like your policy, we're going to close our pocketbook."

Somehow that's being turned into war-mongering. Somehow that's in debate. I don't know about you all, but if somebody does something that I don't like, I don't want to do business with them. We shouldn't do business with Iran. That's what we're debating here. Is that so controversial? We cannot allow partisanship to enter this debate and say that we're somehow war-mongering because we don't want to open our pocket-book.

SCHNEIDER: Mr. Heinonen?

HEINONEN: Actually, I agree with the both of these gentleman say, but in a somewhat different way, if I may say so.

First of all, I think it's important to put the red lines (ph) there and say what the United States of America want from Arak (ph), because Iran says at the same time, not one centrifuge will be dismantled, we will keep building our reactor. So it's important for the discussion.

But having said that --

ROS-LEHTINEN: Having said that, I'm going to interrupt yet again, I'm rather disciplined with the time because we're going to be voting and then members won't have the time.

Thank you sir. Mr. DeSantis, my Florida colleague.

DESANTIS: Ambassador Wallace, I appreciate that lost comment. I mean, when I'm hearing these things, when people say that I was trying to move forward with sanctions is tantamount to us saying that we need to invade Iran, to me, is just not acceptable.

The president said not too long ago that he thought the chance of a deal actually succeeding was about 50-50. To me, I was really alarmed by that. I mean, here's the guy who's supposed to believe in what they're doing, and he still thinks it's likely, or essentially a coin toss.

It just seems to me that understanding the nature of this regime, we may never be able to actually have an agreement that works, just given who they are. But why would you go easy on sanctions? Seems to me, the way would be to apply more pressure on them, show them that we're serious about this, and maybe they would be able to reevaluate whether it's actually in their interest.

So I mentioned earlier but -- but some of these military sites like Parchine (ph), you know Ambassador Wallace, is that -- it doesn't seem to me that we would be able to really monitor what goes on there.

WALLACE: You're right. Absent cooperation, we wouldn't be able to. I want to give some of my time to Ali (ph) because he was cut off a couple times. But I was talking about sanctions previously and how wonderful, in a bipartisan way, this committee and other members of Congress have said what sanctions should be.

Now, I respectfully implore you all to say, "What are your red lines?" On enrichment, on the heavy water reactor, and alike. Ali (ph) was about to refer to that, I think, in his -- in his testimony.

But I've rarely, and it I've had the privilege of testifying before you all many times. I've never asked something of you like this. But please, each one of you should go on the record with the president, the future president, as to what your red lines are. That's important that Congress speak with a unified voice. I beg you to do that. I defer to Olli. Olli?

HEINONEN: Thank you. What I wanted to say that it's not only about the United States of America. It's also about the unity of the international community. And more needs to be invested to P5-plus- one, get the Russians and Chinese fully behind because without them the sanctions will not be (inaudible).

DESANTIS: So in terms of -- I think that's true in terms of what our red lines are. It seemed to me that the United Nations had always said that Iran wasn't going to be able to enrich. And now it's like well you know, you can enrich -- so I think the red line for Congress should be no enrichment.

I think that's the only way that we can have a somewhat degree of certainty that this is something that we can prevent from happening in terms of them having a nuclear weapon.

One thing that's odd about this whole agreement and these negotiations is nobody's talking about, within the context of this, terrorism and Iran's role in international terrorism. And I worry. They're a leading state sponsor of terrorism. They've committed terrorist acts against the United States, going back from the embassy takeover to

Beirut, which they were involved in. They were attacking our service members in Iraq with EFPs.

So, how could it be that we're just kind of just acting like that, the terrorism aspect doesn't exist? This seems to me to be a very serious shortcoming for this agreement. Does anyone want to weigh in on that?

(UNKNOWN): Let me just say I think -- I've worked on many agreements. I mean typically the nuclear is roped off. I mean that's in the tradition. But it doesn't mean the terrorism issue can be let lie unsettled. And I think Congress is going to have to face, in reviewing the lifting of sanctions, it'll have to review that condition. My understanding is that's part of the law.

So I think the administration eventually is going to have to answer how it's going to deal with that. But traditionally these nuclear deals are not -- are done in -- I don't want to say in isolation, but done as cutouts in a sense. And it would be up to, in a sense, oversight to decide whether that is enough to remove sanctions.

DESANTIS: I just wonder whether that model is applicable to a regime like this as it would've been maybe to some of these other nuclear powers. And of course we have had negotiations with countries like North Korea that have ended up backfiring on us.

So I appreciate that. But I still have a lot of concerns.

So, Mr. Jones, what would you recommend when you say hey, the cat's out of the bag? So what should we be doing in Congress if we're somebody who is concerned about this regime who is possessing nuclear weapons? You seem to think that we're not going to be able to prevent that at this point. So what should our response in Congress be?

JONES: I'm not sure either than to look at the problem more broadly. I mean so look down the road to prevent further Irans. We've had a string of failures, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran. We're looking at possibly now Saudi Arabia. Even Turkey's suddenly shown interest.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you, Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Desantis.

And Mr. Vargas?

VARGAS: Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and again thank you for holding this hearing. I appreciate and thank you to the witnesses.

I'm usually a rather optimistic person, but I'm not optimistic at all. And I continue to think that this interim deal was a mistake. In fact, I think it was a terrible mistake. And I hope that I'm wrong, but I continue to think it was a mistake.

I think we're naive in these negotiations. I think that this notion that these are just a tiny easing of the sanctions I think is wrongheaded. In fact, just the opposite, I think that this easing of the sanction is in fact going to allow their economy to blossom and to take off. I think it's a terrible mistake.

And I think it's going to be very hard, I think, afterwards to try to put the genie back in the bottle, to get these sanctions going once again. And another thing that I'm very fearful of, I think the six months is going to turn into a year and then they're going to ask for more time, and aren't we close? And it's going to continue to slide and to be more and more problematic.

And in fact I think all we have to do is really listen to the Iranians themselves and what they're saying. I mean Iran's leaders recently made it very clear that they have no intention of coming into compliance with the international obligations in the nuclear arena. I don't think they have any intention.

In fact, I'd like to read a transcript very quickly here from Fareed Zakaria, who's the host of CNN, and Rouhani. "Iran will absolutely retain its enrichment." That's what Fareed asked. "Because it is our --" and this is Rouhani responding, "It is our national pride and nuclear technology has become indigenous. And recently we have managed to secure

very considerable prowess with regards to the fabrication of centrifuges. We will not accept any limitations."

So, Zakaria asked him again, "so there will be no destruction of centrifuges or existing..."? Rouhani, "No, not at all."

I think they've made it very clear where they want to go with this. Interestingly they say it's not for -- it goes on -- they ask him later if it's for a nuclear weapon. He says no, no of course not.

He says, "and to know that when from a religious point of view, religious leaders, to be more specific the great and eminent leader of the revolution, announces and states that the fabrication and the stockpile of nuclear weapons is haram, religiously forbidden, this should tell you that we don't want to build a bomb."

And yet everything they've done is to build a bomb, everything they've done.

Does anyone disagree with that? Does anyone believe that what they've been doing so far has been in fact for peaceful purposes? Does anyone there? Nobody? Yes, sir?

(UNKNOWN): Can I add just one thing to -- because that interview was very important. And one thing that didn't get quite explicated is that Rouhani also said that he wants 20,000 megawatts of nuclear power and for Iran to provide the fuel for this.

Well, I did some quick math. That's like a million or two million centrifuges, not 19,000. So that gives you an idea of what the Iranian view of this is. Thank you.

VARGAS: No, thank you. And I appreciate that. And I do think that unfortunately that we eased up on sanctions right when they were starting to work. Because I do think that we should've put the real question to them, do you want an economy or do you want a nuclear weapons program?

And I think tightening down the sanction was the right way to go. And I think that it was finally working. And

easing up now is going to be just the opposite. It's going to be so much harder now to get things back on track.

I'd like to ask you, ambassador, about that. What do you think? And I know that you do this every day, but I'd like to hear you again on this.

WALLACE: Sure. I -- thank you. I prepared a quick chart for this. Congressman Deutsche and I talked about this.

But this shows sort of the oil production that is happening now on a daily basis in Iran, around 1.2 billion a day and presumably going up. This green line shows where it would go down to, which would be about 334,000 barrels a day, assuming a trending out over the course of the year.

The next time the administration says it's truly only \$6 billion, \$7 billion of sanctions relief, ask them this question, \$27 billion alone just on oil sales, not even getting to the Iranian auto industry and other sectors. I think this is a very powerful indication of what the sanctions relief is all about.

VARGAS: Anyone else like to comment on that? Because I guess my point would be it's not so much the \$6 billion. I think it's more than that.

An economy looks at confidence. You know is there confidence in the economy to take off? And I think that's the problem here that all of a sudden the world has confidence that these sanctions are going to be lifted. That's why their economy's taking off. It's going to be very hard to impose sanctions once again.

Yes, sir?

(UNKNOWN): Yes. I think it -- maybe I'm by nature an optimist, but the thing to me that seems imminent or urgent to do is to send a signal that the sanctions are going to be fully enforced and that they're going to be strengthened. If time...

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you very much. And I'm going to be a disciplinarian. We're going to cut it down to four minutes so

that we can all get our questions in. And I apologize...

VARGAS: Can you cut it down on the next person?

ROS-LEHTINEN: Mr. Weber's next...

VARGAS: Can you cut it down on the next person, Madam Chair?

ROS-LEHTINEN: Yes, of course we can. Thank you. Go ahead.

VARGAS: All right. Do any of you all on the panel Nov. 4, 1979 ring a bell? That's the day that they took hostages, Iran did, at our U.S. embassy.

Do you know how long they held them for? Four-hundred forty-four days, which now -- so, Nov. 4 will be the 35th anniversary of that hostage taking. They've been exporting terrorism for almost 35 years.

I'm going to follow-up on what Adam Kinzinger said when he said what is the U.S. getting for this? They've been exporting hostages for -- I mean they've been exporting terrorism forever and what are we getting out of this? We're getting told that, as Mr. Wallace said, that we're somehow warmongers because we want to strengthen those sanctions because we want to make them come to the table, negotiate and they're about to do that.

So you all work with me here. Any of you will think 35 years is a long time? Simple yes or no question.

(UNKNOWN): That's the easiest one I've had in a long time. That's a long time.

VARGAS: You all agree that -- is 444 days a long time?

(UNKNOWN): If you're a hostage, yes.

VARGAS: It is a long time, isn't it?

We -- now do you agree with Brad Sherman's comments that the first three-quarters of this "game," quote-unquote, we've

been missing in action; that we're down to the goal line stands. Do you all agree with that?

I'm getting a "no" from Albright. I'm getting two over here, and the guy in the green is just kind of contemplating that.

(LAUGHTER)

He's not admitting to nothing.

But here's the point. If we continue to hold them sanctions -- under sanctions for 444 days, we haven't taken their hostages. We haven't had an act of violence take them -- take them by violence. So if we make them toe that line, then we can't be accused of being violent or being oppressive. By their own words, they want to wipe America and Israel off the face of the map.

Now, have we threatened to wipe Iran off the face of the map? Anybody? Have we threatened to wipe Israel?

Mr. Albright, you lived in Israel. Do you have any family living there now?

ISRAEL: No.

WEBER: OK.

Mr. Wallace, you said 100 percent cooperation was needed, and we would know that pretty quick if we're not going to get that in verification. Should we give them 444 days?

WALLACE: I'm very skeptical. They haven't shown any indication they want to cooperate and there's no verification, which is not cooperation.

WEBER: Mr. Albright, you said we ought to lay out minimum conditions earlier in the negotiations. And the guy in the green -- I can't pronounce your name -- you said we ought to have a red line. We're not real -- we don't have a real good track record on red lines right now.

Would you be in favor of military action if they -- if those red lines are passed? Would that be one of the conditions, Mr. Albright?

ALBRIGHT: For the red lines on the comprehensive solution? No, no, of course not. The red line that has been articulated by President Obama is that if they -- they'll be prevented from getting a nuclear weapon.

WEBER: Yeah, well since they saw us bomb Syria with President Obama's red line, they know how serious we are.

ALBRIGHT: Well, the red line -- the threat of military strikes has to be credible and the U.S. is going to have to reestablish that credibility if it wants to deal with Iran.

WEBER: Yeah, well, we don't have a lot of credibility with the threat of red lines. I'm just...

(CROSSTALK)

ALBRIGHT: Well, I'm not -- Syria is not Iran. I mean, Syria is different than Iran.

WEBER: Well, I understand that.

ALBRIGHT: I mean, it's -- we didn't have a lot of vested interests in the...

(CROSSTALK)

WEBER: Mr. Schneider, I'm going to follow up on what he said. In 12 months, we don't want them coming back and saying, "Look, we're almost there; no more sanctions." Do any of you all think that Iran is going to be serious and that we have 12 months? Or are we going to have two bombs, four bombs in 12 months?

Would you want to go over and live in Israel, Mr. Albright, right now?

ALBRIGHT: I -- I would. And...

WEBER: OK.

ALBRIGHT: ... I don't think that...

WEBER: Well, we're going to miss you.

(LAUGHTER)

The guy in the green. Would you live over there? Anybody else?

ROS-LEHTINEN: And we are done. Thank you so much. You had the full five minutes.

And Ms. Frankel is recognized. Thank you.

FRANKEL: Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you so much for bringing this diverse panel. And really, this is very complicated, at least it is to me. Some of these other folks see it more simple, but I -- I think we all -- we all agree that Iran should not be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon. Although, Mr. Jones, you think they already have one.

OK. So, you agree they shouldn't have been allowed, but that's too late.

The three of you, the rest of you think they don't have a nuclear weapon or you're not sure. You think they do not?

WALLACE: They do not, but they have the capability within two or three months of breaking out with the ability to have a nuclear weapon.

FRANKEL: OK. And I think everybody here pretty much agrees that the interim agreement should not be the long-term agreement. Right?

WALLACE: Absolutely.

FRANKEL: Right. But logic does tell me that, you know, in a give-and-take situation, Iran would eventually want all the sanctions relieved. Is that right?

WALLACE: I think they already have that.

FRANKEL: So you think they have all -- OK.

WALLACE: I think that their sanctions relief is far greater than what meets the eye. Their economy is booming right now, coming back very strongly. Certainly, we could lift other sanctions, but we have to send a message that more sanctions are coming to stop that growth in the Iranian economy. That's a key thing that this committee can participate in.

FRANKEL: OK. So, but do they expect for the relief, if they -- in other words, we would expect them to go further, give up something further than what's in the interim agreement in order to get further relief.

JONES (?): Well, remember the current agreement says that when we finally get done, there's not going to be any restrictions on Iran at all. They're going to be treated like any other non-nuclear weapon party to the MPT. That means they're scot-free at that point.

ALBRIGHT: Well, not exactly. I mean, I would expect embargoes on military goods. I mean, there would be counter-proliferation sanctions. And again, we're talking, if this works, as the administration has outlined, we're talking a deal that's extremely restrictive of its nuclear program and the conditions last 20 years.

They've dealt with IAEA concerns. Their weaponization or past weaponization infrastructure is under verification. They have shown cooperation. So I think it's -- when the sanctions would come off, Iran would have had to have met many, many conditions. And so it's not at all like the interim deal.

FRANKEL: Mr. Jones, do you rule out -- or do you advocate any kind of military action?

JONES: No, I think I -- I think it would take a full-scale war with Iran and I don't see that the U.S. is in any position to embark on such a war at this point. Which is why I think there's nothing we can do. I mean, if we could take military action, then Iran wouldn't have nuclear weapons or wouldn't have them for long.

FRANKEL: OK. So it's very easy to be the -- it's easier to be the Monday morning quarterback. So let me just -- it is what it is right now. Could you each -- my last question is: What do you recommend we do next, given the situation?

WALLACE: Six months from the adoption of the interim agreement, this Congress should make clear that Iran will face the most robust sanctions in history and its oil sales will go down to nearly zero. Its auto industry will not be able to function and their economy will cease to exist. That's the message that the committee must send in order for Iran to dial back its nuclear program, which is a requirement, in my opinion, for a final deal.

JONES: Well, I don't believe the sanctions are going to be nearly that effective. The Russians have already said they're going to negotiate a barter arrangement to launder Iranian oil. I think the Iranians have options. The Indians have helped them as well, so have the Chinese. I'm not optimistic.

ALBRIGHT: Yeah, I think it's important to articulate what a comprehensive solution should look like. If you want zero enrichment, articulate it. If you want, you know...

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so very much. I appreciate it.

Mr. Cook?

COOK: Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ambassador Wallace, I really appreciated what you said about sanctions. I actually believe in them, too. There's always variables that are associated with them. You know, my background -- I was in the military for quite a while, 26 years, and we always had the NATO scenario. This is back in the Cold War time and, you know, the threat was always the Soviet Union for nuclear war.

And after the wall came down, we've never had those similar scenarios. And now, it's kind of changed completely with what is going on with North Korea and, obviously, Iran. In your opinion, how close, in your opinion, anyone, do you think that Iran would -- I think we all agree that they are

going to get the bomb and many of them. Would they use it or is it just a threat?

WALLACE: I think one of the greatest dangers of Iran going nuclear are the incredible sectarian tensions that are plaguing that region right now and the fact that we'll have a nuclear arms race in the region, will take the most volatile region in the world and we will make it more volatile and nuclear-volatile.

And if it were me as a leader, if I were a leader of one of those countries, the ayatollah and others have said that they could conceivably use these sets of weapons before. I think you have to take them at their word. And I think that you have to take the threat seriously.

COOK: Before you answer any more, the reaction of other countries -- let's just go with the scenario that they have the nuclear bomb. We're talking about Saudi Arabia, some of the other Arab states -- Arab, you know, Persian, Iranian, the animosity between them.

Do you foresee many other countries that would be very eager to do exactly what Iran did just because of what happened? And any suggestions on what countries would acquire the bomb in that region?

WALLACE: I think it's very clear that other countries in the region are, again, playing along the sectarian lines, would seek to go nuclear. It might take them a little bit of time.

COOK: Which ones?

WALLACE: Saudi Arabia.

COOK: Anyone else?

WALLACE: I think the Emirates. I think Turkey, Egypt -- a variety of countries in the region.

COOK: So, as many as perhaps six?

WALLACE: All of them.

COOK: OK.

Does the panel share that opinion?

JONES: I'm not sure I'd go quite so high, but I'd also point outside the region. I mean, with North Korea and if the general regime starts to collapse I think we could be talking about South Korea, Japan. I mean, I think this problem is broader than the Middle East.

(UNKNOWN): And then the possibility use of a nuclear attack from a mathematical standpoint if you do the math which is very, very scary there would be some kind of event as opposed to the one with the Cold War, what was limited to just a few powers.

JONES: Well, certainly I'm already frankly quite concerned about Pakistan. I mean, they're -- it looks like at various points Pakistan might just dissolve or break into some sort of Islamist sectarian fight. And who knows who would wind up with the weapon. The same thing with North Korea.

(UNKNOWN): Well, thank you.

I -- I just wanted to....

(UNKNOWN): I think it shows why it is so important for Iran from getting nuclear weapons.

(UNKNOWN): And I agree with you. And I just -- you know, trust and verify and going down this road it just shows how naive we are and the consequences are enormous. And I hope this body here, which seems to be one of the few will continue to fight for that action.

Thank you, Madam Chair, I yield.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you very much. And although votes have started we have two more members who are going to ask questions so we are fine with the time. I didn't cut anyone off.

Mr. Connelly is recognized.

CONNELLY: Thank you Madam Chairman and welcome to the panel.

My colleague just referred to naivete. I'm not what he was referring to. To support an interim agreement that is supported by a number of the players -- main players trying to get Iran to desist might be wisdom rather than naivete. We don't know yet.

Mr. Heinonen, were you involved at IAEA in any of the negotiations with Iran or discussions with Iran or verification experiences with Iran?

HEINONEN: Yes, I was indeed. Visited number of times. Might be 20, 30, times.

CONNELLY: Is it your impression based on that experience that Iran is hell bent on getting nuclear weapons and that an interim agreement such as the one successfully negotiated is merely a stalling tactic until they reach their ultimate goal?

HEINONEN: I think there is one more scenario here, and this is that Iran boasts its enrichment capability to such a level that it is not in breaking its safe (inaudible) application, but may not be in the spirit of the NPT. And this will be the most difficult situation for the international community to handle.

CONNELLY: Were you surprised based on your knowledge and experience in Iran that they agreed to this interim agreement?

HEINONEN: No, I was not, surprised because I have seen following this parcel small deal more step at time agreeing on something then back off and agree again. So this is in the pattern, but now I need to break the pattern. And this is where (inaudible) and the resolutions and (inaudible) mind comes to the picture.

CONNELLY: Ambassador Wallace, you talked about the complete shut down of their economy. One wonders whether

that's possibly, but certainly their economy has hurt based on fairly -- about as common -- I mean, I'm old enough to remember sanctions going way back on all kinds of countries and -- with a spotty record. I mean, sometimes sanctions work pretty well. Sometimes they don't.

And it's -- it's not clear to me that they are always an efficacious tool of foreign policy. But, they certainly are a tool available to us. And, in this case, it looks like it has had a desired effect. I assume that your concern is that with the best of intentions with an interim agreement that we take our foot off that pedal a little bit and ease back on sanctions if not the United States, others and that, that obviously would be a counter-productive development until we see their performance in this agreement and their willingness to now finalize an agreement six month hence.

WALLACE: I think that's right, Congressman.

My concern is not just our foot off the gas, though. But I think we really dialed back the sanctions regime and their economy is flourishing. We measure their currency. We measure their inflation. We measure their stock market, and it is booming. And I'm concerned that the very little concessions that we got no real roll back was met with the dramatic roll back of the economic pressure so they had a economic boom to their economy.

And, my (sic) think my concern is -- and I'm certainly being effusive, you can't shut down their economy -- we could certainly get their oil sales down to few hundred thousand barrels and we should try.

CONNELLY: But -- but, until very recently all the reports I saw were that they having trouble moving their oil in international markets.

WALLACE: The low point was about 761,000 barrels a day. Right now it's already gone up to 1.2 million barrels a day, and even higher.

CONNELLY: Is that -- excuse me for interrupting -- but is that because of something of the carve outs in the agreement? For India for example and some others?

WALLACE: It has been -- actually if the carve outs were kept in place, the reduction of oil sales would go down to about 334,000 barrels. Right now we are on a trajectory of between 1.2 million plus over the course of this year. That was in anticipation of the agreement and the agreement itself So you've seen a huge economic windfall for the Iranians.

CONNELLY: My time is us. Thank you Madam Chairman.

Thank you.

ROS-LEHTINEN: OK, an ex Senate staff (inaudible) you forgot...

(UNKNOWN): it's it is not something I bring attention to, but...

(LAUGHTER)

ROS-LEHTINEN: Inside joke here.

And to wrap up, Mr. Collins expecting big things from you.

COLLINS: Well, we're toward the end here, and we'll get to it. Thank you Madam Chair.

Look, I think the inching comments right there in that last conversation was that Iran would take a little then back up, take a little back up. And then Mr. Wallace just put it -- pointed out, they're (sic) now took a little and no their economy is doing well, it's ever more incentive just to back up and say, well we can't get there right now can we get a little more time, can we?

And I think that is the concern that most of us have here is the sense of -- as has been said earlier, and I'm not going to rehash it, because I've got more specific questions -- is when you look at it, we, frankly, did not get anything from this.

They got what they were looking for and I think the only reason we got to the place to start with was the sanctions

were having an affect. So we'll have to look at it from a different perspective.

I want to get a little more technical. Anyone can answer this question.

Three basic steps needed to produce a nuclear weapon, you know, a (inaudible) fissile material, sufficient quantity and quality for the nuclear device, you have to have a weaponized survival nuclear warhead and produce an effective means for delivering the weapon.

So I have a question, what is known of Iran's development of a delivery method for a nuclear warhead and what type of delivery mechanism would be needed to target Israel or the U.S.?

ALBRIGHT: Their ballistic missile capability is pretty robust. I mean, what is not known, do they have the ability to put a warhead on that ballistic missile and there is divisions whether they can actually do that. Eventually they would be able to if they went down that route.

Can I say though, I don't think we got nothing for this deal. I mean, I don't want to get into a debate. I'm sure you did last week with the administration, but we did get something.

And so I think that has to be acknowledged.

COLLINS: Messed over I think would be a good...

ALBRIGHT: No, no I think progress was stopped. Freezes were something if -- and so I think there were benefits to this deal. And we can argue the value in terms of sanctions. And I think we're all worried about the sanctions slipping more than the administration intended.

COLLINS: No, actually I'm not worried as much about a sanction. I'm worried about a nuclear Iran. I think we can have a disagreement and I would happy concede your point and my point.

But, I think one of the things that is concerned here is

if we're looking toward this let's look at the overall of -- of the pattern of what is developed. You have an opinion that it worked. I have an opinion that it doesn't.

And I think the concern is, is a nuclear (inaudible) it has this capability here, which I'm concerned about from the actual projection and actual use of the material to actually provide a warhead that actually can be used against Israel and actually be used the United States.

That is my question.

And my question -- next question was, if targeted with a nuclear warhead, what deterrent if any does Israel have?

ALBRIGHT: Israel's in a bad situation. I mean, it's -- it's a nation that one or two nuclear weapons -- if they had sufficient yield -- can almost end it's existence. So I mean, for Israel it truly is an existential threat, and I think it would argue that we have to work harder together to keep Iran from getting nuclear weapons.

COLLINS: You would have to agree -- and from your (inaudible) anybody wants to -- it is not just a threat to Israel it is a threat to us. We have assets in that region that we can't overlook. This is a -- this is -- we think about Israel and I -- and other members of this committee have worked very hard on our partnership with Israel and helping Israel, but we also have to look at it -- we can't just neglect ourselves from this. We have assets. I served in Iraq. We still got military people there.

This is something we can't do -- take apart (ph).

WALLACE: Congressman, you're right. And as -- since you -- as you know, you served in Iraq. Most of the various (ph) casualties that occurred in Iraq were as a result of Iranian meddling.

Right now, nothing -- one big absence in this hearing was Iran's role in Syria.

Many, many, if not all -- a vast majority of casualties that are occurring are occurring as a result of Iranian

largess (ph) arms and money. So we haven't even touched on that part of the Iranian -- I don't think we mentioned Syria one time in terms of Iran's support of Syria in this hearing.

COLLINS: Well, in the -- and how much they got out of this deal; you're talking about who lost? I think that's an issue that does need to be discussed and the amount of money they have now that they could funnel into Syria.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you, Mr. Collins. But now, the Florida contingent...

COLLINS: Ted (ph) Yoho (ph).

ROS-LEHTINEN: Is really the best.

Dr. Yoho? You're up (ph).

COLLINS (?): (Inaudible).

(LAUGHTER)

YOHO: Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate that. I appreciate you guys' patience.

Mr. Jones, you said I feel Iran will get nuclear weapons. And that's something we've -- I've talked about before on these panels.

In fact, we had Senator -- or Ambassador Bolton here and he said that we can't allow that to happen.

But yet, our sanction's been going on since pretty much 1979 at different levels, you know?

They started off, you know, more mild -- you know, we froze some bank accounts. And now, we've gone all the way to where we prevented oil from being sold out of that country.

And we've put these sanctions in place since 1979 -- yet, from what I'm hearing from the four of you is within a year -- I think, if I understood this right -- they're going to have five to six nuclear weapons, despite our sanctions.

So, my question is the sanctions, you know, I know they are well-intended and -- but they don't seem to have worked. So, what else can we do?

And Mr. Albright, you -- you brought up that we need to work together -- and I assume with our allies -- to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.

Number one, Mr. Jones, I asked you -- do you feel like they're going to have these weapons regardless?

JONES: I feel like regardless but not in necessarily in the near term. We should think of, like, Pakistan that developed these weapons in the late 80s, but it wasn't until 1998 that they actually tested.

I mean, most of these countries take a long view. I think Washington tends to be sort of too myopic on some of this material.

Also, just on the sanctions, I like to point out -- as Ambassador Wallace has said -- sanctions have certainly hurt Iran, but Iran hasn't stopped.

And to me, that flips around the other way. It shows how -- how interested and how determined the Iranians are to move forward and not give up.

YOHO: Well, then, if you go back and watch -- over the last 25, 30 years, there's been that cat and mouse game where they're building them, no they're not, yes they are -- you know, and we always proved that yes they are enriching.

And they -- I mean, if you look over the last 10 years, they've gone from a few centrifuges to over 19,000.

Mr. Albright, what -- you were talking about how do we prevent this. I mean, what is your idea of preventing them from getting a nuclear weapon? But how do you do that?

ALBRIGHT: (OFF-MIKE)

Thank you, Holly (ph).

What the primary -- or the priority now is to make sure that -- that Iran is -- is tested on whether it's going to accept very serious limitations on its nuclear program and -- and accept verification requirements that'll allow an adequate job to be done at -- so that early detection is guaranteed and there's time for a response.

So, I think it's -- that's -- that's what need to be done now -- and there's a clock ticking that it -- this can't be extended (ph). That the...

YOHO: See, I see that clock ticking since 1979. We've been working to prevent that.

But, you know, I just heard you guys say there was four to five bombs possibly advocate (ph) -- they all have the capacity to build within a year.

And so, we can watch them for another six months, another six years -- my feeling, like Mr. Jones said, is they are going to get one...

ALBRIGHT: Yeah.

YOHO: And what I'd like to focus on -- what do we do looking forward and how are we going to deal with it?

ALBRIGHT: Well, one is -- I think we don't have to worry as much now about them getting four to five bombs in the next year because of this Joint Plan of Action -- that it -- that it did buy time. That it (inaudible)...

YOHO: But earlier on today, you just said -- you know, it was going to be four -- about a year and they would have four to five bombs, is what I understood.

ALBRIGHT: That's if they went to do it. I mean, it was a theoretical question -- if they went to do it.

I think the Joint Plan of Action has bought us time where I don't think they're going to try to do it in the next six months or year, if it is extended.

So, I think we -- that's an advantage of this -- of this

deal.

YOHO: What can we do, if we look have retrospectively, on sanctions? How can we handle this differently in the future going forward, other than sanctions?

I mean, I think that diplomacy is the big thing we need to do. And I also think we need to prepare -- like you said, Pakistan went ahead and developed bombs. India's has them. North Korea has them.

I think we need to have a different policy in place for when they do get one. How are we going to handle that?

And Mr. Heinonen?

HEINONEN: I think that the focus needs to be moved somewhere else, and particularly for this so-called military (ph) dimension (ph).

If we all -- that I put all the effort on the (inaudible) program only, it's like a chain where you try to improve the strength of a chain by improving one ring. But the rest of the rings, you leave, so whenever -- the chain will be then strong.

So, there's -- there's a need for refocus and go (ph) really (ph) to that part -- find what is there, what was going on and then this multi -- single-use and multi-use capabilities.

ALBRIGHT: I agree with that. I mean, it's really -- the ultimate test -- are they going to come clean about nuclear weapons?

And if they didn't work on nuclear weapons, are they going to provide the information to -- to convince people that that's the case? And that should be tested quickly.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you, (inaudible).

YOHO: Madam Chair, I'll...

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you.

YOHO: Thank you.

Thank you, guys. I appreciate your time.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Mr. Heinonen, I finally let you finish an answer.

(LAUGHTER)

ROS-LEHTINEN: Not bad -- one out of 25.

Thank you so much, panelists for excellent testimony.

Thank you to all the members for wonderful questions -- and thank you for the audience and the press for covering this.

And with that, our subcommittees are adjourned and zero seconds to get to the floor -- no problem.

END

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